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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
1.1) Background to Study  
 
1.1.1) Emerging Powers from the Global South  
 
The growth in economic prowess and political influence of emerging market nations in the 
global arena is a ubiquitous trend in international relations. With its origins in the non aligned 
movement (NAM), the characteristics of developing counties’ participation has evolved and 
increased in momentum over the decades since the 1955 NAM Bandung conference which 
asserted the independence of developing countries, distinguishing their interests from being 
proxies of more dominant developed states in the cold war context at the time. In the period 
thereafter, the developing world has changed and evolved in character and composition, now 
conventionally termed as the “global south”.  
 
Several developing countries have since become drivers of international economic growth 
coupled with increasing participation in international institutions. The forerunners or the 
“emerging powers group” by popular discourse usually includes Brazil, India, China, Russia, and 
sometimes is applied more broadly to include South Africa and Mexico. These leaders of the 
developing world are mostly identified by their impressive economic growth trajectories, not 
only in international production and trade but in the direction of capital flows as well. 
Additionally these countries are simultaneously and gradually reshaping international politics, 
they are considered the political and economic centers of gravity in their respective regions with 
similar strongly held aspirations to play a global role. Therefore the rise of these emerging 
market countries represent by default a shift in the global distribution of power.1    
 
The grouping of Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC) was first coined in 2001 by Goldman 
Sachs for investors to identify the world’s fastest growing emerging market economies, the 
expected projection of their combined economies is estimated to surpass the United States by 
2018 and the overall combined economies of the richest states in the world by 2050.2 These four 
countries have since become an informal group at summit level, with the first official BRIC 
                                               
1 Brookings Institution, Rise of New Powers, Top 10 Global Economic Challenges, Brookings Global Economy and 
Development, February 2007. P12  
2 Wilson, D, et al, “Is This The BRICs Decade? ”, BRICs Monthly, Goldman Sachs Global Economics, 
Commodities and Strategy Research, Iss. 10/03, May 2010.  
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meeting in 2009 in Russia. In December 2010 South Africa, at the invitation of China was asked 
to join the group, changing the acronym to BRICS; resulting in a five country grouping of 
emerging markets spanning across the continents of Asia, Africa, Latin America and Europe.  
 
It is important to distinguish between the terms “market BRIC” and the “political BRICS”. The 
former was an acronym coined by the private sector to identify the best and fastest growing 
emerging market economies for investment; the latter was formed by the leaders of member 
states as an informal country grouping based on the likeness of their economies, similarities as 
well as intent on forming international agenda and increasing economic ties. Thus this thesis will 
be referring to ‘political BRICS’, the five country grouping and their interactions thereof in the 
global arena. The BRICS informal grouping originated with economic focus but has since shifted 
to broader topical issues including but not limited to reform of international institutions.  
      
1.1.2) The Triangle: China- South Africa- BRICS  
 
Concurrent and integrated with the dynamics of emerging powers is China’s rise and consequent 
engagement with Africa. There is no doubt that the honed and fluid development of relations 
between China and South Africa has assisted South Africa’s ascension into the BRIC group. 
Since 1998 the China-South Africa relationship has grown and emerged to play a unique and 
dynamic role in China’s relations with the African continent and in a broader sense also 
contributes as a facet to the greater growing influence of developing countries as a whole.  
 
Economically South Africa provides China with an export destination, and is a source of raw 
materials much like the rest of Africa; however being a regional power it also presents China 
with the strategic opportunity to expand the outreach into Africa. China’s markets provide South 
Africa with a channel to diversify traditional north-south economic relations and draw 
investment from alternative sources. Beyond the economic opportunities there lies political 
strategy, South Africa views China as a key player in the global dialogue especially with regards 
to the shift towards global multipolarity in favor of the developing world. China as a prominent 
leader in the global south is a member of the G20, G77, holds veto rights and permanent seat of 
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the UN Security Council, all these political elements carry significance for South Africa.3 In 
international institutions both China and SA, much like many other emerging market economies, 
are pushing for greater leverage and influence for the developing world. 
 
China has become South Africa’s largest trading partner surpassing the US and EU, in 2009 
South Africa exported $4.4bn and imported $35.2bn.4 Just several months before South Africa 
was officially invited to join BRICS, president Zuma paid a state visit to China highlighting what 
has now being termed a upgrade from ‘strategic  partnership’ to ‘comprehensive strategic 
partnership’ between China and South Africa. 38 bilateral agreements were signed ranging from 
political dialogues, trade, investment, mineral exploration and agriculture to joint efforts in the 
global arena, such as in the United Nations and the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation.5 Zuma 
was accompanied by 13 cabinet ministers and 300 strong business delegation, making it the 
largest delegation to accompany him on a foreign tour. In a follow up meeting by vice President 
Xi, in South Africa, further agreements were signed on mining, energy, environment and 
transport sectors.6After the BRICS conference in Sanya, President Zuma was invited to stay for 
the Boao Forum for Asia, which is Asia’s equivalent of the World Economic Forum’s Davos 
meetings.   
 
Though in the past there have been elements of cooperation between these two countries in the 
UN and WTO, the emergence of BRICS has bought to the forefront a clearer and concise agenda 
set forth by the self proclaimed leaders of the global south and added a new dimension to 
relations between these two countries at both a bilateral and multilateral level. Much of this 
agenda, particularly cooperation between developing states in the UN and international financial 
institutions were tenets already existent in China-South African cooperation. As president Zuma 
stated in his address at the plenary session of BRICS in Hainan earlier on this year, “We are now 
equal co-architects of a new equitable international system.” Pointing out specifically that South 
                                               
3 Alves, C and Sidiropoulos, South Africa-China Relations: Getting Beyond the Cross Roads?, 
http://www.saiia.org.za/china-in-africa-project-opinion/south-africa-china-relations-getting-beyond-the-cross-
roads.html, 29 August 2010.    
4 Lapper,R, China Tops S Africa Trade League, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/16041848-ad11-11de-9caf-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz1S7xnELEt, 01 Oct 2009 
5 Fundira, T, South Africa-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership: Dining in the Dragon’s Lair? , 
http://www.tralac.org/cgi-bin/giga.cgi?cmd=cause_dir_news_item&cause_id=1694&news_id=93463&cat_id, Sep 
2010.  
6 China Consulate-Cape Town, China, South Africa upgrade relations to "comprehensive strategic partnership", 
http://capetown.china-consulate.org/eng/gdxw/t726883.htm.  
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Africa expects to benefit both economically and politically from this alliance, and 
acknowledging that South Africa and Africa’s future is linked to the economies of BRIC.7   
 
The Sanya Declaration drawn up at the BRICS conference in April 2011 is the most detailed and 
comprehensive statement released thus far covering the issues which the group of countries is 
most concerned with, amongst other points it called for the changing of governance structures of 
international financial organizations such as the IMF and the WTO, as well as calling for the 
need towards comprehensive reform particularly in the UN Security Council reaffirming the 
commitment to the UN as a forum for multilateral diplomacy as a tool for dealing with global 
challenges and threats.8  
     
However, South Africa’s ascension into BRICS has not been without apprehension. Experts have 
labeled the addition of SA to BRICS as an ‘unnatural fit’, considering the size and populations of 
all the other BRIC states. South Africa by far has the smallest economy and the smallest 
population of the group. As a small-medium economy South Africa lags behind in most 
indicators when compared to BRIC counterparts. The speculation however remains that despite 
good relations with India and Brazil, it was ultimately the leverage of China which assisted in the 
membership of BRICS. Therefore it can be assumed that currently South Africa’s participation in 
BRICS is to a certain degree implicitly reliant and intertwined to her bilateral relationship with 
China.    
 
All the BRICS states serve on the UN Security Council for the year 2011, with South Africa, 
Brazil and India as non permanent members and China and Russia as permanent members. 
BRICS countries also form a smaller grouping within the G20. If anything these dynamics 
provide a unique setting for these groups of countries to band together as a pressure group on 
topical issues in international institutions.  
 
                                               
7 South African Presidency, Address by President Jacob Zuma to the plenary of the third BRICS leaders meeting, 
Sanya, The Presidency, http://www.info.gov.za/speech/DynamicAction?pageid=461&sid=17783&tid=32020, 14 April 2011.   
8 The South Africa Presidency, Sanya Declaration on BRICS, DIRCO, 
http://www.info.gov.za/speech/DynamicAction?pageid=461&sid=17834&tid=32162, 15 April 2011  
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The addition of South Africa to BRICS means that there is a changing dimension of the grouping 
with the potential of leaning towards a more unified political voice for emerging markets, 
expanding beyond its usual focus of economic likeness between member states.  
 
Foreign Minister Mashabane has highlighted that SA joining BRICS is a part of a larger 
commitment to multilateralism and addressing balance on a global stage as well as enhancing 
south-south cooperation. In correlation with South Africa’s multilateral involvement in the India-
Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) grouping, the non-aligned movement and the G77 are 
complimentary components in emerging market based international relations strategy. 9 
Strategically it allows South Africa to align with the most power players of the global south, on a 
economic level it provides more access to investment and trade opportunities and on a political 
level BRICS countries, as highlighted in the Sanya Declaration, assist South Africa on 
international issues at the UN and WTO which are of specific concern to the country. 
  
Therefore BRICS remains a multilateral dialogue forum allowing for the formation of pressure 
groups in international institutions and on international issues. There is still a obvious sense that 
BRICS lacks formal unity and substantial structure.10However, it cannot be denied that goals 
formally and informally expressed through BRICS have a congruency with the goals of China-
South African engagement expressed in prior diplomatic exchanges and the ‘strategic partnership 
framework’.   Furthermore the BRICS grouping’s significance is its potential to change the 
global strategic landscape, thereby directly affecting the position of China and South Africa as 
well as their respective bilateral and multilateral engagements in the international arena.11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
9
Loc. Cit .  
10 Sidiropoulos, E, Perspectives from the BRICS: Lessons for South Africa,  SAIIA Report, March 2011.  
11 Field, S, China’s Emergence As a World Power: Implications for South Africa and Africa, in “China Through the 
Third Eye”, Institute for Global Dialogue, 2004.P.43.  
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1.1.3) Ascending Shareholders in a Multipolar Global Order  
 
States in the international system have long been divided into developed and developing. Where 
developed nations are seen to be largely led by the United States, whilst developing nations 
connote a relationship of dependency, and a status which is lesser in economic clout and political 
leverage than their developed counterparts. The formation of the BRICS grouping and the ever 
increasing economic and political strength of emerging market leader China are dramatically 
changing the landscape of this global distribution of power.      
 
Further highlighted in the Sanya declaration, the move towards a multipolar world is becoming 
ever more prominent. There are many factors which contribute towards the shift from western 
hegemony to a more balanced distribution of power: the global financial crisis weakening the 
economies of developed states, the rise of China and other emerging market states, the increasing 
international grouping of the global south via official and non-official alliance networks. The 
China-Africa engagement is one such network which dramatically changes the traditional aspects 
of Africa-developed world relations, and north-south relations thereof. China-South Africa 
relations within the framework of BRICS and broader China-Africa engagement is a unique 
dimension to a changing global order.  
 
This thesis proposes to examine China-South Africa relations in the context of BRICS, 
speculating that this relationship, termed as a ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ in diplomatic 
dialogue coupled with the agenda of BRICS. Cooperation between China and South Africa, in 
correlation with BRICS agenda at a multilateral level in international institutions and on 
international topical issues suggests that western developed states no longer have a monopolized 
domination of international agendas. Resulting in the ‘decentring of the North’, whereby 
developed states are no longer the sole voice in leading and developing international agenda in 
multilateral forms, nor are they the sole economic trade partner of many emerging market 
economies.   South-South interaction epitomized by China-South African relations on both an 
economic and political level and by the BRICS grouping, demonstrates that there is a changing 
distribution of power at the international level.  
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1.2) Rationale: 
  
In public discourse there is ever increasing acknowledgement of a change in the world system, 
there is greater awareness that traditional hegemonic roles played by Western developed states 
are beginning to erode. This shift is to the emerging economies of the global south, where states 
in the developing world have stronger leverage and greater influence in the international political 
system. 
 
BRICS is a young and ever evolving international grouping. Composed with all the major 
players of the global south from each region, its inception has exacerbated the discourse on the 
change to multipolarity in the international system. In correlation with this, there is also a 
significant amount of research produced on the rise of China, examining the causes of China’s 
growth trajectories and discussing its broad implications for the global community including but 
not limited to the upheaval of US hegemony and stronger ties with fellow developing states 
particularly in Africa. In the sphere of China-Africa relations there exists a plethora of literature, 
with much focus on examining various case studies of particular Africa states with relation to 
China and assessing trade, aid and diplomatic relations. To a lesser extent there is research on 
south-south cooperation with regards to the China-South Africa relationship, what needs to be 
noted is that though China has specific and prominent bilateral relations with various individual 
African states. South Africa is of special significance as there is greater strategic cooperation and 
negotiation on international issues, beyond the range of economic benefits and opportunities the 
relationship offers both countries a partner in multilateral forums to achieve common goals of 
increasing the voice of the global south, a characteristic which cannot be applied as aptly to any 
of the African countries in the conundrum of China-Africa relations.      
 
The addition of South Africa to form the BRICS grouping, has significant impact on the 
maturing and evolving of relations between China and South Africa. Due to this recent advent 
there is little coherent literature exploring this new dynamic of China-South Africa relations. The 
emergence of BRICS speaks to a greater complexity that is occurring in the international system, 
a heterogeneity that is spurred on by the rise of China and the increase of strategic alliances 
between prominent states in the global south.  
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This shift to a multipolar global system where the alliance or grouping for developing countries 
have greater say and a more coherent voice in setting global agendas symbolizes a change in 
world order and consequently a change in the ways in which state in the international system 
interact. 
 
BRICS in its infancy is not only a symbolic representation of the shift in global power but a 
propeller of reform as well. With the potential to facilitate economic development through the 
cooperation of emerging market economies of its member states. It is important to note that by 
definition BRICS is not considered an official coalition due to its current lack of formal structure, 
however the term coalition, alliance and grouping is used loosely and inter changeably to 
describe the BRICS unit.   
 
1.3) Research Question  
 
BRICS holds aspirations in influencing change in the international system; to what extent have 
they managed to assert cohesive action in this regard? And how has this affected South Africa in 
its relations with China?   
 
1.4) Aim:  
 
Examining BRICS desire to be an alternative to a western centric world, this study analyses the 
degree of cohesiveness this new grouping has exerted in refining its international agenda. And 
further interrogating the role and significance BRICS has on China-South Africa relations 
specifically applied to cooperation and issue lobbying in international forums and on 
international issues.  
 
The two emerging dynamics in the areas of economic and political strategic BRICS confluence 
were examined. The voting decisions and political stances shown on the UN Security Council is 
used as a microcosm in analyzing BRICS political and strategic convergence. Economic interests 
presented themselves in the form of maneuvering within the G20 and actions around prominent 
thematic issues such as currency, reform of international financial institutions and alternate 
channels for BRICS trade, economic and financial cooperation.  By carefully examining both the 
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rhetoric and actions of the BRICS groups since the official inclusion of all five members in April 
2011, with particular focus on South Africa and South Africa’s relationship with China in this 
context. The Sanya declaration along with various BRICS ministerial declarations and joint 
communiqués will be referred as they represent the official position of the group.  
 
1.5) Methodology  
 
This thesis will rely mainly on qualitative research, though quantitative data will be included to 
provide perspective on the scale and scope of economic trade between China and South Africa. It 
is qualitative research that will be used to build evidence and argument.  
 
Both primary and secondary sources will be used, where primary sources will mostly contain 
official documents. Secondary sources will also be heavily relied upon these sources range from 
books, journals articles, media clippings etc.    
 
Sources of information include (but are not limited to): Centre for Chinese Studies, The China 
Monitor, Journal databases, published books located in Wartenwelier, Cullen and Jan Smuts 
libraries, media portals such as the Economist, Financial Times and Foreign Affairs. Official 
speeches and statements released by the respective governments of China and South Africa. The 
Institute for Global Dialogue and World Politics Review have both also published broadly on the 
BRICS topic, furthermore in the ongoing academic discourse related to interrelated issues in this 
topic such as the South Africa’s voting patterns its second tenure of the Security Council, the 
author has attended public lectures and has had discussions to broaden the engagement with 
existing research on the topic.    
 
These sources will be used to elaborate and understand China-South Africa relations, and the 
new formation of BRICS.  
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1.6) Theory Component  
 
International relations theory can be lightly applied to describe the formation of BRICS and the 
effects thereof in the international system.  
 
Functionalism, argues that due to globalization and increased integration of the international 
system. States work together based on common interests and common needs, hence south-south 
cooperation between the BRICS states. The drafting of a ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ 
between China and SA could be based on common needs in terms of economic exchanges and 
global agendas. Considering the unique power position that South Africa has on the African 
continent and China has with regards to being a de facto leader in the developing world. One of 
the proponents of functionalism is the argument that the functional approach could eventually 
enmesh national governments in a dense network of interlocking co-operative ventures.12  It 
therefore can be aptly applied to the formation of the BRICS grouping and the enhancing of 
China-South Africa relations, where leading developing states see the need to bind together to 
achieve common interests and goals which uniquely pertain to their ambition to become stronger 
players in the international community. Furthermore one of the first clauses of the BRICS Sanya 
declaration is the acknowledgement of far-reaching, complex and profound changes, marked by 
the strengthening of multipolarity, economic globalization and increasing interdependence and 
there should be strengthened cooperation for common development and the voice of emerging 
and developing countries in international affairs should be enhanced.13  
 
Core-periphery theory, on the other hand, is drawn from the World Systems Theory of Immanuel 
Wallerstein where the international system is divided into the ‘centers’ and ‘hinterlands’ of 
‘cores’ and ‘peripheries’. Thus the world economy is characterized by an interrelated system of 
strong ‘core’ states and weak ‘peripheral’ states. 14 Under the world system theory’s greater 
theoretical base of dependency theory, for developing countries trying to become fully integrated 
in the global economy there is the impediment of asymmetrical interdependence.15 Thus the core 
which consists of developed states with strong economies holds a superior structural advantage 
                                               
12 Mitrany, D, The Functional Theory of Politics, Martin Robertson and Company, London, 1975. P.180.  
13 Sanya Declaration, Op. Cit.  
14 Wallerstein, I and Hopkins, T, World Systems Analyses, Sage Publications, London, 1982. P.42-43 
15 Seers,D, Dependency Theory A Critical Reassessment, Frances Pinter LTD, London, 1981. P.80 
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over the peripheries which consist of rising developing states. However the mobilization of the 
BRICS countries and the individual bilateral alliances such as the China-South Africa strategic 
partnership are testament to the gathering of countries in the periphery in creating a balance of 
power against the core. This shift of power, where BRICS states support each other economically 
and politically has resulted in the ‘decentring of the north’ where developed states no longer 
dominant the ‘core’ of the world system as they no longer have as much influence and 
dominance economically in terms of being the single eclipsing trade partner and investor of 
emerging market economies or politically as BRICS states band together to achieve a more 
coherent and concise agenda in multilateral forums previously monopolized and dictated by the 
global north.        
 
1.7) Limitations of Thesis  
 
The novelty of BRICS may be difficult to maneuver around, though novelty provides a strong 
motive for an academic study, it also provides an element of uncertainty and unpredictability. 
The BRICS grouping is still evolving in agenda and institutional set up, a lack of specific and 
formal architecture makes ubiquitously dynamic. The future direction of BRICS is still largely 
un-determined; there has been speculation as to whether or not additional countries will be 
invited to join BRICS, although considering the complexities of added members to the group it is 
probably unlikely that the BRICS group will formally expand.  
 
There also remain diverging interests between BRICS members which has yet to be challenged 
internationally, the differences present in the heterogeneity of the group may determine its 
relevance and future effectiveness. It is also yet to be seen if the influence of BRICS holds any 
clout in the long term as member states external disagreements lingering as an impediment to 
building a more solid framework for BRICS in the future. In the long run and in retrospect, the 
political changes regarding BRICS may up heave some of the conclusions and interpretations 
established in this study which is limited to a certain part of the “BRICS’ foundational timeline”.  
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Chapter 2: Historical Overview of the China- South Africa Relationship In 
the Context of The Emerging South  
 
Since 1998 the China-South Africa relationship has steadily blossomed, concurrent this has been 
growing China-Africa engagement, and stronger coherence and cooperation between India, 
Brazil, and South Africa as a whole. In short the China-South Africa relationship has emerged 
spewing a similar international trend of emerging countries increased cooperation with each 
other. In order to understand the dynamics of the newly formed BRICS not only it is necessary to 
look at the formation and development of China-South Africa relations specifically but take 
cognizance of the broader context of its historical development in a rising global south. 
Historical global trends such as the cold war has defined and shaped the formation of developing 
world solidarity, while on a bilateral level South Africa’s apartheid regime in the context of the 
cold war influenced relations with the People’s Republic of China. This chapter elaborates on the 
parallel history of developing world groupings and Sino-South Africa relations.   
 
2.1) Rise of Developing World Solidarity   
 
The evolution of developing world solidarity with regards to groupings, coalitions, and alliance 
networks can be traced to the umbrella entity of the non-aligned movement (NAM), becoming 
the provenance of subsequent strategic groupings within the global south.  From the G77 to the 
filtering of the eventual G24 and the G20, to regional organizations such as the OAU, ASEAN, 
ECOWAS, NEPAD to the more recent IBSA and BRICS alliances. The surfacing of different 
developing world groupings over the decades demonstrate a gradual refinement and effective 
configuration of strategic interests as these groupings become smaller, more focused and waver 
away from mere geopolitical commonality.      
  
The formation of Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS) grouping is a contemporary 
manifestation of a developing world alliance which attempts to coordinate common solidarity 
and self interest. It reflects the current changing dynamics of the world system, an exclusive and 
deliberate grouping of prominent emerging powers that hold influence in their respective regions 
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concomitant with greater ambitions at multilateral level, reflecting mutual increasing 
expectations on their own respective rising power status.    
 
2.1.1) Non Aligned Movement (NAM)  
 
From a historical perspective the beginnings of developing world alliances, solidarity, the non-
aligned movement and south-south cooperation can be collectively traced back to the 1955 
Bandung conference in Indonesia. Otherwise known as the Asian-African conference, it was a 
political gathering unique for its time consisting of 29 states, many of which were newly formed 
or in the beginning stages of sovereign independence. The communiqué filtered the “five 
principles of agreement” that China and India had developed a year prior: mutual respect for 
each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference, 
mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence.16 Setting the political rhetoric that later resonated in 
both bilateral and multilateral engagements of China’s foreign policy towards Africa. The 
outcomes of the conference developed common objectives promoting cooperation and voicing 
disapproval of colonialism, thereby laying the foundations of sentiment behind the non aligned 
movement.  
 
Six years later as a wave rapid decolonization began and the intensities of the Cold War become 
even more pronounced, it became clear to the developing world that as more states emerged onto 
the global arena there was a increased strategic opportunity in the then existing political milieu 
of bipolar power struggles between the two great powers of the United States and the Soviet 
Union, therefore to further institutionalize the sentiment and core objectives first discussed at 
Bandung. In Belgrade 1961 the first Non-Aligned Movement Summit took place, though only 25 
countries were present, the grouping took it upon themselves to voice common concern over the 
position of the third world. The consensus was that smaller states in the third world needed to 
stand against the pressures emitted on them by the superpowers of the Cold War.   
 
                                               
16 Willets, P, The Non-Aligned Movement: Origins of a Third World Alliance¸ Nichols Publishing, New York, 1978, 
P.7 
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Non-alignment, as a strategy, at the time was a new departure in world politics: a status previous 
from earlier versions of non-involvement in a conflict.17 States that were non-aligned identified 
themselves to be not involved in the power dispute between the United States and the Soviet 
Union. Instead, attempted to opt for an alternative international order where the third world 
would have a greater stake in the global system through the assertion of independence.  
 
The act of non-alignment was an attractive alterative when the developing world found 
themselves the objects of competition. The general benefits for non alignment due to the power 
configuration of the world system at the time was appealing to many developing states as it 
assisted in helping them assert not only a degree of freedom and independence but  was also a 
means of avoiding alliances while maintaining the open possibility of receiving aid from both 
sides.18Drawing on the common sentiments of emerging states at the time it echoed nationalism, 
anti-colonialism, residue revolutionary attitudes, and paved an arena for safeguarding the 
imperatives of economic growth by attempting to stabilize the power struggle of external forces 
in international relations.    
 
The initial NAM summits were less about alliances within the developing world caucus as much 
as it was about the repudiation of alliances involving the US and Soviet Union. Although there is 
no denying that both great powers of the Cold War illustrated their good faith by offering aid 
within the rhetoric of pledging nonintervention.  
 
As the NAM summits progressed there was a steady attempt to turn the movement into more of a 
solid institution, and employ it as a platform from which developing countries were allowed to 
voice their concerns. However NAM eventually lost cohesiveness, as the Cold War continued, 
further hindered by increasing domestic difficulties within the developing world, and the rapid 
proliferation of new states which seemed to dilute the bargaining potential of any single state (or 
group of states), 19 making it extremely difficult for many developing countries to be completely 
untainted by cold war politics. Furthermore, fully fledged developing world alliances at the time 
still wavered short of and real effective cooperation outside of voting in the UN. Failure to 
                                               
17 Rothstein, R, Alliances and Small Powers, Columbia University Press, New York, 1968. P.245  
18 Ibid, P, 248.  
19 Ibid, P.256 
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develop real alliances, in the new stages of NAM stemmed from the general inability to agree on 
anything besides the mutual dislike of colonialism and the need to assert their new found 
independence in multilateral relationships. Despite its symbolic significance, in relative 
comparison to other existing multilateral lobbying institutions, NAM has always been a loose 
grouping with the tendencies to gloss over more specific and detailed issues for general 
overarching concerns. This has been mostly attributed to the vast diversity of political opinion 
within its own assembly.  
 
With the mellowing out of the Cold War and the virtual extinction of oppression residual from 
the colonial era; as all states in the developing world eventually became sovereign and 
independent on their own accord it seemed that the initial purpose of NAM, to quell pressures 
from US-Soviet tensions, had fizzled out. The one overall remaining purpose for the movement 
was to uphold its status as the principle forum which represented the interests and aspirations of 
the developing world.    
 
The movement underwent rejuvenation, particularly eminent from the mid 1990s onwards as the 
new emerging international order saw several developing states rise in economic clout and 
political bargaining power, collectively holding a bigger stake in the global system. In 
anticipation of the growing influence and paralleled growing agendas for the global south ahead 
of the new millennium, NAM’s 12th summit held in Durban was a milestone for the organization. 
It was the first time appearance of the chairs from the G8 and EU, marking the premiere presence 
of representatives from the global north. Concurrent with the revival of the movement, further 
efforts were made to instigate more functional structures within NAM. In accordance with this 
summit, the new structure explicitly correlated and coordinated with the Group of 77 plus China 
in the UN through a joint committee in New York, in order to enhance cooperation for the 
developing world and further boost South-South cooperation. This arrangement was 
implemented in anticipation of the UN millennium summit, targeting the need to better highlight 
the agendas of the developing world.20       
 
 
                                               
20 Department of International Relations and Cooperation¸Non Aligned Movement, 
http://www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/Multilateral/inter/nam.htm, Dec 2006.                  Last accessed 05/12/2011  
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2.1.2) Significance of NAM 
 
As the movement of a rapidly developing global south gained momentum in the recent decade, 
highlighting the differences between terms of trade and voting power in international 
organizations. There is a newly emerging need for the developing world to be justly represented 
in global institutions in order to leverage better bargaining power on international political and 
economic agreements. Prompting an increased rhetoric on revisiting NAM a traditional platform 
employed by south to voice concern, to be revived with more cohesiveness in order to make the 
developing world more effective players in the international arena.21      
 
However despite the rhetoric and growing sentiment of solidarity within the developing world, 
the attempt to rejuvenate NAM, through the terms of the XII summit and the review of structures 
and methodology at the summits thereafter has yet to yield real effectiveness from the movement.  
Though it remains a symbolic and relevant entity for the developing world, the differences and 
difficulties in drafting a more refined agenda is due to the vast latitude and diversity of the 
movement’s sundry member base, making it more or less impossible for NAM to work 
decisively and constructively towards greater cohesion.  
 
NAM loosely mirrors the changing dynamics that the global south has faced, from initially 
employing the grouping and overall strategic of non-alignment as a tactical principle to leverage 
the maximum amount of advantages from the Cold War bipolar power configuration.  It has 
since vacillated from loose reactive and defensive association of states to a more proactive and 
offensive alliance network, swayed in the direction of striving for more independent goals and 
objectives tailor-suited to the general national interests of the global south. If anything the 
movement set the precedence and solidified a platform of expression for the developing world. 
The spirit of solidarity and five principles encapsulated at NAM are still often referenced in 
current diplomatic dialogue between emerging states. Developing world groupings can be traced 
back to the early south-south solidarity networks established by NAM. Regional alliances and 
organization in the developing world such as the ASEAN, ECOWAS, AU and NEPAD were 
formed to cater to more specific and localized goals and objectives indicating an elaboration on 
                                               
21 Anan. K, Secretary General says the Non-Aligned Movement’s Mission More Relevant Than Ever, 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sgsm10636.doc.htm, Sep 2006.      Last accessed: 02/12/2011  
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alliances in the global south. But the most refined and recent manifestation of alliance networks 
in the global south are the over lapping middle power cliques of India-Brazil-South Africa 
(IBSA), BRICS and BASIC.   
 
2.1.3) Group of 77 plus China  
 
Concurrent with the origins of the non aligned movement, was the broad coalition of the group 
of 77 which emerged in Geneva 1964 bound together by a joint declaration before the 
establishment of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), formed 
by the collective perception of developing countries on the need to bind together against 
common problems through joint action on issues of international trade and development. The 77 
countries present at the first joint declaration issued by the grouping had intended the coalition to 
draw attention to the developing world’s quest to improve the standards of living for its citizens 
which was strongly influenced by the international structure of trade and developmental 
assistance, and a need for the voice of the global south to be heard in the establishment of a new 
international framework. 22   
 
The G77 has held ministerial meetings frequently throughout the years intended to elaborate the 
mechanisms of cooperation, in 1967 the G77 meeting in Algiers which gave rise to the charter of 
Algiers. Identifying common aspirations and mutual challenges faced by the developing world in 
terms of interests related to economic growth and development. The charter took cognizance of 
the economic and social trends which were becoming increasingly unfavorable for the 
developing world with the decline of purchasing power, aggravated indebtedness and disparities 
in import/export trade with developed states. Coordinating a general stance through a program of 
action on problems in general trade issues, commodity policies, the expansion of export 
manufacturers, development financing, and special treatment for least developed countries. 
Instigating an international dialogue on incorporating trade expansion and economic integration 
amongst developing countries.23      
 
                                               
22 Group of 77, Joint Declaration of the Seventy Seven Developing Countries Made at the Conclusion of the 
UNCTAD, http://www.g77.org/doc/Joint%20Declaration.html, 15 June 1964.   Last Accessed: 02/12/2011 
23 Group of 77, First Ministerial Meetings of the Group of  77: Charter of Algiers, Oct 1967. Last 
accessed:02/12/2011.   
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G77 gradually developed an institutional structure over the years with seven chapters established 
as smaller groupings representing the G77 within specialized agencies of the UN. Currently 
liaison offices are present Geneva (UNCTAD), Nairobi (UN Environmental Program), Paris 
(UNESCO), Rome (Food and Agriculture), Vienna (UN Industrial Development Organization), 
and the Group of 24 (G-24) in Washington, D.C. (IMF and World Bank). Though the G77 
retains its name for historical significance it has since increased to 131 countries with the 
additional of China as a non-official member country since 1981.24  
 
Declarations stemming from G77 meetings over the decades have suggested and reiterated 
frameworks for both north-south dialogue and south-south dialogue on economic, trade and 
development issues.  With changing global dynamics and a rapidly budding global south, in the 
recent decade south-south cooperation was renewed through the Marrakesh declaration in 2003, 
highlighting technical exchanges and the importance of coordinating joint negotiation positions 
in the Doha round.25  
 
The G77 has acted as a relatively autonomous interest group within the workings of the WTO as 
well, however the diverging and dissimilar agendas of members within the G77 beneath the 
surface of the rhetoric serve as an impediment to further form any specified goals and objectives. 
Similar to NAM, the G77’s “unity amongst diversity” obligates it to remain in the realms of 
expressing the broad general sentiments of the developing world.     
 
2.1.4) Group of 24  
 
The G24 was established as a chapter within the G77 in 1971 to further coordinate the positions 
of developing countries with regards to international monetary and development finance issues. 
Particularly focused on ensuring increased participation and representation of the developing 
world in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, with biannual meetings, the G24 
includes India, Brazil, South Africa and China as a special invitee.26  
                                               
24 Group of 77¸About the G77, http://www.g77.org/doc/, 2011.                       Last accessed: 02/12/2011  
25 Group of 77, Marrakech Framework of implementation of South-South Cooperation, 
http://www.g77.org/marrakech/Marrakech-Framework.htm.                          Last accessed: 02/12/2011  
26 Intergovernmental Group of 24, About the G24, http://www.g24.org/about.html.  
    Last accessed:02/12/2011  
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As G24 meetings occur prior to the meetings held in the IMF and joint development committee 
of the World Bank, and are attended by the respective their heads, with a joint communiqué 
released at the end of the ministerial meeting. Though decisions are made by consensus, the 
structure and functioning of the G24 indicates the gradual move away from ad hoc forums 
started by the developing world. Altering the approach of how developing world groupings have 
consolidated actions towards achieving objectives.   Additionally over the years the G24 has also 
filtered technical group meetings and workshops on a wide spectrum of specific issues related to 
development.    
 
2.1.5) Significance of G77, G24 plus China  
 
These large coalition networks of developing countries have served as an endeavor to construct 
effective working groups within international institutions focused on the general concerns and 
objectives of the global south. It represents the genesis of an active and coordinated effort from 
the global south to collectively achieve common interests, divergent from that of the developed 
world, serving as a forum for dialogue to initiate constructive confrontations with the global 
north over differing views in the UN, IMF, World Bank and WTO.  
 
Though the G77 and G24 were always more refined than NAM in terms of organizational 
structure, functioning and its activities lean towards a more focused agenda, they still remain 
loose entities pursuing broadly defined ambitions. The vast differences in levels of development 
within the developing world itself necessitate coalitions or alliance networks that are more 
exclusive and limited in their membership in order to truly pursue goals deeper than that of the 
general rhetoric often voiced by these large groupings.  
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2.2) Developing World Interaction between China and South Africa 
 
In the backdrop influencing historical relations China and South Africa were the parallel of 
multiple factors prominent in the cold war, the status of the apartheid government in the 
international arena and the simmering tensions between China and the Former Soviet Republic 
on the differing centers of communism and its consequential influence with political entities 
present in third world allies. Nevertheless Sino-South African relations has gathered momentum 
exponentially since the days of third world solidarity in opposition to the apartheid government 
to the initial establishment of official relations with South Africa’s first democratic government.    
 
2.2.1) Sino- South Africa Relations during Apartheid  
 
Relations between the two countries, initially was characterized by developing world sentiment 
against the Apartheid struggle and expressions of support for liberation groups within in South 
Africa. However despite this public rhetoric of disapproval China had insidiously maintained 
faint economic ties with the Apartheid government whilst upholding unique relations with 
different fractions within the anti-Apartheid movements.  
 
Officially the Nationalist party of China and South Africa had initially developed relations in 
1931, though interactions between the two states were limited. In 1960 concurrent with the 
backdrop of developing world solidarity and condemnation of the apartheid regime as well as 
support for communist influenced liberation movements in Africa, the PRC officially ceased 
economic ties with South Africa, even though there remained evidence of tacit trade in copper, 
diamonds, lead and zinc between independent agents facilitated by middle men in Hong Kong,27 
the overall public international political rhetoric for the most part was disapproval for the 
oppression of liberation movements.28  
 
The apartheid government was concerned with the influence that communism had on liberation 
movements, and made deliberate moves to quell Chinese influence by establishing relations with 
                                               
27 Taylor, I, “The Ambiguous Commitment: The People’s Republic of China and the Anti-Apartheid Struggle in 
South Africa”, in Journal of Contemporary African Studies, Vol. 18, Iss.1, 2000,P.2 
28  Loc. Cit  
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Taiwan in 1976. 29  Taiwan reciprocated by recognizing the legitimacy of the Apartheid 
government, a relationship which was politically expedient for both states who felt equally 
threatened by communist aggression and faced increasing international isolation at the same time.    
 
China’s positioning on South Africa was in relation to the Soviet Union’s influence on the rest of 
Africa. Though relations between the ANC, SACP and the PRC were cordial they succumbed to 
the Sino-Soviet tensions which slowly escalated from the 1960s onwards, affecting support for 
communist influenced liberation struggles on the continent. In the international backdrop of the 
Cold War, most African countries were not only proxies of struggle between the democratic west 
and communist east but liberation movements themselves as well eventually became entities of 
rivalry between the Soviet Union and China. Such was the case for anti-apartheid movements 
within South Africa.  Chinese-Russian contentions resonated with divided support for the PAC 
and ANC respectively.  
 
Despite attempted links with the ANC, China lacked commitment in providing material aid to 
fully fund liberation movements. Regardless of the complicated association of the South African 
Communist Party (SACP) and the ANC, when the two joined together to form the combined 
guerilla movement of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), they had strong Soviet backing which included 
training and the procurement of arms, clearly omitting China’s influence. Thus the ANC and 
SACP had effectively precluded China as the Sino-Soviet split grew deeper.30 Consequentially 
the only remaining liberation movement which China could strategically back in that existing 
context was the PAC. As strategic opposition against the Soviet Union and to maintain some 
form of influence, even so, the support that the PRC offered the PAC was limited and 
inconsistent in comparison to the support that ZANU in Zimbabwe received. China’s lob sided 
support for ZANU in the Southern African region was molded by the perspective that Zimbabwe 
was a less competitive opportunity to boast influence on the continent.31  
 
It was not until the 1980s that relations between the ANC and China showed greater interaction. 
With the PRC ascension onto the UN Security Council, rapprochement with the USSR through 
                                               
29 Payne, R and Veney, C, “China’s Post Cold War African Policy”, In Asian Survey, Vol. 353, No. 9, September, 
1998, P.457.  
30 Taylor, Op. cit, P. 4 
31 Ibid, P5-6 
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Brezhnev’s diplomacy combined with the Soviet Union’s growing fatigue and reluctance to 
continually bear the costs of supporting liberation movements in an increasingly less strategic 
southern African region. Both China and the ANC saw a new strategic opportunity to realign 
with each other. The PRC redefined its equal support for anti-apartheid movements, resulting in 
Oliver Tambo visiting the China on behalf of the ANC in 1983 re-opening links.32        
 
Towards the late 80s and early 90s the domestic political landscape changed dramatically for 
both China and South Africa. China had changed to the leadership of Deng Xiaoping and began 
instigating the new policies of economic reforms to which increased international trade was 
crucial. South Africa on the other hand, was undergoing the transition period in the last days of 
the Apartheid government. The new incoming ANC government presumably had stronger links 
with the PRC over Taiwan largely due to the former’s condemnation and the latter’s official 
support of the Apartheid government. On the eve of South Africa’s democratization, both the 
PRC and Taiwan competed to win the full favor of the incoming government. Taiwan increased 
trade and investment in South Africa from 1990 onwards, taking a diplomatic offense against 
China. Moreover, Mandela had raised funds for the ANC election campaign in Taiwan. A series 
of diplomatic exchanges between the PRC and South Africa took place in anticipation of then 
upcoming 1994 elections. In early 1992, as an appetizer to future relations, then Chinese foreign 
minister Qian paid a transit visit in Johannesburg ahead of a African tour to meet with the 
foreign minister Pik Botha as well as leaders from the ANC and PAC.33   In October 1992 
Mandela visited Beijing and met with President Jiang Zemin, expressing his gratitude for 
China’s support in the anti-apartheid struggle, and initiated negotiations for a trade office despite 
the absence of formal diplomatic ties.34  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
32 Ibid, P10  
33 Singh, S, “Sino-South African relations: Coming full circle”, in African Security Review, Vol.6, Iss.2, 1997. 
Available at: http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/6No2/Singh.html  
34 Taylor, Op. Cit, P.14 
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2.2.2) China-South Africa Relations Post Cold War and Post- Apartheid  
 
Both Taiwan and the PRC regarded South Africa as a pivotal actor in the African region. Though 
South Africa’s relations with the PRC under the Mandela presidency remained more consistent 
to that of the Apartheid government, during the first term of South Africa’s new democracy the 
ANC had attempted to maintain de facto relations with both the PRC and Taiwan. Prior to 1994 
the ANC announced that “a democratic South Africa would not abandon its long term friend who 
assisted the ANC during its worst time”, as the new government was willing to enter diplomatic 
relations with China, it was not willing to severe ties with Taiwan.35 
 
The Mandela presidency was determined to assert its sovereignty and independence, while 
simultaneously promoting the country’s regeneration and reintegration into the global 
community. South Africa was left with a two Chinas dilemma, on the one hand Taiwan had 
increased its loans and contracts to Eskom, Macsteel and the Development Bank of Southern 
Africa, the possibility of disinvestment from Taiwan could have been harmful to the economy, 
especially when compared to that offered by the PRC in terms of financing for reconstruction 
and development programs. 36  Taiwan’s total investment capital amounted to $1.56billion, 
making it on of South Africa’s largest sources of foreign capital whilst the PRC had openly 
offered to invest only $50million.37 Furthermore China’s lingering international reputation after 
the Tiananmen Square incident meant that a newly democratic South Africa whose image was 
entrenched with human rights would be open to criticism by pursuing official relations with the 
PRC.  
 
Nevertheless, Pretoria could not ignore the rise of China in the global system, and the benefits 
that access to the mainland had for South African goods as opposed to that of Taiwan. What 
swayed the decision further was Hong Kong’s scheduled hand over to China in 1997, South 
Africa’s trade with Hong Kong increased from $800million in 1993 to $1.5billion in 1996.Whilst 
trade with China grew from $658.4million in 1993 to $1.35billion in 1996.38  
                                               
35 Naidu, S, “South Africa’s Relations with the People’s Republic of China: mutual opportunities or hidden threats?” 
in Buhlungu, S et al, State of the Nation 2005-2006, HSRC Press, Cape Town, 2006,P.465 
36Ibid, P.464  
37 Singh, Op. Cit, http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/6No2/Singh.html.  
38 Payne, Op. Cit, P. 878 
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After dragging its feet during the first term of the democratic governance, South African foreign 
minister Alfred Nzo met with then Chinese foreign minister Qian Qichen in December 1997, and 
by the 1st of January 1998 a joint communiqué between the two countries was signed, 39 
establishing formal relations, adhering to the recognition of the one china principle. Though 
South Africa still maintained economic and unofficial relations with Taiwan, the Republic of 
China was officially downgraded in lieu of recognition for the People’s Republic. Additional to 
trade and investment benefits with the PRC, there were also other anticipated political and 
strategic spin-offs, the establishment of a partnership within promoting the interest of emerging 
markets in the developing world, and an ally in the mutual advocacy of reform and multipolarity 
in the world system.40     
 
2.2.3) Establishment of Formal Relations from 1998 Onwards   
 
Through a series of high level diplomatic exchanges between the two countries, foundations for 
formal relations were slowly built. In the 1998 joint communiqué on establishing diplomatic 
relations, both governments recognized each others sovereignty and based relations on mutual 
respect, mutual non-interference, and mutual non-aggression.41  
 
On the 25th of April 2000, during President Jiang Zemin’s Africa tour, the Pretoria declaration 
was signed to form a “strategic partnership” between China and South Africa. The tone and 
underlying attitude of the declaration beyond the purpose of strengthening bilateral relations was 
to echo an affirmation of the necessity to consolidate a developing world alliance in solidarity for 
common agendas in the international arena.   
 
The document specifically invoked the initial roots of cooperation at the Bandung conference 45 
years prior and in the spirit of equality and common development, the declaration referred to the 
                                               
39 Loc. Cit.  
40 Naidu, Op. Cit, P.465 
41 Foreign Ministry of the People’s Republic of China, Joint Communiqué Between the Government of the People's 
Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of South Africa on the Establishment of Diplomatic 
Relations, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/fzs/gjlb/3094/3095/t16577.htm, April 2002.  
Last accessed: 04/12/2011   
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need to take cognizance of the imperativeness for developing countries to strengthen cooperation 
and mutual support in the international economic milieu.  
 
Recognizing “that both China and South Africa share many objectives with regard to key 
multilateral issues and an urgent need for the reform of the international multilateral political, 
economic and financial architecture to reflect new global realities.”42 
 
In retrospect, the rhetoric expressed earlier on in the Pretoria declaration has been repeated and 
resonated consistently with South Africa’s contemporary relations with China as well as within 
the BRICS countries multilateral dialogue. The positioning of emerging markets binding together 
in international forums will be further elaborated on in the next chapter.  
        
The Pretoria Declaration put forward the formation of the bi national commissions (BNC) 
between the PRC and South Africa, a move towards a structured organized mechanism to 
coordination interaction between the two states. The BNCs purpose was intended to safeguard 
and incorporate existing agreements as well as to coordinate government to government relations 
within all areas pertaining to matters of mutual interest in both bilateral and multilateral 
spheres.43Furthermore, in the context of South-South cooperation the document stipulates the 
endeavor to pursue closer economic ties through the limiting of impediments of trade, investment 
and commercial relations. As well as encouraging closer cooperation between enterprises of the 
two countries. On the level of political cooperation, with specific reference to the United Nations, 
China pledged to support African interests through the G77 in the UN, while South Africa would 
support China-led developing world efforts to create a new international political and economic 
order. 44 
 
 
 
 
                                               
42 Foreign Ministry of the People’s Republic of China, Pretoria Declaration on the Partnership Between the People's 
Republic of China and the Republic of South Africa, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/gjhdq/dqzzywt/2633/2639/t15595.htm, April 2002.  
Last accessed: 03/12/2011  
43 Loc. Cit.  
44 Loc. Cit.  
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2.2.4) Bi-National Commissions   
  
In December 2001 President Mbeki inaugurated the first plenary session of the BNC where 
separate talks were held between the ministries and departments of foreign affairs, economic 
cooperation and trade, science-technology, energy and tourism.45 
 
Since the inception of the Pretoria Declaration there have been four bi national commissions 
from 2001 to 2010.  At the end of the second BNC meeting in 2004, the joint communiqué 
issued announced that the South African customs union would enter into free trade negotiations 
with China, further reintegrating the commitment to enhance south-south cooperation to 
safeguard the rights and interest of the developing world in multilateral forums such as the WTO 
and the UN. As well as mutual support for the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) 
and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). 46   In a speech then deputy 
President Jacob Zuma made at the second BNC he highlighted that both countries shared 
common perspectives on “restructuring of the UN, the reform of the global trading system, and 
enhanced south-south cooperation”.47  
 
Similar diplomatic sentiments were reiterated in subsequent BNCs with the business and 
investment forum growing a larger presence. Though the BNC was clearly a mechanism to 
process and organize the dialogue for technical cooperation, its existence provides both countries 
a coordinated opportunity in which to hone, revise and further develop bilateral relations on 
specific issues.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
45 Naidu, Op. Cit, P.466-467 
46 Department of International Relations and Cooperation, Joint Communiqué on the Second South Africa - People's 
Republic of China Bi-National Commission, http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/2004/chin0629.htm, July 2004.                                                           
Last accessed: 02/12/2011  
47 Department of International Relations and Cooperation, Deputy President Jacob Zuma to Co-Chair Second South 
Africa - People's Republic of China (PRC) Binational Commission (BNC), 
http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/2004/chin0621.htm, July 2004.              Last accessed: 02/12/2011  
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2.2.5) China-South Africa-Developing World Groupings in Review 
 
International coalitions involving the global south have changed in composition and focus over 
the years. Like many other developing countries at the beginning stages of establishing an 
international presence in the early post cold war era, both China and South Africa, played 
differing roles in the evolution of first generation developing world groupings. The early non-
aligned movement and group of 77 was indicative of the global south’s geopolitical intention to 
shift power away from the develop world nexus to emerging developing countries. First 
generation initiatives were large in membership and stemmed mostly from shared conditions as a 
reactive response to building autonomy.  
 
In the second generation of global south formations of the G20, IBSA, BRICS and BASIC, 
showed the trend that state actors in the developing world seem to be responding to the 
undeniable factors of multipolarity, multilateralism and interdependence which has come to 
shape all aspects of international engagement. Second generation formations and the analysis 
thereof are more refined and specifically calibrated in defining its own proactive interests by 
reflecting selectivity and strategic networking in their groupings. Deliberately independent of 
traditional major powers, they seek to establish political status by raising their international 
profiles. This new generation of international groupings culminates as a result of changes and 
convergences in the global arena, the gradual erosion of the traditional power base that the West 
once held concomitant with the rising economies such as China, India and Brazil as well as the 
growing interdependency between states in coalition and groupings as a means to ensure more 
efficacy in achieving collective agendas in international relations.  
 
Relations between China and South Africa have in recent years reached a new precipice, 
stemming from the historical connections of developing world solidarity, and communist 
ideological support for liberation movements. China’s initial position for the ANC and PAC 
during apartheid, despite the Sino-Soviet communist split, stood the China-South Africa 
relationship in good stead in post apartheid engagements further spurred on by China’s economic 
rise and the economic implications for South Africa thereof.      
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Chapter 3: The Significance of BRICS and Current Dynamics of 
China-South Africa Relations 
  
There are multifarious albeit significant issues surrounding the formation and functioning of 
BRICS, the combination of rising states in this grouping can be argued from a theoretical 
perspective as a concerted effort by leaders of the global south to redefine power structures in the 
international system. This chapter attempts to unpack some of the contemporary political tenets 
surrounding the BRICS grouping. From the amorphous aim of multipolarity most strongly 
advocated by Russia and China, which resonates through to other BRICS member states, to 
analyzing the criticism which has been passed on South Africa’s legitimacy as a member of the 
grouping. The section also gives similar weight to an overview of the current tenets of the China-
South Africa relationship which has been elevated through the most recent series of high level 
visits and joint declarations signed, and thus have had some bearing on South Africa’s ascension 
into BRICS. As well as provide an analysis of the implications that the BRICS grouping has the 
pre-existing IBSA alliance.  
 
3.1) The “Middle Chessboard” of Power   
 
Prominent academic Joseph Nye points to the significant change in composition of power in the 
21st century, he defines power as “the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes that one 
wants”48. In the current day and age power needs to be put into context in order to be understood, 
Nye describes power in the 21st century international system as a multi-dimensional chess game, 
where there are three segmented layers. The top chessboard of military power is still thought to 
be dominated by the United States, with a relative unipolar position in this aspect. The middle 
chessboard represents economic power, which has been, and will continue to be unequivocally 
multipolar. The EU, China, Japan, and the combination of other emerging market states are all 
players which reinforce the current multipolarity of world economic power.  While the bottom 
chessboard is the realm beyond government control, the global networks of non-state actors 
ranging from business corporations to terrorist organizations. Power at the bottom chessboard is 
widely thought to be diffused and decentralized.  
 
                                               
48 Nye, J, “Power in the 21st Century”, In World Policy Review Feature: The DNA of Global Power, 22 March 2011,  
P.2 
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The changing nature of power in a globalized world makes states more porous than ever before, 
in this sense Nye asserts that power has become more of a positive sum game. Where it is no 
longer enough to think in terms of power over others, in order to accomplish goals, power with 
others needs to be considered. “In this world the ability to construct and manage networks and 
connectedness becomes an important source of relevant power”.49 Further elaboration of the 
breakdown of economic power consists of the postulation that growth in economic demand is a 
central tenet in swaying power on the middle chessboard. Demand for energy, materials, goods 
and services essentially means that the world - in bottom chessboard business terms- will revolve 
around the demand vortex’s every need.50 Global influence is intrinsically tied to economic clout 
in terms of growth and the subsequent advantages of increased consumption which accompany it; 
this in turn results in the slowdown of comparative economic heft experienced by the west.    
 
As China and fellow BRICS countries assume the mantle of the new global demand centre, the 
grouping emulates from the base of the “middle chessboard”, by forming a network of states 
undergoing similar stages of economic development with growing middle class resulting in ever 
increasing consumption and expanding GDPs. The BRICS formation is fully cognizant of the 
need to exploit and reinforce the multipolarity of world economy power. With heedful steps 
towards deriving an influential political entity derived from the increasing economic autarky it 
holds. It is the construction of a positive sum association of states with the intention to procure 
and pursue general collective interests in the international arena. In short it is a stringent move 
towards etching in multipolarity.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
49 Ibid, P.3  
50 Barnett, T, “Demand as Power in a Resilient Global Order”, In World Policy Review Feature: The DNA of Global 
Power, 22 March 2011,  P.6. 
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3.2) BRICS and Multipolarity in the World System  
 
Multipolarity can be loosely defined as multiple centers of power in the international system, 
though this does not necessarily imply equal and evenly distributed stake holders, it does express 
a balance of power which is divergent from bipolarity and unipolarity. As a culmination of the 
transformation of the world system since the cold war, multipolarity is increasingly reinforced by 
developing world groupings.  
 
The BRICS formation serves as an indication of the evolving complexity of political and 
economic power dynamics in the international community. The objective of multipolarity itself 
has been a recurrent theme with BRICS member states and is constantly present much of the 
rhetoric in the formation and current functioning of the grouping. From a strategic perspective 
emerging powers in general, would favor the restructuring of power dynamics to allow for 
distribution away from the West ensuring that they hold a greater share and stronger leverage in 
the global arena. The concept of multipolarity serves as a nebulous abstract goal lingering in the 
background of BRICS discourse and action.      
 
In the two decades following the post cold war era, academics of international relations have 
expressed varying forms of analysis indicating that the new world order, though no longer 
bipolar, is not entirely multipolar either. As Nye draws attention to the fact that the new 
emerging multipolar world post cold war is fraught with ambiguity; though the USA still holds a 
recognizable central role it is not entirely hegemonic.51 The seemingly non-polarity of the new 
world order was largely thought to be ill-defined, though a mandatory phase in highlighting the 
transitory nature of the international system,52 in the two decades After the end of the cold war it 
appears that there was a concerted effort by some rising powers to shift and lock in the status of 
multipolarity in the world system.  
 
Multipolarity, in the current system is unevenly distributed in terms of political and economic 
power; the new centers of emerging power are palpable with the noticeable shift from west to 
east and state to non-state. Former US diplomat and current president of the Council of Foreign 
                                               
51 Nye, J, Bound To Lead: The Changing Nature of America Power, Basic Books, New York, 1990. P.235-236.  
52 Cooper, A, Niche Diplomacy,London, Macmillan Press, 1997. P.1    
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Relations Richard Haass explained the shift in polarity not necessarily a consequence of the 
decline in US power but rather the growth in centers of power elsewhere. As states get better at 
piecing together their plethora of financial, human and technological resources for increased 
prosperity and productivity culminating in the rise of new powers, which has resulted in a larger 
group of actors who are able to exert influence regionally and/or globally.53 Haass also cautions 
that it is not only states who are centers of power but many non-state actors as well including 
regional powers, companies, international organizations, non-governmental organizations and 
terrorist organizations ultimately leading to non-polarity rather than multipolarity.54  
 
However despite this interpretation and the relevance of the growing importance of non-state 
actors, it is still ultimately States as independent entities of political and economic power who 
dictate much the course of action in the international arena. The suggested multipolarity of the 
world order was inclusive of the EU, US, China, Russia, India and Japan, mainly because the 
forecast of growth in either or both economic and military power subsequently amplifying their 
influence.          
 
In recent years with the decline of US economic power and the rise of emerging countries’ 
political and economic leverage, it seems that multipolarity in the world system is constantly 
being further defined and legitimized.  China has made obvious strategic movements towards 
multipolarity through networks of economic partnerships. The bilateral dialogue between Russia 
and China have repeatedly agreed on the concept of a multipolar world order since the late 1990s. 
Regional emerging powers such as Brazil, India and South Africa too had reason to favor 
multipolarity as a part of a song sung by developing world leaders to allow for a more distributed 
stake in the international system. However it is between the larger powers, China and Russia, of 
the BRICS grouping that multipolarity was a key feature in bilateral relations and was of special 
strategic interest in considering their close proximity in challenging the US’s power status.  
 
BRICS, for both these countries, represents an extension on this cooperative clause. The 1997 
“Joint Russian-Chinese declaration on a multipolar world and the establishment of a new world 
                                               
53 Haass, R, What Follows American Dominion?, Financial Times, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/683c4bb6-0b4c-
11dd-8ccf-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz1hzs8qwE8, 16 April 2008.                                                                                                             
Last accessed: 07/12/2011  
54 Loc. Cit.  
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order” was the first in a string of diplomatic documents between the two countries advocating 
increased participation of rising powers in the world system. The declaration not only 
acknowledged that the end of the cold war resulting in multipolarity gaining momentum, but the 
increased importance of rising developing states to interact as their role in international politics is 
growing as is their escalating share of the world economy. Pointing out that developing countries 
are an important force to promote multipolarization, where all relations between states should be 
carried out with mutual respect for sovereignty, mutual non-aggression and non-interference.55  
Russia was the declining great power now aiming to recover its lost status, while China a rising 
power strategically maneuvers to resist any impediments to restrain its global role.56 Thus the 
presence of Russia in the BRICS grouping amongst other countries more traditionally thought of 
as from the developing world is ,in addition to the strategic and economic benefits, strongly 
guided by diplomatic ideology that empowering countries on the rise means disempowering 
countries on the wane, most notably the US. It was at Russia’s insistence that the BRICS 
countries meet informally in 2006 before the first official summit was held in Yekaterinburg in 
2009.   
 
However, it is important to note that in recent years China’s economic rise has served as a 
overshadowing concern gently nudging the regression on anti-hegemony rhetoric, since Hu 
Jintao’s term of office China has included a diplomatic disclaimer which asserts that when 
promoting multipolarity it is not aimed against any particular country nor was it staging a play of 
contention for hegemony but rather as a solution to world peace, stability and development. 
57Despite this, the agenda lingered insidiously in China’s innate need to build a network of 
alliances precluding the US through the emphasized term of “partnership” and “mutual 
cooperation” with varying States, particularly in the developing world.   
 
The BRICS grouping integrates itself neatly into China’s “peaceful rise” rhetoric and strategy, 
sewing together an informal alliance network which can be leaned upon not only to further 
enhance already existing bilateral and multilateral relations, but also used as a power base 
                                               
55United Nations, China-Russia: Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Establishment of a New 
International Order,  http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/52/plenary/a52-153.htm , 20 May 1997. P.987-988 
56 Turner, P.183 
57 Turner, S, “Russia, China and A Multipolar World Order: The Danger in the Undefined”, in Asian Perspective, 
Vol. 22, No.1, 2009. P.168  
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adjacent to the US. The benefits of a multi-state power base and influence though particularly 
useful for China in terms of its rising position, it too is relatively beneficially to the other BRICS 
member states.  Brazil, India and South Africa, countries who are already a grouping through the 
IBSA dialogue forum, may view BRICS as a strategic opportunity to join forces with larger 
rising powers not only reaping economic benefits but reinforcing their status as leaders and 
agenda setters for their respective regions. It provides all the countries involved with enhanced 
status in the international system as well as tangible spillover benefits in terms of institutional 
positions. China and Russia along with many other developing countries in the public diplomatic 
discourse of state-shared ownership in the international system have, in the past, agreed on the 
pursuit of multilateral world order without actually mentioning the specifics of how to achieve it. 
The BRICS grouping serves as a subtle and somewhat subliminal method of actively working 
towards multipolarity. As an alternative source of initiative in the international order, the 
formation is appreciatively different from the past, increasing these countries’ prospects to weigh 
in on world affairs.  
Though it is difficult to fully calibrate what a defined degree of multipolarity is in the world 
system the BRICS grouping does represent, for the countries involved, in the very least a 
symbolic move towards a mutually exclusive initiative independent of the US to formulate and 
further pursue their own agendas. As a way of demarcating an arena for multilateral dialogue and 
international leadership transparently directed away from the West.     
 
It is important to note, however that beneath the surface of the rhetoric and the budding stages of 
power groupings there presumably are many dissimilar methods and objectives yet to be fully 
fleshed out and made mutually comprehensible. Not only just between the heavy weights of 
China and Russia, but varying degrees of separation with Brazil, India and South Africa as well.       
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3.3) The Formation of BRICS  
 
BRICS can be seen as a malleable formation of states whose alliance network is employed both 
within and outside of formal international institutions. Though the BRICS grouping lacks a well 
defined institutional and structural framework, its elaboration is steadily built up though 
multilateral dialogue and the diplomatic documents which are a result thereof. Thus in order to 
understand the formation of BRICS, it is imperative to trace the beginnings of the multilateral 
meetings as well as the joint communiqués, declarations and statements that they have produced 
as the components which shape its existence.   
 
The official BRICS summits took place annually from 2009 onwards; the foundations for this 
grouping were instigated at several informal and formal meetings of gatherings with leaders from 
each country since 2006. Originally constructed as BRIC, excluding South Africa, the acronym 
merely existed as colloquial term in the corporate sector to refer to the world’s emerging market 
economies with strong growth potential. The informal diplomatic discussion for a new 
international grouping had its roots in St. Petersburg, in July 2006 where in trilateral format 
China, Russia and India held informal meetings, meant as a prelude to discussions in September 
later on that year to parallel the UN’s annual meeting, which would include Brazil. Informal 
discussions in gatherings held between Brazil, Russia, India and China continued on the sideline 
of general assembly meetings in New York until 2008 where a meeting independently prescribed 
on the sole focus of BRIC excluding any background context of the UN was commenced in 
Yekaterinburg, Russia. The foreign ministers of the four economies discussed broad topical 
issues, establishing the quadripartite joint communiqué reiterating the rhetoric on common 
approaches towards pressing issues on global development, securing equal opportunities for 
development, and noting the need for structural changes in the United Nations and global 
economic order.58  
 
Subsequent to the first exclusive albeit unofficial meeting of the grouping, were two more 
ministerial gatherings specifically related to finance issues spurred on by the international 
                                               
58 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Russia, Joint Communiqué of the Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Brazil, Russia, 
India and China, Yekaterinburg, Russia, 
http://www.mid.ru/Brp_4.nsf/arh/7824EB49B74B090FC325744B002A4C88, 16 May 2008.  
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economic crisis, parallel to the G20 meetings, the dialogue emerging from these meetings in 
2008 and early 2009 thereof voiced concern over protectionism and the reform of international 
financial institutions to deepen the current underrepresentation of emerging and developing 
countries.59        
 
The first official BRIC summit in Russia 2009 yielded a repeated rhetoric of support for a more 
multi-polar world order, supporting India and Brazil’s aspirations for greater role in the United 
Nations, and stressing the central role of the G20 in dealing with the international financial 
crisis. 60  What emerged from this first joint statement of the BRIC summit was a nutshell 
summary for the issues which had been previously discussed by the four countries at informal 
group meetings at the backdrop of the UN and G20 in the years prior. Though the diplomatic 
expressions were not new, the summit allowed for the announcing of a cohesive and clarified 
stance taken by the four emerging powers on general issues of concern in the global arena, 
showing a more well-defined diplomatic and unified general perspective.    
 
The second summit held in Brazil 2010, showed an attempt towards a loosely distinct plan of 
action and further refinement of common objectives. The declaration which presented itself at 
the end of the summit calibrated into specific topical issues, providing greater clarity in dividing 
the agenda into international trade, agriculture, energy, development, international and economic 
issues. With sector specific initiatives aimed at strengthening cooperation linking respective 
ministers of finance, agriculture and representatives for security issues. It was also the first time 
BRIC nations coordinated focused meetings of respective development banks, business forums 
and think tanks.61     
 
In between the second and the third summit the grouping gained the additional member of South 
Africa, at China’s insistence. Shortly after a heavy weighted bilateral engagement between China 
and South Africa in the upgrading to the “comprehensive strategic partnership” between the two 
countries, China invited South Africa to join BRIC, effectively rendering it BRICS.   The process 
                                               
59 Embassy of Brazil in London, Final Communiqué  of the Meeting of Finance Ministers of BRIC Countries Held 
in London, http://www.brazil.org.uk/press/articles_files/20090904.html, 04 Sep 2009.  
60 Russian Presidency, Joint Statement of the BRIC countries’ leaders, Yekaterinburg, 
http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/2009/06/217963.shtml, 16 June 2009.  
61 Russian Presidency, 2nd BRIC Summit of Heads of State and Government - Joint Statement, Brasilia, 
http://eng.news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/5, 15 April 2010 
Master’s Thesis of (Katherine) Hao-Fei Xiong  39 
 
of South Africa’s inclusion into BRICS was discussed in months prior to the official invitation, 
on the 23rd of December 2010 Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi informed his South African 
counterpart Minister Nkoana-Mashabane that China, in its capacity as rotating chairperson of 
BRIC, based on an agreement reached by fellow member states officially invites South Africa to 
be a full member of BRICS, with request to attend the third summit in Sanya, Hainan.62    
 
Sanya declaration in April 2011 stands as the most recent BRICS general agreement at summit 
level, emphasizing the theme “broad vision and shared prosperity” as a platform for dialogue and 
cooperation, though the Sanya declaration not as well structured as its immediate predecessor, it 
did specifically highlight: the concurrent term of all member states on the UN security Council 
for the year 2011 with particular concern for in the Middle East and North Africa, noting joint 
discern for the use of force and infringement on territorial integrity and sovereignty. With South 
Africa’s inclusions the declaration includes clause which supports the African Union High-Level 
Panel Initiative on Libya and development in Africa within the framework of New Partnership 
for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), as well as additionally encouragement for the hosting of 
COP17 in Durban.  
 
The summit churned out an all encompassing rhetoric advocating the individual concerns of all 
member states, the reiterated plan of action showed limited divergence from what was 
formulated prior at the Brazil 2010 Summit, with the continuation to hold topical based meetings 
between respective delegations on health, development, think tank symposiums, agriculture and 
within the BRICS business forum. Meetings of representatives from BRICS member states in 
during annual meetings of the UN and under the G20 framework in the IMF and World Bank 
was reemphasized, with informal periodical gatherings of representatives from member states in 
international organizations based in New York and Geneva. Stemming from this is the proposal 
to establish a BRICS group within UNESCO to further common strategies. 63               
 
                                               
62 Government of South Africa, Minister Nkoana-Mashabane on South Africa’s Full Membership of BRICS,  
http://www.info.gov.za/speech/DynamicAction?pageid=461&sid=15414&tid=26188 
,  24 Dec 2010. 
63 South Africa Presidency, Sanya Declaration on BRICS, 13 April 2011, 
http://www.info.gov.za/speech/DynamicAction?pageid=461&sid=17834&tid=32162, 15 April 2011 
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The formation of BRICS was originally initiated by informal discussions and meetings of the 
countries involved mostly in correlation with ongoing international events such as the annual UN 
General Assembly and G20 meetings, these joint communiqués set up the foundations of 
cooperation for the grouping to respond collectively to topical international issues. Dialogue 
amongst the four founding members was vibrant in the global arena in the years before its first 
official summit in 2009, and acted as a foretaste to the functioning of these countries 
coordinating issues of mutual concern in a formal grouping. Ultimately it is through the annual 
official Summits where general strategy and action is configured.   
 
As Sanya produced the first declaration emulating the newly updated BRICS formation, in many 
ways it was overly inclusive and the action plan was broad, lacking the uptake on further 
calibrating goals and strategies theoretically expected as meetings and summits of member states 
progress. Though BRICS still rests in its early stages, the current workings of the group thus far 
shows its executed functioning vacillates between nebulous and comparatively malleable.   
 
3.4) Functioning of BRICS 
 
There are two general mechanisms being constantly, albeit loosely, employed. Following the 
foundational precedence of BRICS member states gathering within the framework of 
international organizations, BRICS currently gathers on the side as a correlating working group 
to strategize common positions within the UN, IMF and World Bank at their respective 
headquarters.  
 
While concurrent to this, annual BRICS summits are used as a platform to centralize approaches 
of the alliance and to promote independent sectorial meetings between respective committees 
aimed at improving multilateral cooperation. Though much of the collective discourse in 
international organizations takes place on an informal basis between representatives of member 
states in association with their participation in formal institutions. However independent BRICS 
summits are the main arena which provides the continuous formation for the mode of operation. 
  
The grouping works steadily to institutionalize itself through ministerial meetings, gatherings of 
permanent representatives at international institutions, annual summits and the concurrent 
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business cooperation forums which accompany these meetings. BRICS action is yet to evolve 
beyond mainly discourse, lacking a fully fledged cooperation agenda. More coherencies in 
BRICS can be achieved through the application of agreed upon agenda, which is yet to be seen. 
The plan of action emerging as the eventual consequence of the BRICS summit declarations 
omits clear cut goals showing the unison which help define the growing political entity of 
BRICS.       
 
BRICS in practice is still most cohesively grouped around the mutual umbrella term of emerging 
economies, dealing with economic and trade issues can thus be more effectively achieved as a 
prelude to higher levels of strategic cooperation in international diplomacy.   
 
Though the functioning of BRICS is still being constantly defined, it is safe to assume that it will 
continue to remain in the confines of soft power focus in omitting security issues on it general 
agenda. At most BRICS roam on the political and economic levels of the chessboard of power, 
with a clear mitigation of coalition efforts to diffuse unipolar military power in the international 
sphere.   
 
3.5) Comparing the Characteristics of BRICS Countries  
 
3.5.1) Analyzing Reservations on South Africa’s Eligibility    
 
BRICS is conventionally thought of as the cluster of the world’s most prominent rising 
economies, with impressive growth forecasts and expected economic dominance which in turn 
can be translated into political power. Before becoming a political alliance the grouping was 
originally linked solely through economic likeness and investment potential, despite its evolution 
towards agendas that are more diverse insofar as encompassing political objectives, it is still 
commonly thought of as a gang of economic rising powers.  
Therefore when South Africa was invited to join BRICS, there was much speculation and 
discussion on whether or not the country’s entry into the grouping was a legitimate fit in relative 
comparison to the economic prowess of its counterparts, South Africa very noticeably lags 
behind in being able to yield the same investment and financial indicators as fellow member 
Master’s Thesis of (Katherine) Hao-Fei Xiong  42 
 
states. In global fiscal rankings South Africa is much further down the list than other BRIC states, 
putting the congruence of BRICS into question.  
 
There exists the perception that there is less commonality between South Africa and fellow 
BRICS member states, and if by convention the grouping is one based on rising power 
commonality there would seem to be limited gain in including South Africa, the smallest partner 
of the group. Commentators sometimes refer to the fortuitous inclusion in the bloc as a great 
opportunity for the country to “punch above its weight”,            
 
In total BRICS (South Africa included) represents 40% of the world’s population, and close to a 
quarter of its economic output. In forecasting for growth in these economies (South Africa 
excluded) predict that by 2020 the bloc will become a economic hegemon whose combined 
economies will be larger than that of the US at around a possible 25$trillion. Jim O’Neil the 
Goldman Sachs manager who originally coined the term BRICS has asserts that in addition four 
founding BRIC members Mexico, Turkey, Indonesia and South Korea will in total become the 
eight future growth markets of the world economy.64 If after all the strongest commonality and 
prerequisite of the BRICS bloc are similar economic characteristics, than in terms of emerging 
economic credentials, there are other candidates who merit membership from an economic 
growth perspective more than South Africa.  
 
GDP as Percentage of BRICS Total (2010)  
Source: 2011 BRICS Statistical Report.65 
                                               
64 Zhang, C, O’ Neil Says BRIC Nations No longer Emerging Markets, 
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Table Comparing Indicators of BRICS Countries (2010 Data) 
 Brazil Russia India China South 
Africa 
Total population  
(unit in millions) 191 142 1182 1338 50 
Real GDP Growth Rate 7.50% 4.00% 10.10% 10.30% 2.80% 
GDP- at current prices  
(Est. unit in billion US$)  2000 1460 1300 5800 360 
Inflow of FDI 
(Est.  unit in billion US $) 46 14 25 105 1.5 
Source: 2011 BRICS Statistical Report
66 
 
South Africa’s economic credentials dwarf in comparison, making it difficult to form a 
compelling argument based on economic weight, BRIC partners are identified by their structural 
importance to the global economy with a significant population, markets, proportion of global 
trade and investment potential.67 In glancing at the comparisons, South Africa noticeably dwarfs 
in all these criteria.  
 
However it is important to note that the intentions of the BRICS grouping was to evolve beyond 
mere economic association in the perception of the global investment community, the BRICS 
political grouping at summit level is a coordinated attempt to translate combined economic 
power into international political clout. Therefore accounting for the economic gap between 
South Africa and BRIC partners are geo-political considerations and diplomatic strategy.   
 
In an effort to consolidate the impression that BRICS is a rising force, the inclusion of South 
Africa forms from the logic that it will facilitate the BRIC partners’ consolidated efforts to push 
for engagement with Africa. In line with the common vision for a more equally distributed 
                                               
66 Loc. Cit  
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multipolar world, the addition of a regional African power boosts legitimacy as a “South-South” 
grouping thereby increasing the power of a collective voice when speaking on behalf emerging 
market and developing states; effectively aiding BRICS when dealing with issues of fairness in 
the global system. Moreover, South Africa has in the past shown itself to be a reliable and 
present participant in several coalitions with other BRIC members, most notably in the G8 
outreach 5, IBSA, BASIC and the G20.68 In addition to this South Africa, the most diversified 
economy and largest investor, in the global south, on the Africa continent, with companies active 
in at least half of all African countries.69  Thus, from a wider perspective, when it comes to 
relative comparisons of representatives from each region, South Africa is an apt geopolitical 
choice as the largest economy in Africa and accounts for a third of total GDP in sub-Saharan 
Africa; it offers a point of entry into the continent, particularly when it comes to resource 
exploitation taking into consideration the BRIC propensity to invest.70 In a mutually beneficial 
opportunity BRICS markets provide a broader destination for South African goods while at the 
same time this association provides scope for enhanced cooperation in niche synergies such as 
agriculture, technology and infrastructure as well as sources of investment capital to further 
develop corporate expansion projects.71     
 
Recent reports by the IMF and the McKinsey Global Institute indicate that Africa’s improved 
economic potential, based on the current trajectory the continent will reach better prospects in 
coming decades with enormous raw material reserves, 60 percent of usable arable land, a young 
population which can be harnessed for increased labor and consumption as well as improved 
economic governance positions Africa as the new center, or “last frontier” for global economic 
growth.72      
 
                                               
68 Loc.cit  
69 Xinhua News, South Africa Brings Special Insights into BRICS, Beijing Times, 
http://en.ce.cn/subject/brics/bricso/201104/12/t20110412_22359022.shtml, 12 April 2011.    Last accessed: 
10/12/2011 
70 Makwiramiti, A, BRICS: A Friendship of Convenience?, Consultancy Africa, 
http://www.consultancyafrica.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=789:brics-a-friendship-of-
convenience-&catid=87:african-finance-a-economy&Itemid=294, 01 July 2011.                 Last Accessed 
05/12/2011  
71 Oxford Analytica, South Africa’s BRICS Membership Will Disappoint,  Daily Brief, 
http://www.oxan.com/Analysis/DailyBrief/Samples/SouthAfricaBRICSMembership.aspx, `18 March 2011 
72 Carim, X, “Perspective: Department of Trade and Industry”, in Kornegay, F and Masters, L, From BRIC to 
BRICS, Institute for Global Dialogue, May 2011. P.79 
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South Africa was ranked 19th by the UN’s world investment prospects survey, which examined 
countries according to their eligibility as host economies for FDI. China was placed first 
followed by India, Brazil, the US and Russia. Therefore despite the economic disparity, all 
BRICS countries are considered prime destinations for foreign investment, suggesting an alluring 
proposition for potential of FDI exchanges between BRICS economies. More importantly, given 
that Africa’s commercial terrain is a difficult landscape to manage the South African corporate 
sector has an already existing pan-African presence which is attractive to foreign multi-nationals 
with the propensity to invest and expand on the continent.73  
 
South Africa’s Growth in Exports to the African Continent Since 2000  
 
Source: Standard Bank Research
74
 
 
 
                                               
73Freemantle, S, “Perspective: Standard Bank Is There an IBSA-BRIC Business Future?”, in Kornegay, F and 
Masters, L, From BRIC to BRICS, Institute for Global Dialogue, May 2011. P.99 
74 Loc. Cit 
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Considering the familiarity of South Africa’s corporate sector with engaging in business within 
Africa, it is viewed as an optimal bridge for international corporate entities, particularly from the 
BRICS countries to connect more directly in the continents growth trajectory in terms of 
business activity.  
 
Therefore the logic of South Africa’s inclusion is twofold; the position of South Africa as the 
prime economy and proverbial leader on the continent provides BRICS with a strategic political 
and economic conduit. Not only drawing on diplomatic strategy of harnessing an Africa 
representative but keeping opportunities open for foraging future trade and investment ties as 
well. However it is important to note that despite the narrative surrounding African credentials 
enhancing BRICS geopolitical significance, and its perceived influence on the continent and as 
an economic point of entry that was a major factor which attracted membership into the grouping, 
it should be noted that regardless of South Africa’s political self perception as the continents 
representative and spokesperson in the international arena whether or not it truly it is able to 
assume the guise of Africa’s collective interests is still questionable.   
 
However it is important to note that as the BRICS grouping gradually and presumably grows into 
the shoes of a collective future economic hegemon, it will be vital for South Africa to pull its 
weight amongst fellow partners and demonstrate efficacy; to do this it must be able to offer more 
than the rhetoric and perception which furthered its initial entrance into BRICS.  
 
3.5.2) Atypical Member: Russia in BRICS   
 
BRICS formation is in itself an obvious group of diverse states, at different levels of 
development, democratic and non-democratic, and economic standing. As questions are posed on 
South Africa’s economic eligibility to the congruence of the group, Russia must also be picked 
out as the atypical member. Unlike its fellow BRICS countries, it is not a developing state by the 
traditional definition. It did not suffer to any degree a subjugation of colonialism or the 
development challenges that arose thereof, it does not grapple with the novelty of a budding 
international diplomatic persona nor is it necessarily a genuine regional power considering the 
power dynamics of the European continent. Russia has remained in a relative degree of 
segregated participation from major multilateral networks and coalitions. More true to form is 
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the characterization of Russia as a former superpower, eager to regain a status, therefore to this 
end what Russia shares with emerging regional powers is the aspiration of dislodging western 
hegemony in order to gain a greater share of the world stage as its common 
denominator.75Combined BRICS actions and statements strongly reflect the sentiments of the 
global south and often reach out into the status of south-south cooperation. Despite this Russia 
was a vital driving force behind the formation and continued gathering of BRICS, stems largely 
from its individual interest, multilateral networks help aid its ambition to pursue a more 
prominent role in the international system by mitigating its isolation. Therefore Russia’s 
congruency with developing world sentiments is strategically etched into the need to obstruct 
western international agendas in a effort to forward its own.        
 
3.6) Overview of Current Relations between China and South Africa   
 
In the past few years increase exchanges on all levels had grow exponentially between China and 
South Africa, as expected with budding economic interaction, diplomatic engagements and 
political agreements thereof have also further developed. Since the Pretoria declaration on 
establishing a partnership between the two countries, a more concise strategic partnership was 
developed in 2004, followed by the elaboration on this in the program of cooperation on 
deepening the strategic partnership between China and South Africa in 2006. Concurrent to 
increased and expected growth of trade and investment, both respective governments sought to 
further solidifying and coordinated bilateral engagements through forming the comprehensive 
strategic partnership in 2010, which can be assumed to be one of the determining factors in the 
prelude to South Africa’s invitation into BRICS at China’s insistence.      
 
3.6.1) Comprehensive Strategic Partnership  
 
From the 23rd to the 26th of August 2010 China and South Africa further developed bilateral 
relations by upgrading to adopt a comprehensive strategic partnership. The declaration that 
emerged was one that reiterated but also further defined past diplomatic rhetoric.   
 
                                               
75 Laidi, Z, “The BRICS Against the West”, CERI Strategy Papers, Sciences Po, No. 11, November 2011. P.9  
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In the high level exchange between President Zuma and President Hu, the declaration articulated 
the enhancing of future strategic bilateral dialogue through annual ministerial meetings between 
China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and South Africa’s Department of International Relations 
and Cooperation to be held in addition to the two year bi-national commissions. In the sphere of 
economic cooperation a joint working group will be established under the joint economic and 
trade committee to study statistical discrepancies in bilateral trade, whilst China has pledged to 
support South Africa’s manufacturing industry through increased investment and to promote 
value added activities. Additionally, companies will be encouraged to look into cooperation for 
infrastructural projects.76  
 
With regards to international and regional affairs, both countries have reaffirmed their 
commitment to promote and protect multilateralism as well as enhance the representation of 
developing world countries in international financial institutions. Furthermore, special mention is 
made about the G20 voicing support for concerted effort towards developing world 
representation in addressing and facilitating global economic recovery. And in relation to 
respective agenda based multilateral forums, China expressed support for South Africa’s 
initiatives in the AU, the implementation of NEPAD, and participation in other Regional 
Economic Organizations. Special mention of the Forum for China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) 
was also made articulating China’s undertaking to enhance institution building and 
implementation of FOCAC programs, and acknowledging South Africa’s offer to host the 6th 
ministerial conference in 2015.77    
 
The current declarations between the two countries epitomize a new precipice in relations and 
heightened interaction, as economic engagement is further facilitated and solidified by 
diplomatic engagement and the policy agreements stemming from these interactions.  
    
 
 
 
                                               
76 Department of International Relations and Cooperation, Beijing Declaration on the Establishment of A 
Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of South Africa, 
Official document, 24 August 2010.  
77 Loc. Cit.  
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3.6.2) A Crescendo in Sino-South African Economic Relations  
  
Since the formal establishment of relations in 1998 and the creation of the bi national 
commission in 2001, trade and investment between China and South Africa has grown 
exponentially. Increased economic relations between two countries acts as both a prelude and 
obligatory basis for increased bilateral ties on a political level, ultimately trade provides an 
opportunity for both sides to reap individual benefits. And can be considered as the cornerstone 
in the foundation in China’s relationship with South Africa, notwithstanding the diplomatic 
strategic usefulness of being in good relations.  
 
Graph Showing South Africa’s Trade with China  
 
Source: Department of Trade and Industry
78
  
The exponential growth of trade between the two countries can be highlighted through the rise in 
exports and imports. In 2006 South African trade with China totaled US$13.6million in exports 
and US$48.7million in imports, by 2011 exports and imports totaled US$68,6million and 
82.2million respectively. In terms of trade composition exports to China includes chromium, 
manganese, copper, coal, nickel and aluminum. While imports from China mostly included 
manufactured electronic and industrial devices categorized as machine parts and accessories, and 
data processing machines.79    
                                               
78 Graph formatted from data available from the DTI. See reference 79.  
79Department of Trade and Industry, South African Trade by Countries- China, 2007-2011,  
http://apps.thedti.gov.za/econdb/raportt/RA6483.html,                         Last accessed: 15/12/2011  
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Source: Department of Trade and Industry
80
  
 
As trade increases with China the trade deficit between the two countries has shown a steady 
decrease in recent years, with the trade gap gradually growing smaller. However it is important 
to note that while the reduction of trade deficit is promising, the composition of trade is equally 
as important. South African exports are still primary by nature and included only a limited 
amount of value added and manufactured goods, on the other hand China’s imports consist 
almost entirely of manufactured or secondary goods.  
 
The two countries have established a bilateral mechanism under the bi national commission for 
trade and investment cooperation, where issues such as trade imbalance, are regularly discussed 
through the Joint Economic and Trade Committee (JETC).81 With regards to investment, Chinese 
investment in South Africa is in excess of R37billion since 2003, roughly R3.8billion of which is 
focused on metals. In 2008 the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China purchased 20percent of 
Standard Bank for R43billion. South Africa ranks second in China’s mining investment in Africa, 
behind the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Whilst South African companies such as Naspers, 
                                               
80 Graph formatted from the available data, Loc. Cit.  
81 Department of Trade and Industry, China Country Briefing, 
http://www.dti.gov.za/parliament/052610_Briefing_1_China.pdf. 2010. P. 4 
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AngloGold, First National Bank, and SAB miller have investments in China which total roughly 
US$600million.82  
 
In March 2010, the SA-China Economic and Trade Forum which was held in Pretoria, saw 
companies from both countries partake in a contract signing ceremony amounting to a total of 
US$ 311 million.83  Trade and investment play an imperative role to political relations both in 
the bilateral China-South Africa engagement and on a larger level between fellow BRICS states. 
Much like other African Countries such as Tanzania, Ghana, Nigeria and Ethiopia, China 
features as the largest trading partner of South Africa.  
South Africa, on the other hand does not feature on China’s top 5 trading partner’s list which 
includes the EU, US, Japan and South Korea.  Amongst the other top ten African countries that 
trade with China: Angola, Nigeria and Sudan all of which are oil based in exports, South Africa 
is China’s second largest Africa trading partner (behind Angola) and holds the unique position in 
being the largest trading partner with a diversified economy accounting for 18% of China’s total 
trade with Africa.84  
 
Therefore despite the waning of the trade deficit, in terms of unadulterated economic leverage 
South Africa is still in an obligatory position with its largest trade partner, however in terms of 
political and economic tact South Africa offers a amicable and reliable partner in the region and 
thus, from a broader perspective is able to yield a small leverage against China’s economic 
incentives.    
 
South Africa’s diplomatic actions and incorporation with the business sector in its engagement 
both on bilateral and multilateral level with China and BRICS reflect the awareness of the 
potential gains in strengthening economic relations through available opportunities. President 
Zuma arrived in Beijing prior to the signing of the comprehensive strategic partnership 
agreement, with a 350 strong delegation of business leaders representing companies across 
                                               
82 Ibid. P.6  
83 Ibid, P.7 
84 Yong, L, China’s Trade Rush with Africa, Forum on China Africa Cooperation, 
http://www.focac.org/eng/zfgx/t820242.htm, April 2011.                         Last accessed: 14/12/2011  
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sectors. With over a dozen bilateral agreements signed on this occasion.85 The state visit was 
kick started with the meeting of the South-Africa China business council, where President Zuma 
emphasized the expansion of foreign trade for South Africa is a means in pursuit of the ultimate 
goal of improving the standards of living. Economic growth is viewed as a catalyst to achieving 
development goals, and therefore in relation to domestic goals China’s partnership in economic 
interaction is clearly outlined.86   
 
These actions and diplomatic statements are illustrations of South Africa’s willingness to take 
advantage of new trade and investment opportunities. The independent initiative indicates clearly 
defined domestic objectives as ends to the means of fostering foreign trade with China.         
 
3.6.3) China’s Clout in South Africa’s Ascension to BRICS and Respective Individual Benefits 
 
South Africa’s insistence in joining BRIC can be traced back to the 2009 summit in Russia 
where through private diplomatic communication President Zuma requested that member states 
consider including South Africa as an African representative in the grouping. It was however, not 
until the comprehensive partnership meeting in Beijing that President Hu formally accepted 
South Africa’s request shortly followed by an official invitation.87  
 
Entry into BRICS was collectively agreed upon by all members, though it is palpable to see the 
strategic individual benefit that both China and South Africa gain from this arrangement in terms 
of political tactic and economic prospects. For China benefits in a public diplomacy, inviting 
South Africa into BRICS as a partner will help counter continuing negative accusations of neo-
colonialist resource exploitation by reaffirming the willingness to include and show 
consideration for African representation.88  
 
                                               
85 Consulate-General of the PRC in Cape Town, China, South Africa Upgrade Relations to “Comprehensive 
Strategic Partnership”, http://capetown.china-consulate.org/eng/gdxw/t726883.htm, 24 Aug 2011.                                                                                                   
Last accessed: 14/12/2011  
86 Speech by President Zuma, Address by President Zuma to South Africa-China Business Forum, Beijing, 
http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/2010/jzum0824.html, 24 Aug 2010.   
87 China Interview: World Dialogue, Transcript of Interview with Malcomson Representative at the South African 
Embassy, http://www.focac.org/eng/zfgx/t808932.htm, 23 March 2011. Last accessed: 15/11/2011  
88 Oxford Analytica, Op. Cit  
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Bringing in South Africa to the cluster can be seen as a further consolidation of bilateral relations 
both on an exclusive basis and in non-exclusive multilateral basis. In other words the kinship 
with South Africa can be leaned on to China’s benefit in related multilateral forums such as 
FOCAC and BASIC, giving China a useful partner and obligatory supporter, furthermore the 
incorporation of all IBSA countries into BRICS ensures that China (along with Russia) is able to 
steer developing world agenda through the influence of this grouping. China’s persuasion in 
BRICS allows it to cast a shadow of influence over IBSA thereby maintaining position as the 
global chief manager in guiding rhetoric and action on behalf of the developing world.    
 
In China-South Africa relations and its multiple extensions into BRICS, FOCAC and to a lesser 
extent BASIC, China has political capital with its engagement with the rest of Africa. And fits 
squarely into the narrative of China’s Africa Policy, using South Africa as a strategic lynchpin, 
as illustrated by attempts through diplomatic declaration, in the comprehensive strategic 
partnership agreement, to further integrate South Africa in FOCAC through uniting on issues of 
development. And in line with China’s economic aspirations, South Africa’s corporate sector is 
an important player in trade and investment within and beyond the SADC region, with an annual 
amount of investment at an estimate US$ 1.4 billion. South Africa holds a strong position in 
regions’ finance, power generation, telecom, construction and agricultural sectors. Thereby 
offering corporate entities with networks and learnt experience in operations which China-
BRICS related capital can help fund and further elaborate.89      
 
On the peripheral concerns of international disapproval for China’s contribution towards 
pollution, enhanced multilateral engagement with South Africa further reinforces the bonds in 
the BASIC grouping, allowing a buffer against developed world’s apprehension on agreements 
over climate change. In retrospect of the past short term, the invitations of South Africa to 
become a fully fledged member seems premeditated in timing ahead of the Copenhagen 17 
conference, and temporary term on the UN Security Council.    
 
On the other hand for South Africa, there too lie individual benefits. South Africa wants to be a 
part of an active force in the reshaping of the global order, reinforcing the existing and future 
                                               
89 China Times, China-South Africa Cooperation Under BRICS Framework, 
http://www.focac.org/eng/mtsy/t816478.htm,  04 April 2011.         Last accessed: 14/12/2011  
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bilateral engagement with these four countries.  As the economic and political prowess of BRICS 
grows, so will South Africa’s influence on the continent by association to it. Though there may 
be some potential strain in this arrangement as South Africa’s individual interests in many parts 
differ from its neighbors. In principle, belonging to BRICS, allows South Africa new 
opportunities to trade and investment as it deepens a linkage with global growth centers. With 
support from China, under a multilateral trade framework that is ongoing in its definition, there 
is potential in linking up specific industries such as agriculture, manufacturing, infrastructure, 
minerals beneficiation between South Africa and BRIC partners. 90 Additionally, in terms of 
political prestige, BRICS membership allows South Africa to reassert its position as regional 
leader in the international arena.    
 
Moreover, hypothetically South Africa, though not as immense as fellow rising powers, is still 
thrown up against the same threshold as other BRICS member states when it comes to formal 
and informal constraints in the international system. Membership of this group allows a platform 
to voice concerns and eliminated future possible impediments to be encountered on the path of 
South Africa’s economic growth.  The current relative amorphous tendency of the group can be 
ironically beneficial to a newcomer member state, as it affords leniency to shape the ever 
changing agenda and functioning of BRICS. Essentially allowing South Africa, and by loose 
extension Africa, a handle in being able to define a part in where it fits into the ever changing 
global order.  
 
3.7) BRICS versus IBSA: Preclusion or Propagation?  
 
Though BRICS has diverted much attention as a new consolidated centre of cooperation amongst 
dominant states of the global south, its emergence was preceded by the middle power grouping 
of India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA).  
 
IBSA was launched in 2003, and much like BRICS, was intended to be a forum for dialogue and 
cooperation where countries could collectively tackle the common agendas of influencing 
change in the global economy and restructuring institutions of global governance. A club of like 
minded democratic regional powers, IBSA has seemingly lost momentum over the years and 
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particularly and since the recent formation of BRICS its future as an effective block has been put 
into question. In the analysis surrounding BRIC (before the inclusion of South Africa), there 
remained the projecting concern that BRIC would marginalize South Africa and divide south-
south cooperation as Brazil and India would most likely side with more powerful states of China 
and Russia. However the IBSA-three countries now exist as an informal fraction within BRICS, 
posing the question about whether or not BRICS will overshadow IBSA to a point of preclusion, 
rendering the IBSA forum to be redundant and obsolete or if the dual existence and functioning 
of both will be successfully incorporated into mechanisms which assist in propagating and 
coherently coordinated the agendas of the countries involved. 
 
On the one hand, South Africa’s inclusion in BRICS ensures dual participation in both IBSA and 
BRICS thereby nullifying the potential of marginalization from international groupings; however 
the influence of bigger players such as China and Russia may disintegrate the cohesiveness of 
the IBSA-three countries effectively rendering the IBSA group unnecessary due to the similar 
objectives of the two groupings.  
 
The IBSA group has its origins at the G8 Evian Summits in 2003, subsequent to India, Brazil and 
South Africa being invited as developing world participants to the summit, the IBSA dialogue 
forum was established in 2004. The forum has since met five times at summit level to discuss 
issues of trade and other international issues of mutual concern. IBSA has an informal structure, 
without a official secretariat, a method of engagement which BRICS has also followed with its 
structure and grouping. Stemming from the lack of a permanent secretariat both IBSA and 
BRICS rely on multiple factors of engagement through wide latitude of sectors in encouraging 
increased multilateralism between the countries. IBSA having been the older forum of the two, 
has had time to develop and evolve in the way it functions as a forum, by practice IBSA has 
established three pillars approach. First, are the political forums at summit level which issue 
declarations and communiqués, conveying the countries’ shared opinions on main issues. Second, 
are working groups which include forums that span across different topics ranging from trade 
and business, media to gender issues. Third is the IBSA facility fund, designed to finance 
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development projects in developing countries, the fund is managed by the UNDP and has 
assisted in poverty alleviation projects in Haiti, Burundi and Timor-Leste amongst others.91  
 
Trilateral trade is one of the main concrete areas of cooperation where visible results have been 
achieved, with trade increase between the three countries rising from $3.9 billion in 2003-2004 
to approximately $10.4 billion in 2007-2008. Discussions are still ongoing for the formation of 
trilateral trade arrangement between the three countries.92  
 
Though there is a fare amount of overlap between IBSA statements and the objective announced 
in BRICS meetings, IBSA’s aspirations for change and greater representation for the global 
south in international organizations is also largely reverberated by BRICS, therefore in this 
regard India, Brazil and South Africa through the combined weight of BRICS may be able to 
exert more influence by having their agendas in international organizations such as the UN and 
WTO being jointly represented by China and Russia in BRICS. IBSA has its own sectoral 
working groups who have established a method of engagement on their own accord regardless of 
this similar repetition in the BRICS arena, therefore the functional cooperation fostered will 
mostly likely be maintained considering the time and effort invested in the IBSA initiative. 
Furthermore one distinct feature of IBSA which is largely absent in BRICS is the IBSAMAR, 
the India, Brazil and South Africa Naval Exercises,93 with security cooperation in defense for the 
purpose of education and training. Essentially IBSA and BRICS are not coalitions which 
represent and either/or zero sum option for their member states. 94 Therefore there lies the 
potential to in managing IBSA’s agenda so that it is complementary to that of BRICS, whilst still 
maintaining relevance for the dialogue forum.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
91 Sotero, P, Emerging Powers IBSA and the future of South- South Cooperation, Special Report: Woodrow Wilson 
International Centre for Scholars, August 2009. P.4-6.  
92 Ibid. P.5  
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Chapter 4: BRICS in the 2011 United Nations Security Council  
 
4.1) Introduction 
 
The United Nations Security Council essential serves as the principle organ of global governance 
in the international arena, in 2011 the BRICS member states held seats on the UNSC. Permanent 
members Russia and China were accompanied by Brazil, South Africa and India, serving 
temporary rotating terms. Analysis of actions and statements made within the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) for 2011 is particularly poignant considering that BRICS all 
encompassing presence in the highest body of the UN shows reminisce of whether or not there is 
a degree of cooperation matching the new emerging concerted rhetoric of these countries. The 
council can be viewed as a microcosm representing the push and pull dynamics of global 
geopolitical conflict and cooperation, with the potential to shape the future strategic landscape. 
Considering BRICS fundamental intentions of the pursuit of instilling global south interests, an 
all inclusive BRICS-UNSC can be viewed as a testing ground for efficacy of the multilateral 
strategic partnership in regard to how successful they are to advancing each of their own 
individual agendas in tandem with the Security Council and fellow multilateral BRICS partners. 
Intertwined in this process, the nature and credibility of the foreign identities of the new 
members of the UNSC is also tested. As the IBSA three has had to navigate the traditional 
western powers of the US, UK and France balanced with their pseudo coalition partners of China 
and Russia.95    
 
The long standing narrative of Brazil, India and South Africa in pursuit of Security Council 
restructuring is yet to be seen. Although the presence of BRICS in the UNSC prompts the 
discussion of whether or not the rising influence of IBSA three countries is ever more present in 
the UNSC would naturally instigate any concerted effort to follow through on the rhetoric.  
 
For South Africa more specifically, the international context in which it takes the second tenure 
on the Security Council has changed significantly. With the concurrent interplay of the increased 
bilateral ties with China and multilateral ties with other BRICS states being balanced with 
mounting self perceived expectation to lead an African agenda in tandem with Nigeria, whose 
presence is an added dynamic to maneuver as it too attempts to drive the interests of the 
                                               
95 Kornegay, F, Op. Cit,  P23-24  
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continent forward. Moreover, South Africa has also attempted to bear the burden of correlating 
Africa Union decisions with countries’ whose crisis are concurrently bought to the UNSC.  
 
2011 has proven to be a particularly challenging year for the international community in regards 
to maintaining global peace and security amidst a series of uprisings and revolutions across 
North Africa and the Middle East. The Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia was the catalyst of the 
Arab Spring which eventually saw mass protests and reactive violent suppression across at least 
fifteen countries.96 In this context, of particular importance was Libya and Syria, both of whom 
necessitated Security Council action in regards to the repercussions of violent uprisings in their 
respective countries. In addition to the happenings of the Arab Spring, the conflict in Sudan 
change course as South Sudan became the newest recognized independent state in the world. As 
a result of the events in 2011, a much debated topic of protection of civilians became a 
prominent subject of discourse across several issues and draft resolutions that came before the 
Security Council.  
 
Of the 66 resolutions adopted by the UNSC this year, 40 of them concerned Africa, while 115 
out of 213 of the public meetings convened dealt with issues related to the African continent. In 
addition to the much focused upon events of the Arab spring, resolutions were passed on both 
South Sudan. Considering that South Africa has positioned itself explicitly and implicitly as the 
representative and leader for Africa issues in the global arena. UNSC activity in 2011 provides 
an enclave of analysis for South Africa’s foreign policy in action. With Sino-South African 
bilateral relations reaching a new precipice, this dynamic combined with the newfound 
proverbial grouping of the BRICS states provide a relevant basis of analysis for voting activity 
amidst conflict and accommodation in the UNSC.     
 
The 2011 rotating non permanent council members in addition to South Africa, India, Brazil also 
included Colombia, Germany, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Gabon, Lebanon and Nigeria, Portugal. 
As of January 2012 the newly elected countries of Azerbaijan, Guatemala, Morocco, Pakistan 
and Togo will begin their two-year terms replacing Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Gabon, 
Lebanon and Nigeria. Whilst Russia and China remain as permanent and veto members on the 
                                               
96 Namely Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, 
Syria, Yemen and Tunisia.   
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council, Brazil has just concluded its tenth tenure on the UNSC, in equal standing with Japan as 
one of the most frequent non-permanent members. India is currently serving for the seventh time 
whilst it remains South Africa’s second tenure since the 2007-2008 rotation.97 
 
South Africa’s voting behavior during its first tenure on the UNSC sparked widespread criticism 
for failing to demonstrate congruence with international expectations of the country to uphold 
perceived principles to human rights and democracy.  Much of the commentary during the 
previous tenure cited growing economic relations with China as a possible reason for voting 
decisions taken, implying that a quid pro quo dynamic was being played in the background.  
 
South Africa’s current tenure has thus far been marked with criticism for indecisiveness in 
foreign policy objectives specifically in relation to Libya. The series of events which unfolded 
through a wave of uprisings, as far as the BRICS dimension to UNSC voting goes in the case of 
Libya South Africa was seen to be largely out of synch with not only the BRICS grouping but 
the expectations of the international community as a whole. This chapter analyses the voting 
behavior and diplomatic positions of BRICS member states over the three main issues of Libya, 
Syria and Sudan before the UNSC, by fleshing out Security Council resolutions and statements 
made by official representatives at its meetings. Examining on the level of cooperation taken 
between South Africa and China as well as amongst BRICS states at the UNSC for 2011, 
showing that as the year progressed a stronger sense of cooperation arose which was particularly 
evident in the difference of unity shown and expressed between the crisis of Libya and Syria.  
 
The China-South Africa nexus is evident in the combined cooperation in political stance and 
voting positions in the Security Council which has been further amplified by the enhanced 
assistance of other BRICS states. There is indication of a fair degree of yielding to each other’s 
agendas, where in Libya’s case both China and Russia conveyed their disapprove through 
abstentions, along with Brazil and India, and choose not to block the no fly resolutions to which 
South Africa had voted “yes” and initially supported. In the case of Syria, South Africa had 
strongly supported Russia and China’s apprehension on the intended reimplementation of a 
Libyan no fly zone demilitarized model as a infringement on sovereignty, which too had the 
                                               
97 UN Department of Public Information, Security Council 2011 Roundup, 
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backing of India and Brazil both in the form of abstentions and diplomatic rhetoric before the 
Security Council.  All BRICS states explicitly commended South African led AU efforts, on the 
referendum and subsequent separation of North and South Sudan, an issue which has been 
ongoing since South Africa’s first tenure on the Security Council.  
 
In the previous opportunity to examine cooperative behavior between China and South Africa on 
the UN Security Council, there existed a fair amount of congruency in the perspective taken on 
the issues which came before the council, the common stance was a combination of individual 
agendas which remain on the same side of the coin, in addition to a general developing world 
solidarity present in the reactive resistance of western led agendas in the global south. 2011 was 
the second tenure in which China and South Africa’s simultaneous presence on the Security 
Council was accompanied by fellow developing world leaders of Brazil and India, in addition to 
Russia had resulted in a BRICS five member strong grouping within the UN.      
 
4.2) China and South Africa Concurrent Membership: Past Reputations on the UNSC 2007-2008   
 
During the previous concurrent membership of both South Africa and China in 2007-2008, 
several pivotal human rights cases concerning various countries had come before the council. 
China’s voting behavior, though still provoking criticism is often anticipated by human rights 
activists in international civil society. However South Africa’s voting behavior in the previous 
tenure concerning several key cases had sparked a storm of negative criticism often citing a 
surrendered bilateral relationship with China as one of the explanations for the synergies in 
voting.  
 
Considering the numerous cases involving African countries or thematic debates which are 
strongly relevant to the continent, both South Africa and China’s position are placed from unique 
perspectives balancing self interest and the maintenance of wider relations. The 2007-2008 
tenure provided cases which would affect the interests of the two countries. Controversial voting 
over resolutions for Myanmar, Zimbabwe and Sudan had become the focal point for highlighting 
developing world resistance to sanctions in the UNSC, and the struggle for the pursuit of their 
respective agendas.       
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In review, though neither India or Brazil were on the UNSC for 2007-2008, although individual 
agendas may differ, many of the synergized voting patterns of China and South Africa were also 
mirrored by Russia indicating the probability of a general position being formed in the UNSC 
against western developed states by leaders of the global south.  
 
4.2.1) Zimbabwe  
 
Prior to the power sharing agreement between Robert Mugabe and Morgan Tsvangari, the 
situation in Zimbabwe was considered of grave humanitarian concern by western states. A draft 
resolution had come before the UNSC in July 2008 attempting to place sanctions and travel bans 
on Zimbabwe and its’ top officials. The resolution was sponsored by the US and the UK, and 
vetoed by China and Russia.98 South Africa had too voted no to the resolution citing that it was a 
member of the efforts in the AU and Southern African Development Community (SADC) which 
were instigating their own process to quell the situation. South Africa’s proverbial African 
leadership position was an obvious factor in disagreeing with the resolution, rather prioritizing 
the agreements made through regional led efforts than endorse a western proposed punitive 
action which would have been received with great resentment and undermined the then ongoing 
SADC mediation process.99 The growing trade relationship between China and Zimbabwe at the 
time was also an undeniable factor in affecting Chinese agenda, by proxy China’s diaspora 
economic interests needed a safeguard, in addition to fleshing out cooperation with South Africa 
in the international arena. Therefore the congruency shown in disapproving sanctions on 
Zimbabwe was a combination of individual interests which translated into a cooperative common 
stance.   
 
4.2.2) Myanmar  
  
Of similar international condemnation was Myanmar’s totalitarian regime, which has long been 
considered to enjoy the buffer of China’s guardianship in the global arena. Though significant 
progress regarding the country’s improvements towards democracy has been made since South 
                                               
98 BBC News, Zimbabwe Sanctions Vetoed, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7502965.stm, 12 July 2008. Last accessed: 
07/02/2012.  
99 Masters, L, South Africa in the UN Security Council 2011-2012, Institute for Global Dialogue, 18 November 
2010. Pg. 13-14. 
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Africa’s first tenure, the UNSC held an emergency session in January 2007 to consider a joint 
call for sanctions initiated by the US however Russia, China and South Africa had all voted 
against sanctions citing similar reasons. That Myanmar’s situation was not considered a threat to 
international peace and security which is the ultimate intended purpose of the Security Council, 
reinforced by the argument that even ASEAN had declared the situation was not going to be a 
threat to the region.100 In rhetoric, South Africa had made the vote based on principle, reasserting 
its stance against the perceived misuse of the UNSC beyond its mandate. However its vote 
against sanctions in Myanmar could have been equally influenced by increasing bilateral trade 
with China, choosing not to take an antagonistic stance on issues which did not directly affect 
South Africa’s national interests. From China’s strategic vantage point, it was and remains 
Myanmar’s biggest trading partner, a bilateral trade which holds key prospects for China’s 
procurement of oil and gas.101 Both China and Russia repeated the position that involvement in 
the internal affairs of another country could not be supported, reinforcing the explanation of 
general opposition of the resolution being influence by principle on enforcing the integrity of 
state independence.    
 
4.2.3) Sudan  
 
Prior to South Sudan’s independence, the conflict in Sudan epitomized by the genocide in Darfur 
necessitated international action in finding a solution. Differing views both among African states, 
and between African and Western states was a point of contention, though a Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement had existed since 2005 states were still struggling over its actual 
implementation. Stemming from a investigation on accusations of war crimes and genocide in 
Sudan, the International Criminal Court (ICC) had chosen to indict Sudanese President Omar Al 
Bashir. The AU, along with China and Russia had long shown reluctance over the endorsement 
of drastic actions against Sudan in order to affect change.  
 
However unlike their previous non-affirmative positions on human rights issues in Myanmar and 
Zimbabwe, both China and South Africa voted for resolution 1769(2007) on Sudan. The 
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document authorized the formation of an AU-UN hybrid peacekeeping mission in Darfur, which 
was unanimously passed by the UNSC. Both China and South Africa had supported the text 
because despite disagreement with Western states over the handling of punitive measures on 
Sudan, the document called for a objective peacekeeping mission with the sole purpose of the 
protection of civilians in the Darfur region.102 As it was endorsed by the AU, South Africa was in 
full support of the mission, China considering is African engagement and need to maintain a 
relatively amicable international image prior to the Olympics had too supported it.  
 
However the split over Sudan in the UNSC became most apparent when the ICC indictment of 
President Omar Al Bashir came to light. South Africa in tandem with most African countries had 
strongly opposed it. In closed door discussions at the Security Council, South Africa along with 
Libya, China and Russia wanted to defer the indictment saying that it would endanger prospects 
of peace in the Darfur region.103 South Africa’s diplomatic efforts in the Darfur peace process 
would have been further jeopardizedif it is was seen to have supported the indictment, 
additionally China’s oil and resource trade with Sudan may have been hindered as the 
endorsement of this indictment was a step too far in antagonizing relations with Sudan. 
Furthermore China had to support the opinion of the AU in order to maintain its marketing as a 
development partner of Africa.      
 
Much of the prior congruency in voting between China and South Africa on the UNSC was 
motivated by a combination of individual agendas culminating in a common position, in addition 
to an already existing bilateral relationship based strongly on the rhetoric of mutual cooperation. 
However it is also important to note that for the most part Russia had taken a similar stance on 
all the relevant issues, pointing to a general comparable perspective amongst rising and 
developing states of the global south. The dimension of BRICS presumably adds impetus to this 
common stance. Upon analyzing South Africa’s second tenure on the UNSC, which 
coincidentally falls in the same rotation group as India and Brazil, has sparked a familiar level of 
criticism for recent voting decisions taken.     
                                               
102 UN Department of Public Information,  Security Council Authorizes UNAMID, 5727th Meeting, 
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 4.3) Libya  
 
The past conflict in Libya was a source of much international attention, out of all the countries in 
North Africa and the Middle East it was the only uprising which escalated into full blown civil 
for in 2011.104  
 
4.3.1) History of Qaddafi Rule in Libya 
 
Moammar Al Gaddafi led the military coup against then King Idris of Libya in 1969, thus 
commencing a drastic restructuring of the Libyan regime using his self penned Green Book as a 
political anthology for principles and ideology Al Qaddafi oversaw the redistribution of land and 
wealth, reallocating oil revenues by instilling a gradual network of nepotism over the decades, 
distributing members of his tribe, extended family and loyal supporters in key government and 
military positions managing a loosely decentralized power buffer against his opposition.105  
 
The most notorious feature of Libya’s foreign policy was its confrontation with the United States 
over the years. Having long characterized by the West as backing separatists, Islamic movements 
and terrorists groups as legitimate parties seeking self-determination, Libya was on the United 
States’ list for states that sponsored terrorism until a gradual rapprochement of relations occurred 
between the two countries in 2003. Nevertheless, despite the improvement of Libyan relations 
with the international community in recent years, domestic grievances remained a ubiquitous 
source of discontent for the general civilian public.   
 
4.3.2) Overview of Libyan Uprising and Civil War  
 
Following the international coverage of the Tunisian Jasmine revolution in December 2010, 
sporadic uprisings in Libya began the following month eventually culminating in February as 
several hundred protestors took to the streets of Benghazi resulting in the “day of rage” as 
protestors defied violent crackdowns by the Libyan government. The National Transitional 
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Council took over Libya amidst the upheaval claiming temporary leadership of the country for 
the duration of the process of ousting Qaddafi’s leadership.106  In the escalation of social unrest 
rebels and pro Gaddafi forces battle for strongholds of main cities and oil reserves in the country, 
the astronomically sudden and severe nature of internal conflict results in the matter being put 
forward to the Security Council. Totaling 19 formal meetings during the conflict’s duration, the 
first resolution was passed unanimously on the 26th of February.107 Resolution 1970 was the 
UNSC’s attempt at swift reaction to the situation in Libya and demanded an end to vio lence and 
suppression of civilians, with a referral of the matter to the ICC and placing all encompassing 
sanctions of an arms embargo as well as asset freeze and travel ban on officials in Libyan 
leadership. The sentiments expressed by state representatives on the Council began as largely 
undivided; as all members including BRICS states conveyed general concern and condemnation 
for the violent suppression in Libya.108 
 
 4.3.3) Resolution 1973 and the “No Fly Zone” 
 
As the conflict continued, the most notable of all resolutions passed in 2011, was the adoption of 
resolution 1973 on the 17th of March. Stressing the need to protect civilians under threat of 
further attack by the government forces of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, attached to which the 
official no fly zone was implemented. Where all flights in the airspace of Libya was banned to 
prevent aerial attacks on civilians, with the exception of plane flights were related to assisting 
civilians or evacuating foreign nationals. Particularly noting respect for the League of Arab 
States in acknowledging the need to implement a no fly zone over Libya. As well as further 
detailing the arms embargo urging state’s to inspect their territories including seaports, airports 
and the high seas for vessels bound to or from the country. Furthermore member states were 
ruled to ban all flights permission to land on their territory if they were registered or operated by 
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Libyan nationals, and forbid any aircraft to take off from their territory if it was carrying supplies 
of armaments to aid the Libyan government.109  
 
Voting for this resolution resulted in a final tally of ten in favor to none against with five 
abstentions namely Brazil, India, China, Russia and Germany. Noting here, that with the first 
most important incident before the UNSC where all BRICS members were present, the grouping 
voted mostly in synch with each other by choosing to abstain, with the exception of South Africa. 
The explanations given by the representatives of the countries who chose to abstain lingered in 
the realm of expressing general doubts over whether or not the enforcement of a no fly zone over 
Libya would be the best possible course of action to protect the civilian population and prevent 
further escalation of violence and upheaval.   
 
Though the resolution resembled formal international action and implementation towards a no fly 
zone in Libya, it is important to note that international action and calls to implement a no fly 
zone preceded the issue’s submission before the Security Council on the 17th of March 2011. A 
month earlier there had been several external political statements made from various entities 
expressing the need to enforce the no fly zone, initial publically voiced by Britain and France, 
the international consensus at the UNSC grew stronger as rebel leaders on the National 
Transitional Council had urged the international community to implement immediate action on 
demilitarized airspace in order to prevent further casualties, 110  concurrent to this was US 
congressional dialogue on the situation in Libya which eventually resulted in the passing of the 
non binding resolution 85 urging the UN to consider demilitarizing Libyan airspace. 111The 
matter was also discussed by the Arab League having reviewed and agreed upon by all 22 
members that it was necessary in the interim for the UN to authorize a no fly zone which was to 
be immediately lifted once the crisis had ended.112 Therefore the passing of the no fly zone 
resolution through the UN was posited on a concert of international consensus from relevant 
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political entities, a situation which member states voting on the UNSC (subsuming BRICS) at 
the time was most likely cognisance of.    
 
4.3.4) Interpretations Around South Africa’s Controversial Voting on Res1973(2011)  
 
South Africa’s voting on resolution 1973 remains the most criticized international foreign policy 
action in 2011. Considering the Libyan situation posed itself as the first major international 
situations where the pseudo official BRICS voting remained in tandem with South Africa being 
the only exclusion. Much confusion and speculation surrounded commentary against South 
Africa as the BRIC four nations had opted to abstain from the resolution while South Africa had 
voted in favor of the no fly zone, followed by public condemnation through President Zuma and 
various other diplomats for NATO’s enforcement of demilitarized airspace. South Africa’s 
voting behavior stuck out like a sore thumb from the rest of BRICS in public international 
perception, pinned as an example of the inability of the five nations to coordinate actions in the 
UN, whilst the collective abstention by the BRIC four was simultaneously interpreted by some to 
be a failure in asserting dissatisfaction with the concern of foreign military intervention 
infringing on the sovereignty of another state.   However upon much closer inspection reasons 
for South Africa’s voting behavior on resolution 1973 was influenced by a complex set of factors 
behind the scenes. Therefore this section first seeks to detangle the explanations given for an 
affirmative vote on the no fly zone, followed by an analysis and interrogation of the implications 
of the BRIC-four abstentions and diplomatic sentiments over the issue which followed in order 
to grasp a better understanding and better deduce whether or not there was some resemblance of 
BRICS coordinated action in the UN over the Libyan issue.  
 
The point of contention placed upon South Africa’s voting behavior was that it not only 
contradicted with the BRICS collective action of abstaining, but statements released by top 
ranking officials from the government thereafter seemed to directly oppose the initial supportive 
sentiment embodied in a positive vote for a no fly zone over Libya. Despite having been one of 
the ten “yes” votes on the UNSC Res1973 which formally approved the no fly zone. Several 
days after the resolution was passed President Zuma very publically condemned foreign military 
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intervention in Libya, reiterating that respect for the territorial integrity is vital.113 The unfolding 
of events had portrayed South Africa’s foreign policy alignment over the Libyan no fly zone 
debacle as duplicitous at best and incoherent with incompetence at worst. Leading to some 
political analysts to speculate that the “yes” vote on resolution 1973 was an embarrassing 
mistake made by a representative at the Security Council.    
 
Further sparking an investigation of what the events which unfolded by Dr. Eusebius Mckaiser 
as the presentation for the 2011 Ruth First Memorial public lecture entitled Looking an 
International Relations Gift Horse in the Mouth, South Africa’s Response to the Libyan Crisis.
114 
The research for this presentation consisted of interviews from South African officials and 
diplomats located at the United Nations, the Department of International Relations and 
Cooperation, and in Cabinet.  
 
President Zuma’s human rights day speech a week after the resolution had passed expressed a 
direct contradiction of South Africa’s actions at the UN, stating the sentiment resonated the 
position of the AU. The AU Peace and Security Council, which South Africa remains a 
prominent member had held a meeting the week before the no fly zone issue came before the 
UNSC. The issue of demilitarized airspace over Libya was extensively discussed although there 
was no final resolution on opposition against a no fly zone. During the drafting of resolution 
1973 the South African team was in constant communication with Pretoria and representatives at 
the AU over the issue, expressing concerns that the text of the document was open to 
exploitation as it was “not water tight and susceptible to abuse”.115 As a precautionary measure 
South African diplomats did in fact further clarify with the AU whether or not a position was 
taken on a no fly zone. As it turns out AU officials informed South African diplomats that no 
official position was taken thereby leaving the matter open to interpretation. What is known is 
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that initially the African Union Panel which consisted of South Africa, Uganda, Mauritania and 
the DRC stated that AU consensus was the rejection of foreign military force in Libya.116 
 
According to policymakers in line with principles upheld by the AU, the responsibility to protect 
clause had to be taken into account with regards to South Africa’s voting. The principle dictates 
that though first and foremost the responsibility to protect civilians is the state’s obligation 
however if in an event where the state is unable or fails to do so, than the onus is on the African 
collective. In regards to the concern voiced over the Libya’s civilian population, South Africa’s 
position and the African position was in synch with the distress raised by the international 
community over the treatment of protestors and the violence that the civilian population had been 
exposed to as a result of the uprisings in Libya. Therefore doubts expressed over the possible 
loopholes in the text of the document were overridden by the imperative to protect civilians in a 
vote against Gaddafi’s forces abusing state powers.117 Additionally, South Africa was placed 
between a rock and a hard place as any abstention or no vote to the resolution could have been 
marketed by the P3 (US, UK and France) as a demonstration of South Africa’s continuous lack 
of ability to come to the table and responsibly address pressing human rights issues, in the sense 
that a non-affirmative vote on would have flouted all of the document’s main clauses which 
articulated the pressing need to protect the human rights of civilians.              
 
In short, South Africa’s “yes” vote to resolution 1973 was born out of the need to protect 
civilians which was supported by the text in the document despite existing doubts over how the 
no fly zone was going to be implemented. It is also important to note that fellow African 
representatives of Gabon and Nigeria had also voted “yes” to the document. Therefore on the 
surface it seemed that South Africa’s voting over Libya was aligned exclusively to the African 
bloc more than that of the BRICS grouping. Indeed in Zuma’s human rights day address it was 
highlighted that "The UN Security Council resolution should be implemented in letter and spirit 
by all members of the UN Security Council. […] Operations aimed at enforcing the no-fly zone 
and protecting civilians should be limited to just that. They should not harm or endanger the 
civilians that Resolution 1973 sought to protect”.118 A sentiment which was further echoed by 
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Nigerian Ambassador Adegboyega C. Ariyo saying that support for the resolution went in so far 
as its attempt to peaceful resolution to the conflict and where it allows for humanitarian aid to 
reach those that need it. Resolution did not call for the killing and destruction of the Libyan 
people on either side of the conflict.119  
 
A similar interpretation of the mishap which occurred over the no fly zone definition was also 
given by former President Mbeki, the South African representatives assumed in their 
understanding of the term “no fly zone”, was only limited to the prevention of planes being 
flown over the demarcated airspace and excluded the active and pre-emptive shelling of Libyan 
air bases and other strategic landmarks which could have the tendency to put civilians in 
danger.120 
 
A no fly zone in its broadest definition means that there is the enforcing of a certain territory’s 
airspace as a demilitarized zone in order to prevent civilians from aerial attack. It has been 
enforced to varying degrees in recent decades most notably over Iraq and Bosnia. Though the 
main aim is to prevent planes being flown over the airspace with intention to launch aerial 
attacks on civilians, in some instances it does include initial and continued attacks by external 
forces on airbases in the marked territory as an assurance that there is no possibility of planes 
being flown off runways.      
 
Upon closer inspection of the document the text of resolution 1973 gives no direct definition to 
include an explicit explanation of the bombing of airbases as a part of the procedures involved in 
implementing the no fly zone, though it is implicitly alluded to in both the preamble and main 
clauses of the document.  It also does not identify NATO as the specific military force liable for 
implementing military actions approved over a no fly zone, though there is also implicit 
inference of this in the preamble. Where there is reference to establishing “safe areas in places 
exposed to shelling as a precautionary measure” and main clauses of paragraph 8 where the term 
“take all necessary measures to enforce compliance” relates to these two aforementioned matters 
respectively.  
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 - Taking note also of the decision of the Council of the League of 
Arab States of 12 March 2011 to call for the imposition of a no-fly 
zone on Libyan military aviation, and to establish safe areas in places 
exposed to shelling as a precautionary measure that allows the 
protection of the Libyan people and foreign nationals residing in the 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 
 
8. Authorizes Member States that have notified the Secretary-General 
and the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, acting 
nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, to take 
all necessary measures to enforce compliance with the ban on flights 
imposed […] the measures they are taking to implement this ban, 
including by establishing an appropriate mechanism for implementing 
the provisions of paragraphs 6 and 7 above.121  
  
In both instances of protection from shelling and using all means necessary to enforce the no fly 
zone could have fallen under the broad construal of the text, the text allows a malleability and 
open ended opportunity for interpretation. Thereby explaining the subsequent rhetorical catch up 
that South African and other African states played in voicing their opposition on the over 
infringement of sovereignty by NATO on Libya through the use of Res1973 as a mechanism. 
Therefore in the legal sense the actual implementation of Res1973’s no fly zone, had boiled to a 
matter of transcribed schematics in the application of the wording when it came to NATO being 
the actual military entity enforcing demilitarized airspace in the manner that it did. 
 
Thus South Africa’s overarching actions over the Libyan case has been labeled another failure in 
coordinating public diplomacy. Public diplomacy is characterized as successfully marketing 
ideas and actions of foreign policy in public opinion. It seems that South Africa had been in 
drafting an alternative AU lead plan for Libya behind the scenes through the sending in of an AU 
panel to negotiate peace with rebel forces excluding Qaddafi as reflected in res1973 where the 
document did yield acknowledgement to the deploying of AU to send a ad hoc high level 
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committee from the peace and security council along with a UN special envoy to initiate 
dialogue for political reforms. The enforcement of military intervention by NATO was largely 
seen by the AU as counter productive to any attempts on the diplomatic side to achieve 
settlement for stability in Libya. South Africa had failed to successfully communicate to the 
world this version of events and equally failed at coherently and assertively expressing the 
circumstances surrounding its perspective on voting “yes” to the no fly zone, in that though it 
supported the sentiment and intention of the resolution. It did not support the manner and method 
in which those clauses aim at protection civilians was enforced. The unfolding of events and the 
political response to it thereafter was not made clear enough, instead South Africa’s reaction was 
roughly patched together by a series of disconnected public statements which made little logical 
sense in public international opinion.  
 
However aside from badly communicated public diplomacy, it does need to be noted that in the 
fractured international discourse leading up to resolution 1973 there was a strong and clear 
indication that the P3 had intended to use NATO to enforce the no fly zone, and that such 
enforcement would most definitely include the pre-emptive bombing of strategic landmarks. In 
the beginning of March prior to UNSC action, NATO forces were already being authorized for 
deployment to the Mediterranean sea of Libya’s coast whilst Defense Secretary Robert Gates had 
addressed the US Congress by stating that a “no fly zone begins with an attack on Libya to 
destroy air defenses”122. Had South Africa and other African states been more receptive and 
pragmatic in accepting the political realities and unfolding international intentions over the no fly 
zone issue as the BRIC four nations demonstrated through their articulated apprehension and 
abstentions, then perhaps the document would not have been passed in its current form nor 
would South Africa have voted “yes” to it without raising caution to military intervention.  
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4.3.5) The BRICS Collective Position on Resolution 1973              
 
In analyzing whether or not voting amongst BRICS in the Security Council shows hints of 
previously discussed and agree upon positions, it is important to note that not all votes made by 
BRICS states need not to be the same in order to reach a desired outcome. BRIC states (South 
Africa excluded) all abstained, noting in particular veto powers of China and Russia deliberately 
choose not to block the resolution with negative votes. Therefore even though voting between 
South Africa and BRIC countries was not in synch, it does not preclude a degree of amicable 
correlation. The abstentions came as an expression of doubt and discontent rather than strong 
condemnation for the implementation of the no fly zone. In all five of abstentions involving the 
BRIC four plus Germany, voiced diplomatic sentiments which were later repeated by South 
Africa.  
 
India’s explanation of their abstention representative Manjeev Puri stated that over concern for 
the welfare of the Libyan population, the report of the UN envoy to Libya still had not been 
received therefore the resolution was based on very little clear information on the actually 
situation in Libya. More importantly there lacked certainty on how the proposed measures were 
going to be enforced, which in their view was crucial in such an important decisions with wide 
ranging implications. Similarly, Brazilian representative Maria Viotti expressed doubts over 
whether or not military enforcement would realize the common objective of protecting civilians 
considering the possibility that it may inflict more harm then good by exacerbating current 
tensions thereby putting Libyans at even greater risk. In the same breath both the veto powers of 
Russia and China had explained that their abstentions were strongly tied specifically to the 
unanswered question of how the resolution would be enforced and by whom, as well as what the 
limits of engagement would be. Stating specifically that it’s passing was not in line with Security 
Council practice of mulling questions in full before voting on a document. China made specific 
mention of the fact that in line with respect for the wishes of the Arab League and African Union 
it chose not to veto as it attached great importance to their requests.123     
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By abstaining, the BRIC-four were allowed to fence sit safely and show disapproval while avoid 
blame for the massacre of civilians by the Qaddafi regime. It is indicative of their long term 
reactive rejection for western led military intervention, particularly when their direct interests are 
not at stake.124 Moreover, the curbing of downright opposition against Res 1973 indicated a show 
of consideration for the states who voted in support of it, particularly noting South Africa and the 
other African members of Gabon and Nigeria.   
  
The intention of western countries was not only to uphold the proverbial protection of civilians 
and assist in freedom towards a fair and just democracy in Libya. But falling of the Qaddafi 
regime resembled the opportunity to cut off a perceived pariah state as well as secure relative 
stability for at least one other center of oil production. For South Africa, on the other hand, the 
dilemma presented a diplomatic obligation to be at the forefront of what was perceived as an 
African issue. One that required AU led action in the international arena. Therefore South 
Africa’s direct interests were affected to a greater degree than other BRICS states. The ad hoc 
sentiments voiced by South Africa on behalf of Africa strongly resembled to the same concerns 
bought up by the BRIC four members in the explaining their abstentions.     
 
Abstention provided a place for accommodation for the poorly expressed wishes of the AU to 
ensure the responsibility to protect civilians, as specifically indicated by China. Therefore when 
taking in the statements made by the South African government after voting on resolution 1973, 
and the initial statements made by the BRIC four country representatives, what can be deduced is 
that in the complexity of the Libyan debacle, though diplomatic sentiments were congruent 
amongst BRICS states, particularly when it came to South Africa’s sharing the same feelings of 
doubt upon implementation of the no fly zone. The coordinated action for this congruence was 
most certainly not present, attributed to South Africa’s voting decision which was necessitated 
by its interpretation of the principles of the AU. 
 
Taking note that though South Africa’s membership of BRICS had been publicized, the Libyan 
crisis occurred prior to its official ascension into the grouping at the Hainan summit in April, that 
following month. Therefore though there are indications of dialogue over Libya between South 
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Africa and the BRIC four states, particularly China, considering the immediate and abrupt nature 
of the Libya crisis which prompted an equally swift need to instigated international action had 
thrown South Africa-BRIC coordination off its bearings, further exacerbated by the 
preoccupation with mediating policy action between the UNSC and the AU. Despite the flaccid 
yielding by BRIC four states to Res1973, the deficit of better coordinated action between South 
Africa and BRICS can also be partially attributed to the premature formation and limited 
platform and opportunity for South Africa’s agenda to be fully articulated with fellow BRIC 
states. 
 
There was an attempt by BRICS to address this less coordinated deficit of cooperation over 
Libya through the Sanya declaration which emerged out of the first official five member BRICS 
summit in April 2011. In paragraph 9 of the declaration, members acknowledged the concurrent 
presence of all BRICS states on the UN Security Council and noted the importance of working 
together effectively to facilitate future coordination on issues under the UNSC’s consideration. 
Furthermore there was a concerted reiteration for the respect for territorial integrity and 
sovereignty of each nation and the avoidance of the unnecessary use of force. The integration of 
South Africa’s agenda into BRICS was made obstinate through paragraph 10 which articulated a 
common position of concern over Libya, emphasizing the role of the African Union High- Level 
Panel Initiative on Libya.125   
 
Though attempts to reverse the slow uptake on a coordinated UNSC-BRICS position with 
regards to Libya’s no fly zone was passively addressed by the Sanya declaration. The debacle 
that Libya presented had far reaching implications for the public perception of South Africa’s 
foreign policy both domestically and internationally. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
125 South African Presidency, Op. Cit,  BRICS 2011 Sanya Declaration  
Master’s Thesis of (Katherine) Hao-Fei Xiong  76 
 
4.3.6) BRICS Coordinated Action and Common Stances on Libya after the Hainan Summit  
 
Much media attention was focused on the initial UNSC decision over Res1973; however there 
has been a less balanced analysis of the subsequent Security Council follow up as the Libyan 
situation progressed. Equal investigation should be forwarded to the voting behavior and 
diplomatic stance taken by the BRICS countries after Res1973 and ensuing April BRICS summit 
in order to gain a balanced and all encompassing perspective of BRICS action within UNSC on 
Libya.   
 
Following NATO airstrikes, struggle between rebel forces and the Libyan government continued 
with the National Transition Council asserting that a ceasefire agreement was only credible if it 
included Qaddafi’s departure. In May International Criminal Court chief prosecutor Luis 
Moreno-Ocampo in a follow up to the referral made in Res1970 of prosecuting human rights 
abuses, informed the Security Council that taken into account credible evidence of civilians 
being subjected to systematic arrests, tortures, killings and enforced disappearances. Arrest 
warrants were due to be issued for individuals in the leadership who were responsible for some 
of the abuses. The BRICS response was largely unanimous in tone and sentiment, India who is 
not a signatory of the Rome Statute voiced a continued support for the matter indicating that it 
wanted a cessation of violence. However it did note with some concern, as did South Africa, 
with Res1970’s paragraph 6 which allows the UNSC to waiver the exclusive jurisdiction of 
states not part to the Rome statute.  This concentrated expression on concerns over the 
implementation of clauses through the lofty interpretation of wording in Council resolutions was 
further reiterated by Russia and China, the latter who also additionally and specifically endorsed 
the AU’s five point road map on Libya. In short the rhetoric expressed by BRICS in the Res1970 
follow up was a combined apprehension on the potential for the exploitation of text contained in 
the clauses of UNSC resolutions.126  
 
In June, Mauritania’s foreign minister and member of the AU high level panel addressed the 
Security Council clearly registering his discontent with the marginalization and disregard for the 
AU’s diplomatic effort in attempting to resolve the Libyan crisis. Noting in particular that the 
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AU high level ad hoc committee had been in constant contact with all partners involved, 
highlighting that President Zuma with the endorsement of the committee had flown to Libya and 
discussed the situation with Colonel Al Qaddafi as a means to bring an end to the crisis, and that 
the AU had drafted an roadmap for Libya calling for a ceasefire and immediate cessation of  
hostilities as a short term goal, something that was being implicitly pushed aside despite 
Res1970 and Res1973 recognizing the role of the AU. 127  The briefing before the Security 
Council was reaffirmed by South Africa’s Dr. Mashabane, speaking on behalf of the AU 
articulated unease that despite the NATO led action there were still casualties and no apparent 
end to the violence in Libya, further clarifying that South Africa had originally supported 
Res1973 because it hoped that it would create an enabling environment for Libyans to resolve 
the conflict themselves rather than an imposed regime change by outside influence. The 
emphasis for South Africa and the AU was on a solution which was tailored by the Libyan 
people, in line with the sentiments expressed in the AU roadmap.128 It was also noted that both 
President Zuma, along with UN special envoy Al-Khatib were planning another trip to Libya 
presumably to facilitate dialogue over a ceasefire. 
 
South Africa was central to the AU’s initiative on finding a solution to Libya, the two main 
concerns of South Africa and Africa put before the Security Council were identified as the 
marginalization of the AU’s position on the issue, and the conveyance of apprehension that the 
NATO led airstrikes was not only potentially harming civilians but failed to bring about an 
improvement to the unrest. South Africa’s two concerns were supported by China and Russia 
respectively in May, a month prior to the AU’s representatives addressing the council in June. 
Indicating that there was some form of dialogue between South Africa and their veto allies of 
Russia and China, shaping their positions in a comprehensible and complementary manner 
before the UNSC.  
 
By August NATO launched “operation mermaid dawn”, eventually claiming Tripoli and key 
cities of Sirte, Sabha, Zuwara from Qaddafi’s forces. Leaving most of the country under the 
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supervision of the National Transition Council, taking account of the improved situation by 
September Res2009 had been passed by the UNSC. The crux of the document initiated the UN 
Mandate for the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), for an initial duration of 
three months to assist in the restoration of public security, additional to supporting transitional 
justice, and undertaking inclusive political dialogue to promote national reconciliation. The 
document also reaffirms the arms embargo and modified the asset freeze authorizing funds for 
humanitarian and public service needs, with regards to the no fly zone the UNSC opted to have a 
loosening of the clauses in Res1973. Despite both passive and overt rhetoric from BRICS 
countries on the disapproval of the imposition, the resolution expressed the readiness to lift the 
no fly zone upon the continued improvement of the situation and in consultation with Libyan 
authorities.129 With representatives Baso Sanqu from South Africa and Vitaly Churkin from 
Russia noting their respective anticipation to a complete lift on the no fly zone.130  
 
The beginning of a culminating end for the Libyan conflict was marked by the death of Qaddafi, 
caught while attempting to escape rebel forces in a sewage tunnel in October 2011, signifying the 
cessation of forty years of totalitarian rule in Libya. 131  Following the formal declaration of 
liberation on October 23rd, the UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 2016 to terminate all the 
provisions of the no fly zone in Res1973; 132 it fully acknowledged the declaration of liberation 
and the transition process with the official end of the Qaddafi era there was no longer any 
foreseeable need for NATO remain active in military interventions. In the immediate aftermath 
of the conflict the ICC prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo addressed the UNSC on the 
investigation of human rights violations in Libya, with the announcement that a warrant for 
arrest was issued for each of Muammar Al Qaddafi’s sons for crimes committed against civilians. 
It was also made known that there had been allegations of crimes committed by NATO forces 
including the detention of civilians suspected to be mercenaries and the killings of detained 
combatants to be impartially investigated by the court. In the response to the ICC’s address India 
reiterated that though it was not a signatory on the Rome Statute it encouraged the ICC to remain 
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impartial in investigating all crimes alleged committed by all parties in Libya, and that everyone 
under the Rome statute should be held accountable for crimes committed regardless of political 
considerations. Russia articulated a more detailed position, by pointing out the loss of civilians 
lives directly related to NATO bombing and supported the investigation into Qaddafi’s death. 
With South Africa paralleling in the same sentiments in addition to drawing attention to the mass 
murder of sub-Saharan Africans amidst the conflict. While Brazil and China too voiced a 
common support for the ICC initiative.133 BRICS response to the report leaned on the support for 
the objectivity of ICC investigations on both sides, which includes investigating NATO’s alleged 
actions with the equal amount of weight.    
 
4.4) Syria  
 
BRICS coordinated voting and position has been most obvious in the case of Syria for the year 
2011. What was obvious was the common voting stance taking by BRICS states on the draft 
resolution The over cautiousness and disapproval of BRICS for Security Council draft 
resolutions on Syria is in many ways a knee jerk reaction to the concurrent authorized and 
irreversible actions taken by NATO in Libya.  
 
4.4.1) Background to the Syrian regime and coverage of conflict  
 
Syria’s government has been largely viewed as a non-democratic nepotistic regime. After the 
Ba’ath Party took over the government in 1963, by 1970 Hafez Al Assad succeeded as president 
beginning what would be almost thirty years of rule over Syria. His reign during the cold war 
was marked by a close alliance with the former Soviet Union, and strong criticism of the US and 
the west in general. With Hafez Assad’s death in 2001 the transfer of power was handed to his 
eldest surviving son Bashar Al Assad, with close family members and members of the minority 
Alawite tribe in key political and military positions in Syria, with the historical propensity to 
vehemently suppress opposition. The Assad regime remained in full control even after the death 
of its founding leader. Having long been a strong Arab voice of disapproval against America, 
                                               
133 UN Department of Public Information, ICC Prosecutor Briefs Security Council on “Libya Case”, 6647th Meeting, 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10433.doc.htm, 2 Nov 2011.  Last accessed  04/01/2012 
 
Master’s Thesis of (Katherine) Hao-Fei Xiong  80 
 
and an important neighbor in the region with regards to Israeli-Arab relations. 134Carried on from 
his father, Bashar Al Assad still maintained a relative degree of anti-west and anti-Israeli 
sentiments, however lacking from his predecessor was the reputation to maintain a stable Syria 
through years of experience in power as a compensation for the absence in the growth of 
economic and political rights and opportunities.    
 
There have always been expressions of discontent in the past within Syria against the Assad 
family’s control of the Ba’ath Party’s regime. The 2011 Syrian uprisings were triggered by the 
wider Arab spring, with sporadic protests occurring for several weeks before social media in the 
region attempted to organize a “day of rage” protests in early February 2011. Despite continued 
efforts by the government to quell the protests by March large groups of people gathered in 
Damascus resulting in mass crackdowns, and several hundred people marching in the city of 
Daraa, many in the Syrian cabinet resigned to President Assad and hundreds of political 
prisoners were released as a concession by the government to civilian opposition. By April 
international media reported on Syrian government forces actively opening fire on protestors in 
several towns and cities across the country. Further continued by reports of the army opening fire 
on civilians indiscriminately in the uprising’s main hub of Daraa, as well as rounding up 
suspected protestors.135  
 
4.4.2) Syrian Situation before the United Nations Security Council  
 
On April the 27th Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs B. Pascoe briefed the Security 
Council at its 6524th meeting on the situations in Syria, characterizing it as a mix of measures to 
reform matched with increasing violent suppressions and stating that despite the promise of 
reform contained in the announced legislative changes, such as the lifting of the state of 
emergency which has been in place since 1963 and the issuing of a  decree that would give 
stateless Kurds previously denied citizenship in the country, crackdowns on anti-government 
protestors had vehemently intensified. There were allegations of artillery fire against civilians, 
the shooting of medical personnel attempting to aid the wounded, raids against hospitals and 
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mosques and the destruction of medical supplies. In addition to the wide scale detention of 
human rights activists, lawyers, and journalists, as well as the torture of those detained in 
connection with protests including children. Though it is reported that most of the protests were 
peaceful, there were a few which saw protestors using violence to cause the death of security 
forces. The UN could also verify that basic municipal services of water and electricity as well as 
telephone lines had been cut to the cities.136   
 
Following this briefing, delegates of the UNSC took to the floor voicing mixed views, though 
most countries urged an end to the violence and stressed importance for the respect of human 
rights amidst protests, the Russian Federation’s statement was particularly focused on noting that 
it felt the provoked internal conflict in Syria was an effort deliberately geared at invit ing 
international interference which, in Russia’s opinion, would only result in a dangerous cycle. 
Further destabilizing the security of the Middle East and complicating the situation. South 
Africa’s statement was terse and common in calling for restraint from all parties, while Indian 
delegate Hardeep Puri stressed that the council needed to reassert that it was the responsibility of 
sovereign states to respond to the aspirations of their own people and that the Council’s mandate 
was to urge all sides to seek resolution through peaceful means. Brazil emphasized that the 
solution to the problem was national dialogue with as little outside pressure as possible and 
China pointed towards constructive international help in line with the UN charter. The Syrian 
representative at the Council responded with strong reservation to the West’s alleged 
intervention in his country citing that the US state department has given financial support since 
2005 to Syrian opposition figures, warning that some states were trying to interfere with the 
affairs of others under the responsibility to protect rubric which has been largely rejected by the 
developing world.137  
 
Despite Syria’s statement before the Security Council being strongly characterized by anti-
American sentiment, what the speech had managed to successfully imply was that the global 
south was becoming increasing adamant against interference by the west. The diplomatic tone 
reverberated by the BRICS block at the first UNSC meeting over Syria, lead bluntly by Russia 
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due to historical and strategic concerns, was largely a connotation for respect of non-interference 
and sovereignty with regards to the situation.       
 
Subsequently and inevitably the situation in Syria came before the UNSC in the form of a 
resolution. On the 30th of June the Council convened, unrest in Syria bought about concerns on 
the fragile ceasefire agreement in the region with Israel. Proposing that the United Nations 
Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), which has been in place since 1974 to supervise the 
ceasefire agreement, be extended for a further six months until December 2011. Stemming from 
fears that the instability in Syria would result in the breach of the Israeli-Syrian ceasefire 
agreement and thereby further threaten peace and security in the region, in addition to possibly 
provoking inter-state conflict. 
 
Resolution 1994(2011), notes with concern that the middle east remains tense and calls upon all 
parties to fully implement the ceasefire resolution 338(1974), urging all parties to respect the 
terms of the disengagement of forces agreement.138    
 
Although resolution 1994(2011) was unanimously adopted, member states differed on the degree 
of relevance this issue had before the Security Council. The resolution in itself was a short 
reiteration safeguarding the role and mandate of the UNDOF in the Golan Heights, and very 
limited in injecting new controversial clauses to the situation. Therefore though it did not directly 
contradict or threaten the interests of any particular state, it was to an extent used by the US to 
provide an international rhetorical safeguard on Israeli interests against a constantly changing 
Syria. In the responses to this resolution the US delegation stated that they were specifically 
concerned with the Syrian government using the killing of civilians in demonstrations in the 
UNDOF mandated area as an obvious ploy to distract attention and incite violence in the area.  
 
Both Russia and China expressed support for the renewing of the UNDOF’s mandate but 
cautioned that the extension of the mandate and the situation in Syria should be seen as separate 
matters, the question of Syria and the extension of the mandate should not be linked, as the 
internal unrest continues to be the internal matter of a sovereign state. India, Brazil and South 
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Africa remained relatively docile on Res1994 while the P2139 communicated their apprehension 
on a insidious attempt to link the political unrest in Syria with the UNDOF as a Security Council 
issue.  Russia specifically pointed out that their support for the resolution and the overall 
unanimity of the UNSC was based on the technical nature of the text which did not directly 
address the situation in Syria, further highlighting to the council that Syria was not supposed to 
be on its agenda.140   
 
What was increasingly obvious about Syria’s issues being discussed in the UNSC was Russia’s 
reactive need to guard its historic ally against Western interference. With the support of China, 
attempts to deal with Syria in the same manner as Libya was being constantly thwarted by the 
BRICS group, clearly demonstrated in its successful efforts to block a draft resolution on unrest 
in Syria. 
 
4.4.3) Culmination of BRICS Blocking the Draft Resolution on Syria       
 
As uprisings and mass revolts in Syria remained ever persistent, the UNSC in its 6598th meeting 
issued a statement expressing grave concern and condemning Syrian authorities for alleged 
violation of human rights in civilian protests. The statement which was read by India who held 
the rotating seat of the UNSC presidency for the month of August, articulated profound regret for 
the deaths of hundreds of people, urging for an immediate end to the violence and calling for 
restraint from all sides. Most notable is the statement which in addition to calling on Syria to 
implement its announced reforms, is the reaffirming of the Council’s strong commitment to 
sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Syria, explicitly stressing that the solution 
to the crisis can only be Syrian-led. This presidential statement regarding Syria mostly reflected 
sentiments of the developing states present in the UNSC.141 Concurrent to asserting its concern 
for the situation in Syria it was vehemently clear in endorsing a self made solution in line with 
the utmost respect for the state’s independence.  
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However two months later a draft resolution came before the Council sponsored by the UK, 
France, Germany and Portugal. The document intended to address the conflict in Syria, though it 
strategically emphasized a reiteration of the text in respect for sovereignty narrative present in 
the president’s statement on Syria. The draft, in addition to demanding the immediate cessation 
to the violations of human rights use of violence against civilians, in its second last clause 
expressed the intention to overview Syria’s implementation of the resolution within 30days and 
incited measures under article 41 of the UN charter as a possible option.142 On the surface, the 
draft resolution appeared of pure intention and contained enough rhetoric to support developing 
world concerns on interference of internal affairs. However the clause which incites article 41 of 
the charter directly implies that the UN would be considering the implementation of sanctions 
and the possible authorization of military intervention thereafter is Syria continuously fails to 
comply with the clauses set out in the resolution within the prescribed 30 days.  
 
Article 41 states that the Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed 
forces are to be employed to give effect to its decisions and may call upon the members of the 
UN to apply such measures which may include complete or partial interruption of economic 
relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, radio, and other means of communication and the severance 
of diplomatic relations.143 
 
By extension, under international law and allowable UN practice article 41 also allows direct 
lead into article 42 of the UN charter. Which states that should measures provided for article 41 
be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate it may take such action by air, sea and land forces, 
as may be necessary to restore or maintain international peace and security. Such action may 
include demonstrations, blockade and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of members of 
the United Nations.144 
 
What the draft resolution was effectively trying to propose was the initial steps towards active 
sanctions and possible future military implementation in Syria, presumably similar to that 
imposed on Libya. The draft also tactfully made direct mention of the diplomatic efforts of the 
                                               
142 United Nations Security Council, France, Germany. Portugal and the United Kingdom: Draft Resolution, 
S/2011/612, 04 October 2011.   
143 United Nations Charter, Chapter VII: Action With Respects to Threats to Peace, San Francisco, 1949, P.9   
144 Loc. Cit.  
Master’s Thesis of (Katherine) Hao-Fei Xiong  85 
 
Arab League, South Africa, Russia, Brazil, India and Turkey in addressing the situation. What 
was apparent was the mustering of support in aligning the document’s text to resonate 
developing world sentiment, in an effort to gain favor with the BRICS states. Revisiting the 
strategy employed in Libya where resolution text could be later interpreted to legitimize 
interventionist action.   
 
In the voting for this resolution, while India, Brazil and South Africa abstained, China and 
Russia vetoed blocking the passing of the text. The document received 9 yes votes, 2 vetoes and 
4 abstentions. Thereby making BRICS plus Lebanon the main drivers of the non-affirmative 
majority in the Security Council with regards to this resolution, in this instance South Africa did 
not vote on par with Nigeria and Gabon, instead its diplomatic sentiments remained squarely 
with the grouping of BRICS.    
 
Once again, though the BRICS votes were not unanimously identical. It was an obvious 
coordination of non-affirmative voting behavior in the UNSC. The IBSA three countries need 
just to abstain if it is assured that one or both of the P2, Russia and China, would be placing a 
veto ensuring that the resolution does not come to pass. Lessons learnt, for South Africa in 
particular, from the Libyan case was that resolution text could be easily manipulated by being 
interpreted to include a wider spectrum of actions, such as the implementation of sanctions 
followed by full and extensive no fly zone in Syria.   
 
In the respective responses to the failure to adopt this particular draft resolution, Russia said that 
it was obvious the differences over the draft were not about the text but rather on the difference 
of political approaches. Voicing disagreement with the accusatory tone against Damascus and 
the ultimatum of sanctions, bluntly noting its shock that NATO’s actions in Libya was being 
used as a model for future actions. Clarifying that it in no way supported or condoned the Assad 
regime and actions taken by the current government, however stressed that dialogue was the best 
response and that change itself was gradual and not immediate like most Syrians would demand 
it be. China, mentioned that any actions taken should be in compliance with the UN Charter 
which urges non-interference in international affairs. Noting with concern that sanctions might 
further exacerbate the situation. Both Russia and China had co-sponsored an alternative 
document/ draft resolution to which internal Syrian dialogue was encouraged as the most 
Master’s Thesis of (Katherine) Hao-Fei Xiong  86 
 
effective way to end the crisis. The same sentiments were repeated by IBSA three countries, 
South Africa’s statement warned that any decision on Syria issued by the UNSC needed to be 
aware of the territorial integrity, considering that the text had been abused, alluding to the case of 
Libya and that implementation of clauses have gone beyond mandates. Conveying concern for 
the imposition of punitive measures was designed as a prelude to other actions, as the 
resolution’s sponsors had rejected language which ruled out military intervention thereby hinting 
towards their eventual intentions. Brazil and India both mentioned the lack of sufficient dialogue 
in addressing sanctions and other intended actions in the text.145 
 
4.4.4) Strategy and Maneuvering: West versus BRICS over Syrian Draft Resolution  
 
The Syrian case in following UNSC action on Libya and the BRICS official Hainan Summit 
presented an interesting opportunity for BRICS member states to leverage the an alliance in 
order to safeguard their own respective interests. Syria is a vital player in the dynamics of Israel-
Arab politics and therefore by extension it is a vital player in US-Israeli-wider Middle East 
politics. Over zealous intervention by the west through legitimately endorsed actions by the 
UNSC is of ephemeral concern to developing world leaders as it reasserts US led intervention by 
infringing on the staunchly held principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity in the global 
south. For Russia in particular, the limiting of NATO action in the region and military 
intervention upon its long standing ally has been a main concern, resulting in the continued 
efforts to propose a draft resolution as an deterrence to the implementation of article 41 and 42 in 
the UN charter. The power buffer against the US and further NATO action is also partially 
shared by China, who acts as the other partner in support while being backed by Brazil and India.  
 
South Africa in regarding the Syrian issue had a chance to reassert its principle against the use of 
force, following the debacle on Libya. Determined to affirm its reservations against being blind 
sided by the ploy to over reach mandates through the use of vague text in resolutions, the debate 
South Africa had on Syria in the UNSC mainly involved the deliberate fleshing out of implicit 
intentions ingrained in the text ensuring that if it were to support a document it would explicitly 
exclude the use of military force. Upon initial impression the draft resolution on Syria repeated 
                                               
145 UN Department of Public Information,  Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution Condemning Syria, 
6627th Meeting, 04 October 2011.                                                      Last accessed: 04/01/2012  
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strong developing world and BRICS sentiment on the respect for Syrian-led action save for the 
consideration of implementing article 41 in a ultimatum against Syria thereby opening the door 
to sanctions and further military intervention thereof if sanctions were perceived to have no 
effect.  The draft had made attempts to laud South Africa, Brazil, Russia, India and Turkey on 
diplomatic efforts in engaging with Syria; furthermore the documents sponsors deliberately 
excluded the US but included its other prominent European allies. As tactics used to quell 
possible anti-US sentiments amongst global south leaders, superficial grooming of rhetoric 
aimed at winning over the amicable support from states who would otherwise vehemently 
oppose sanctions as a gateway into further intervention.  
 
What the Syrian issue has demonstrated is a combined effort to block western led actions on the 
Security Council. BRICS could not be perceived as passively endorsing the expansion of 
intervention in the Middle East from Libya to Syria. Instead allowing for a Arab League led 
solution, despite Syria’s long standing uneasy relationship with the Arab League.  The 
coordinated action on Syria is telling of its direct relation to actions passed on Libya where all 
BRICS states felt that it was overstep in the mandate.  What was markedly different was the 
newly learned awareness still fresh from Libya, cautioning BRICS states into showing a great 
deal of reservation regarding vague text and insidious intention embedded in UNSC resolutions. 
 
4.4.5) BRICS Joint Communiqué on the Situation in the Middle East and North Africa  
 
On the 24th of November 2011, the deputy Foreign Ministers of BRICS met to discuss the years’ 
events concerning the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), the communiqué announced and 
consolidated a common position on a range of pressing issues involving different countries in the 
region. This consolidated response further reiterated BRICS collective stance, though it 
emphasized the role of the Security Council, the communiqué noting that its primary 
responsibility is to maintain peace and security. Stating that it was inadmissible through outside 
intervention in the internal political process, therefore with regards to Syria, external interference 
not in accordance with the UN Charter should be excluded. In this context the experience of the 
international community with regard to Libya needs a thorough review to see if the actions taken 
were in conformity with the provisions of the relevant resolutions of the UNSC. Additionally it 
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voiced support for an Arab League led initiative in Syria, and the consolidated efforts of the 
Africa Union in aiding transitional stability in Libya.146  
 
The narrative highlights BRICS discontent and perception of the over reach taken by NATO with 
regards to the resolutions passed. It is also clear that among BRICS states; military intervention 
has not been diplomatic viewed as something which is in line with the provisions of the UN 
Charter.     
 
Moreover the communiqué makes inference to the BRICS stance on the settlement of Arab-
Israeli conflict, announcing support for the Madrid Principles and the Arab Peace Initiative, and 
welcomed the Gulf Cooperation Council’s initiative concerning the peaceful transition of power 
in Yemen.147The communiqué outside the UNSC was a consolidate effort to reaffirm a BRICS 
stance on the issues that were prominent and present in the international arena.   
 
4.5) BRICS Voice Support for AU Efforts in South Sudan  
 
South Africa during the first tenure on the UNSC in has been previously branded and accused of 
being a “rogue democracy” with regards to its voting behavior vis-à-vis Sudan. The country had 
gone through significant changes since South Africa’s last tenure on the Security Council, with a 
long and persistent facilitated process which resulted in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement, and implemented efforts to assist in South Sudan’s independence by holding a 
referendum in January 2011. Sudan is of particular importance to South Africa, perseverance of 
the AU facilitated process eventually yielded results on several main issues, an effort which was 
largely led by South Africa through the diplomacy of former president Mbeki as a carry over 
from his term of office.  Securing respect for the AU High Level implementation panel in Sudan 
within the UNSC was of utmost importance to South Africa, adamant that this long running 
conflict was solved by African led solutions.  
 
                                               
146 Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Joint Communiqué on the Outcome of the Meeting of BRICS Deputy 
Foreign Ministers on the Situation in the Middle East and North Africa, 
http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/89A37436A9B44BC2442579530024C8D4, Moscow, 24 November 2011.                                                                                                    
Last accessed: 23/12/2011 
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2011 saw South Sudan officially gain its status as an internationally recognized independent state, 
with acceptance into the United Nations, and establishing missions in the disputed Abyei region 
and the official UN mission in South Sudan (UNMISS).148 The ongoing Doha mediation process 
was jointly held by the AU and UN with the main rebel groups as an effort to facilitate dialogue 
to agreement.    
 
What was palpable in the discourse surrounding Sudan and South Sudan before the Security 
Council was the BRICS conveyance of support for the AU-led efforts in sharp contrast with the 
omission of similar sentiments by other Council members. Following the announcement of the 
acceptance of the South Sudan independence referendum, delegate statements were revealing of 
their diplomatic sentiments. While the US and UK strongly criticized their ongoing concern for 
the Abyei region. The Russian Federation affirmed their support for the Doha mediation process, 
and emphasized that lasting stability in Sudan was dependent on the continued support of the AU. 
China, India and Brazil echoed a very similar rhetoric, with Brazil particularly noting that their 
bilateral trade with both North and South Sudan had grown considerable in the area of 
agriculture and bio-fuels. South Africa, having a central role on the matter recalled the AU’s 
solemn declaration on Sudan and expressed the continents solidarity. While urging rebel groups 
outside the peace process to join the Doha talks.149 A similar repertoire was reiterated when it 
was announced to the Council that both North and South Sudan had signed an interim agreement 
to pull out of the resource rich Abyei region, BRICS states specifically congratulated the efforts 
of Mr. Mbeki and others on the AU High Level Implementation Panel.150 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
148 UN Department of Public Information, Op. Cit, Security Council 2011 Round-Up   
149 UN Department of Public Information, Presidential Statement Welcomes Acceptance of Referendum, 6478th 
Meeting, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10169.doc.htm, 9 February 2011.    
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150
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4.6) China and South Africa in the Wider Grouping of BRICS: 2011 Security Council   
 in Review  
 
Despite the transition from Mbeki to Zuma on the domestic front, South Africa’s position and 
foreign policy on the Security Council remains largely congruent with the principles established 
by the ANC, with only very minor changes. With the tendency to bring the responsibilities and 
loyalties attached to its position as a leader in the AU to its decisions and diplomatic stance at the 
UNSC. For China, previous and continuous geopolitical considerations remain the same. Much 
like the South Africa’s first tenure on the UNSC, 2011 has provided cases where similarity and 
correspondence can be drawn between China and South Africa in both voting positions and 
diplomatic statements in the UN. An addition to this dynamics has been the formal advent for 
BRICS, though still lacking in a formal bloc framework blueprinting more specific principles 
and objectives with regards to cooperation within the UN. The practice of case by case 
consideration by BRICS states have thus far been the main modus operandi for collective action 
in the UNSC.  
 
It is important to note that the novelty of the BRICS grouping by nature produces a trial and error 
period where coordinated cooperation in the broader sense is still an ongoing process of 
discourse and formation. Within the UNSC, BRICS cooperation can be gauged by examining 
each case and comparing voting decisions as well as political statements made. The controversy 
surround the initial BRICS reaction to Res1973 on Libya has been given an extensive 
examination in this chapter, following the BRIC-four abstentions and South Africa’s “yes” vote, 
widespread criticism was cast on the seeming inconsistency with the BRICS’ respective foreign 
policies and the nature of the voting thereof.  
 
In the follow up of the voting China had specifically indicated that though it disagreed with the 
implications of the text in the document if did not block the resolution out of consideration for 
the wishes of African states. While Brazil, Russia and India had all vouched that an abstention 
would suffice as their disapproval. South Africa’s initial support was based on the AU’s 
objective in the need to protect Libyan civilians which was marred with military intervention of 
the no fly zone in the technical process of influencing outcomes through the text of resolutions. 
The stance on Libya thereafter was relatively congruent amongst BRICS states. China’s yielding 
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a veto on Libya and the overall BRIC-four states’ willingness to provide leeway for Res1973 
which South Africa had originally supported, shows that there was a cooperative consideration 
made by BRIC states, to provide a opening for South Africa in its capacity as a prominent leader 
of AU agenda to pursue its own outcomes in the UNSC.    
 
A perceivably more united BRICS showed in the collective stance taken on Syria. Actively 
influenced by UN action in Libya and spurred on by the BRICS official summit in Hainan which 
implemented a greater degree of cohesion by allowing for focused dialogue outside the UN. 
BRICS states vehemently opposed a draft resolution which allowed for a possibility of 
implementing sanctions, the ineffectiveness of which was a prerequisite to military intervention 
in articles 41 and 42 of the UN charter. South Africa had supported Russia’s rhetoric of outright 
opposition on proposed measures to be taken over Syria’s crisis, backed by China in a double 
veto against the draft document. The firm stance against the intentions of the Western proposed 
resolution allowed BRICS states to assert their position on the disapproval for intervention which 
infringement on sovereignty. The efforts made by the Syrian government to introduce reform in 
order to appease the grievances of civilians is used as a defense by BRICS states for the veto, 
citing that unlike Libya, Syria had taken steps to instigate reform at the will of its people and 
thus should be left to its own integrity in resolving the matter, and UN intervention should rather 
be substituted by the more relevant Arab League.  
 
The BRICS meetings outside the UNSC with regards to issues concerning the Middle East and 
North Africa, indicate a consolidated move to further define and group cohesively their stance to 
pressing international issues. The stance strengthened the sentiments and actions taken in the 
UNSC by BRICS states in regard to MENA issues, particularly their position on both Libya and 
Syria.      
 
China’s support for South Africa and by proxy efforts of the AU in Sudan’s transitional split is 
indicative of the continuation of previously existing cooperation between the two countries; 
however during the second tenure South Africa has received this gradual reverberated wide 
support from the BRICS base as well.  China and greater BRICS’ encouragement for joint AU-
UN led missions particularly in the resource rich Abyei region, may be attributed to the move to 
align themselves with South African efforts in the AU in its capacity as key mediator in the 
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settlement of the conflict as a strategic point of departure in order to gain political mileage for 
future trade relations with both North and South Sudan.   
 
The analysis and overview of voting in the Security Council for the year 2011 commencing 
subsequently after the formation of BRICS indicates that initially there was a slow uptake on 
coordinated cooperation in voting particularly with Libya, however as the year progressed and 
the learnt experiences drawn from commentary and criticism were cycled, a greater showing of 
group voting and united rhetoric on issues presented before the UNSC thereafter.   
 
The China-South Africa nexus has been continued during the first year of South Africa’s second 
tenure on the Security Council. Previous congruency over Myanmar, Zimbabwe and Sudan was 
motivated by a combination of individual agendas culminating in a common position, in addition 
to an already existing bilateral relationship based strongly on the rhetoric of mutual cooperation. 
As current elaboration China-South Africa cooperation in the context of BRICS has resulted in 
an increased support base in common stances taken to defensively erode western hegemony.    
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4.7) BRICS and UN Security Council Reform: The Absence of Prospects    
 
Though it is highly unlikely that over the course of one year, BRICS countries would make an 
active effort to lobby for the restructuring of the UNSC over the more immediate and pressing 
issues put forward in before the Council. An analysis of BRICS states in the Security Council 
cannot be had without yielding reflection upon the long debated issue of UN reform which is a 
collective aspiration for the BRICS non permanent members.151  
 
The increased awareness of the BRICS presence on the UNSC and more frequent participation 
and activism on international issues, will spur on the consideration of whether or not BRICS 
countries, more specifically the IBSA three countries will choose to maintain the status quo in an 
effort to remain pragmatic with the terms of cooperation in the company of Russia and China, or 
fully commit to mobilizing real effort for UNSC reform and/or expansion. The actual presence of 
all five states working on the UNSC provides a glimpse of the level of cooperation in the UN 
that could be expected from this grouping, albeit a short amount of time, it serves as an appetizer 
for the general stance and trends that BRICS states gravitate towards.    
 
The active presence of India, Brazil and South Africa on the UNSC in the context of the novel 
BRICS grouping prompts discussions and inquiry into the prospects of Security Council reform, 
relating to the propensity of the IBSA three states to advocate reform for the inclusion of 
themselves as continentally prominent representatives from the global south.  
 
If the ultimate cumulative goal of the BRICS five states is to pragmatically bring about a 
mechanism from which they have stronger leverage on international issues and simultaneously 
push their own agendas, than the current structure of the Security Council provides limited 
assistance in achieving that goal. The obvious limitations of a two year non permanent 
membership and the disproportionate distribution of voting power means that India, Brazil and 
South Africa need to constantly rely upon Russia and China to agree to veto on issues and 
overcome potential divergent interests.    
 
                                               
151 India, Brazil and South Africa  
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Given the rigidity of the UNSC and the extreme unlikelihood that veto states would willingly 
reconfigure power that would collectively diffuse their influence, Security Council reform was 
last given serious consideration under the impetus of former secretary general Kofi Annan.152 As 
far as post efforts go in lobbying for restructuring, India and Brazil has had an alignment with the 
G4 including Germany and Japan as a interest group for UNSC membership. In the General 
Assembly, the G4 have been directly opposed by the Uniting for Consensus group otherwise 
known as the Coffee Club, under the leadership of Italy, whom call for consensus amongst 
member states before any decisions on membership are made. Variations of proposed models 
have included the expansion from 15 to 24 members of which six additional permanent seats are 
added, or by creating 8 new four year renewable terms for non-permanent members.153 All of the 
suggested models have had very limited political mileage in being translated into serious action 
by the permanent five.  Even if the Council transforms into accepting permanent members with 
non-veto positions, it is still seen to be a largely ineffective proposal.  
 
The geopolitical power dynamics and contention amongst member states makes consensus in the 
General Assembly itself a difficult endeavor. Japan’s bid is strongly opposed by China and South 
Korea, India is opposed by Pakistan while Brazil is opposed by Argentina and Mexico.154 In the 
African bloc, there was previously general support for the forerunners of Nigeria, South Africa 
and Egypt, but an insidious source of contention remains particularly between South Africa and 
Nigeria when endorsing one state representative for Africa.    
 
Therefore despite India, Brazil and South Africa’s long term and somewhat distanced aspirations 
to join the UNSC as more prominent players, a situation which would in theory ensure the 
influence of BRICS in the UN and legitimize official positions in the international arena, the 
power politics and geopolitical competition involved in the process diminish these prospects 
greatly. On principle and historic precedence China strongly opposes the G4 owing to the 
membership of Japan and India, sparking rivalries in the expansion of influence. Regardless of 
the rhetoric in diplomatic statements and paragraph 8 of the Sanya BRICS Declaration 
                                               
152 Ikome, F & Samasuwo, N, “UN Reform Towards A More [In] Secure World?”, in Global Insight, Iss. 49, April 
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153 Ariyoruk, A, Players and Proposals in the Security Council Debate, Global Policy Forum, 
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announcing Russia and China’s support and understanding for India, Brazil and South Africa’s 
desire to play a greater role in the UN. There is almost a non-existence in paralleled action to 
follow through on this conveyed support.155  
 
If anything China has used the rhetoric of support to Countries with UNSC reform aspirations as 
a expression of dissatisfaction and additional power buffer against the G4. More recently as 
Pakistan took up the 2012 non permanent rotation on the UNSC in concurrent with India’s 
remaining year. China explicitly and deliberately declared that it attached “great importance to 
Pakistan’s request for a seat on the UNSC [made at the 66th General Assembly meeting in 
September 2011]”,156highlighting an obvious move against India’s support base and by extension 
the support base for Japan in the G4. The occasionally strained relationship between China and 
India over this particular matter and the show of antagonism over endorsement of membership 
hints to a degree of separation and divergent interests within BRICS which have yet to be fully 
provoked to the surface.       
 
Despite the structure of the Security Council being anachronistic in nature, irrelevant in 
correlation with an ever changing global order, where there are alternate centers of power outside 
the UN, a category to which is aptly applicable to BRICS.  
 
Though Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa have demonstrated a fair amount of 
cooperation in the year 2011 with their fortuitous concurrent membership on the UNSC, due to 
the absence of prospects for Council reform in the near future the grouping’s influence in the 
UN’s top organ will be limited to parallel consultations with BRICS states who serve on the 
UNSC157 and based heavily upon very broad agendas formed by overarching developing world 
solidarity. In this regard South Africa’s bilateral relationship under the principle of South-South 
cooperation will be vital, as well as managing the added impetus of over BRICS states as a basis 
for support.       
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Chapter 5: BRICS Guarding Economic Prosperity  
 
5.1) Introduction  
 
The international financial crisis of 2008-2009 necessitated a sense of collective coordination 
from emerging economies to shelter the possible spillover effects. The crisis has highlighted the   
inadequacies of the current system with the dollar as its lynchpin. Historical evidence indicates 
that there is a strong temptation for countries to gravitate towards protectionism as consequential 
actions after a recession. For emerging markets increased protectionism and weakening currency 
is a threat to the framework which secures international economic growth. In a post- crisis era 
the BRICS economies not only face the threat of trade protectionism but must also manage the 
inflationary effect of capital inflows from developed countries making them prone to capital 
flight and bubble bursts. 
 
The collective economic aspiration of the BRICS countries is the main tenet of the grouping and 
most palpable common purpose. With the residual precariousness of the global economy still 
lingering after the 2008 financial crisis, emerging market leaders have legitimate concern over 
the future state of the global economy.  For the BRICS member states, core priorities included 
securing the prospects for future growth while safeguarding current economic strengths. In order 
to achieve their aims, a substantial amount of leverage over the global financial architecture is 
crucial through expanding the dialogue for reform of both the World Bank and the IMF.   
 
A main center of collective concern for BRICS countries is navigating the possible globalised 
spillover effects of the financial crisis while concurrently consolidating their positions on both 
prominent international financial issues and within international financial institutions. These 
actions branch off into independent meetings outside formal institutions, attempted coordination 
within the G20, and the further implementation of Summit conclusions regarding stance and 
planned actions on currency and banking. 
 
The BRICS economies combined represent over 12$trillion in value, solidifying their position as 
an engine for global growth, the collective share of the global economy amounts to roughly 19 
percent and is expected to continue to increase exponentially over the next two decades. Despite 
this BRICS are still not prominent enough decisions makers in the international economic system. 
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Western developed countries remain the rule makers and judges.158 Therefore efforts to reform 
the international financial system through the relevant institutions is a priority for BRICS as a 
means to secure future economic prosperity by obtaining a greater share in general decisions 
making. Reforms in the IMF and World Bank are strongly geared towards more significant 
representation; improved representation translates to enhanced attainment of the interests and 
agendas for the BRICS emerging markets.           
  
 
 
After a meeting of the BRICS trade ministers at the Sanya summit, India’s commerce and 
Industry Minister Anad Sharma had stated that the group was discussing measures to expand 
economic cooperation, and that the five countries will be coordinating their synergies on reforms 
of global institutions like the IMF and World Bank, as well as enhancing cooperation in the G20 
and the WTO.159 
 
The BRICS maneuvering on the economic and financial stage can be analyzed in the prism of 
influencing agenda in the G20 and the response on thematic issues such as currency adjustment 
and methods in which to curb the global financial crisis in emerging market economies. The 
formation of BRICS results by default as a smaller grouping within the network of the G20 
major economies, thus BRICS coordinated action in both rhetoric and logical assumption can be 
calibrated in the G20.  Most recently the G20 meeting in Cannes, France provided BRICS with 
an opportunity to coordinate amongst themselves as a unit before the actually conference took 
place.  
 
This chapter analyzes the collective actions and statements made by BRICS states to address 
their concerns of the instability in the global economy which threatens to override their prospects 
of economic growth. These efforts are made in two fold, first through formal groupings outside 
formal institutions such as the G20, and through voiced urgency to implementing reform of 
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international financial institutions, particularly the IMF. This chapter looks at the details and 
implications of the reform advocated by BRICS, the events of 2011 in the IMF’s leadership also 
allowed BRICS an opportunity to exert their stance on the election of the funds new chief. 
Russia’s recent ascension into the WTO subsequently means that there is a full BRICS presence 
in the organization, this section also attempts to elaborates on the implications. Concurrent to 
BRICS actions in formal organizations concerning trade and finance related matters, the group 
has also attempted to form a loose framework as an alternative mechanism to address their 
mutual concerns on finance and trade. An analysis into these peripheral effects reveals that they 
are specific and fill a niche in intra-BRICS economic relations. The BRICS informal reforms 
outside of existing international financial architecture indicates the propensity of proactive 
measures to both ensure and enhance the collective future prosperity of their economies.        
 
5.2) BRICS and the G20 Major Economies  
 
The G20 was originally formed in 1999 by developing countries in response to the financial 
crisis that was ensuing in the late 1990s. Its purpose was to promote cooperation and consultation 
between the worlds’ major economies on issues related to the international financial system. At 
summit level the G20 convene on an annual basis, while drawing on technical assistance from 
the expertise of international organizations, the group aims to discuss economic and finance 
related issues in order to better maintain stability and prosperity in the international economy. 
Respective finance ministers and central bank governors are often present and party to the 
discussions and negotiation process of the summits. Members of the G20 have in the past 
successfully created a framework for strong, sustainable and balanced growth through realigning 
national policies so that they are more in line with the needs of the global economy. They have 
also recently agreed to a financial regulation plan in order to deal with the financial crisis. 
However one of the main objectives of the G20 related to the ambition of its developing member 
states is to instigate a change in global financial architecture, especially in regards to the 
economic decision making process by promoting governance reform in the World Bank and the 
IMF in particular.160      
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What should be noted is that though there is a range of disparity in the G20, from western 
developed states to rising developing states from Asia, Africa and South America, there have 
been eight main developing world members who have strong claims to being the ‘core’ global 
south group within the G20. Brazil, South Africa, India and China are generally regarded to be 
amongst them. 161  The BRICS Sanya declaration and subsequent coordination actions has 
targeted the G20 as the platform through which they choose to implement BRICS common 
agenda related to maintain collective economic prosperity by guarding the stability of the 
international economy. It is important to distinguish the difference between the G20 major 
economies from the G20 developing states agricultural coalition within the WTO. The G20 
major economies consists of all BRICS states in addition to other substantial players in the 
developing world such as Argentina, Indonesia, , Mexico, Saudi Arabia, Turkey as well as states 
who fall within the developed world grouping such as the United States, Australia, Canada, 
Japan, South Korea, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and the European Union at 
large.162  
  
With the G20 summit in Cannes, France and the advertised presence of all BRICS member states, 
the grouping is a microcosm of rising powers in action. BRICS’ overall aim reiterated through 
joint statements and summit documentation is to actively push for the reform of international 
financial architecture and pursue ways in which to cushion the effects of the financial crisis on 
emerging market economies. In short, BRICS represent a group within the G20 whom are more 
adamant to instigate a stronger direction for agenda setting both in line with their collective and 
individual needs.  With the recent financial crisis still sparking discourse over the best mode for 
recovery, the G20 has been obligated to reconnect with its origins in the current financial and 
economic environment. Seeking to ensure a mitigation of economic downturn and securing a 
more prosperous future for its member base through creating the platform for the dialogue of 
institutional reform.  
 
The presidents of the BRICS states met prior to the commencement of the G20 summit, at the 
Hotel Carlton in November 2011 to order to better coordinate their positions and discuss ways in 
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which to implement common agendas through the Cannes 2011 action plan. At the BRICS 
exclusive meeting ahead of the G20, the five states discussed in addition to the G20 agenda, the 
Eurozone debt crisis, the fragile world economy, the reform of the international currency system 
and the regulation of reserves.163  
 
Developing world bloc-type alliances have gradually evolved to shifting coalitions focusing on 
particular issues and combining developed and developing countries. The G20 epitomizes the 
learned experience of coalition building and BRICS as a group within it represents an avenue for 
the refinement of engineering a shifting coalition in the international global economy.     
 
The G20 with the growing individual and international clout of each respective BRICS member, 
has the potential to drown out the G8, as all members present in the G8 are also present in the 
G20, furthermore the rising influence of BRICS leading the G20 as a support base further 
nullifies the meetings of the G8 plus outreach five164. As the rising core group within the G20 of 
Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Mexico gain more clout internationally along with the 
BRICS countries, the alternative power base of the G8 wanes by comparison.   
 
At BRICS summits, it has been demonstrated that the grouping prefers to use the vehicle of the 
G20 as an extended mechanism in which to achieve their agendas in reforming the global 
financial architecture and remains the premier forum for international cooperation out of the 
multiple country groupings formed in the IMF and over international economic and financial 
issues. The G20 supersedes the G77, and is overtaking the G8. By composition the G20 
resembles a greater degree of transparency; as the globalized nature of the international economy 
obligates states to step outside of their exclusive developed and developing clubs into diverse 
forums where all developed, emerging market and developing states are represented.    
 
 
 
 
                                               
163 Pereira, A, BRICS Countries Convened Ahead of G20 Summit in Cannes, BRICS Information Center, 
http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/reports/111114-leaders-ap.html, 03 Nov 2011. Last accessed: 09/01/2012  
164 Which overlaps in membership between the G8 major economies, BRICS and Mexico 
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5.3) BRICS Summit Concurrence on Economic and Financial Issues      
 
BRICS states have at summit level been coherent about their stance on reforming international 
financial institutions. Reform has been a topic of discourse and asserted plan since the first 
BRICS summit in Yekatrinaburg 2009 mostly based on the collective position that emerging 
countries should be given greater representation within the governing structures of international 
financial institutions to reflect their growing importance and represent their perspectives within 
these institutions. The rhetoric is geared towards reconsidering “voice and vote” as well as 
“mission and mandate” of the IMF and World Bank to better accommodate the BRICS states.165 
 
The G20 has been the main mechanism used to advocate reform of Bretton Woods institutions. 
At the 2005 Ministerial meeting in China, members agreed that quotas and representation of the 
IMF and the World Bank should be increased in order to mirror changes in global economic 
weight, the 2009 G20 London summit leader committed to reevaluating the leadership selection 
of International Financial Institutions, with BRICS states driving the rhetoric behind the 
dissatisfaction of the US and European domination of the World Bank and IMF. Additional to 
dedication towards making IFI’s more transparent and accountable. G20 member have also 
endorsed voiced reforms of the World Bank increasing the voting power of developing countries 
transitioning to 4.5% from 2008 onwards.166    
 
The BRICS declaration stemming from the 2010 Brasilia summit declared that the G20, with 
significant contribution from the BRICS states have increased the resources available to the IMF. 
Noting that under the principle of fair burden sharing, a substantial shift in the voting power in 
favor of emerging market economies and developing countries is vital to bringing their 
participation in decision making processes. Calling attention to the voting power reform of the 
World Bank and quota reform of the IMF to be concluded, furthermore it highlighted  for the 
need to implement a merit based selection method for the heads of the IMF and World Bank.167    
 
                                               
165 Marchyshyn, M, BRICS Leaders Conclusions on International Financial Reform 2009-2011, BRICS Information 
Centre, 30 November 2011, P.1  
166 Ibid, P2.  
167 Russia Parliament, Joint Statement of the BRIC Country Leaders, Second BRIC Summit Brazil, 
http://eng.news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/5,  25 April 2010                                         Last Accessed: 12/12/2011  
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From the BRICS perspective, reform is a means to achieving assured financial stability in the 
future, considering the pressing need to foster greater cooperation in the global economy 
following the financial crisis of 2008-2009.  
 
The Sanya BRICS summit proposed an added dimension to an already established BRICS stance 
on financial reform, member states declared that the inadequacies and deficiencies of the existing 
international monetary and financial systems exposed by the global economic downturn needed 
to be addressed through a broad based international reserve currency, steering away from 
reliance on the dollar, which would provide greater stability and certainty, the improvement of 
the system to be instigated by adjusting the role and expanding the composition of Special 
Drawing Rights (SDR) in the IMF.168      
 
5.4) BRICS’ Limited Concern over Reforms at the World Bank   
 
Reform of both the IMF and World Bank has been on the BRICS agenda since its inception, the 
general dissatisfaction with these institutions is the dominance in shares which western 
developed countries hold over emerging market countries and developing countries. The change 
in quota and shares of these institutions have been long implored by BRICS states, at the 2009 
BRIC Finance Ministers meeting, the group had concluded that international efforts should be 
consolidated in handling global economic and financial challenges stemming from the 2008-
2009 financial crisis, with the stabilization of the international financial system through 
recapitalization, liquidity support and the cleaning of bank balance sheets a necessary priority 
and focal point. The communiqué made little mention of the World Bank, only that the second 
phase of voice and representation reforms should be sped up.169  
 
In April 2010, the 186 countries of the World Bank group endorsed the boasting of its capital by 
more than $86billion and giving developing countries more influence. The International Bank of 
reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the organization’s arm which lends to developing 
countries has increased its capital and increased shares for developing countries. Achieving a 3.3 
                                               
168 Presidency of South Africa, Op. Cit, Sanya Declaration  
169 Russian Foreign Ministry, BRIC Finance Ministers’ Communiqué,   
http://www1.minfin.ru/en/news/index.php?pg4=3&id4=7173, Horsham England, 13 March 2009. Last accessed: 
12/12/2011 ,  
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percent increase in voting power for developing and transition countries, bringing their total 
share to 41.19 percent. Operation reforms were also made in increasing the transparency of the 
Bank by disclosing new access to information and launching the Open Data Initiative providing 
free and easy access to information for developing countries.170   
  
After a meeting with both the IMF and World Bank, the BRICS finance ministers’ joint 
communiqué in Washington 2011 expressed growing concern over the state of the global 
economy. However it included little mention of World Bank reform. As emerging market 
economies, BRICS states’ primary concerns are with the stabilization of the international 
financial and monetary system which would ensure its economic growth through global trade, in 
a post crisis era though the support for greater developing world representation at the World 
Bank is a crucial principle to BRICS’s identity as the lobbyist entity on behalf of the global south. 
None of the BRICS states rely heavily on World Bank loans, thus the focus of energy on reforms 
within this institution is placed lower on its priorities list.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
170 Theis, D, World Bank Reforms Voting Power, 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:22556045~pagePK:64257043~piPK:4373
76~theSitePK:4607,00.htm ,Press Release: 2010/363/EXT, 25 April 2010. Last accessed: 12/12/2011  
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5.5) BRICS’ Main Concern: Reform of the IMF  
 
Reform of the IMF has been employed by BRICS as the precipice institution in which to engage 
in efforts to stabilize the international financial system. The BRICS Finance Ministers’ 
Washington Communiqué was strongly weighted in conveying the imperatives of IMF reform. 
Stating that while BRICS countries had recovered quickly from the 2008-2209 financial crisis, 
the composition of their economies as emerging markets meant that member states have been 
subjected to inflationary pressures, and the growth prospects of all the BRICS’ economies have 
been dampened by global market instability. Expressing concern that the medium to long term 
plans of fiscal adjustment in developed countries have created and uncertain environment for 
global growth, declaring that the group was open to making additional efforts in working with 
other countries and International Financial Institutions in order to address the present challenges 
to global financial stability. A greater share and stronger leverage for BRICS in international 
financial institutions is crucial in the long term for safeguarding their collective economic 
prosperity.171 Increased representation translates to enhanced presence in the decision making 
processes of the institution thereby ensuring the interests and agendas of emerging market 
economies are looked after. Thus BRICS countries are more concerned with IMF reforms which 
in their view has not been implemented with a strong enough sense of urgency. The dialogue and 
actions pertaining to reforms in the IMF mostly revolve around the increase of quota shares, the 
shifting of voting power, modification of regional representation in its governance structures and 
an ongoing discourse on the composition of Special Drawing Rights (SDR).  
 
 5.5.1) IMF Quota Reforms  
 
In investigating the BRICS motivation behind IMF reform, it becomes abundantly clear that the 
IMF has lagged behind in reflecting the BRICS states growing share of the global economy. The 
influence of member states within the IMF is determined by quotas, quotas essentially reflect the 
status of participation and leverage a member country has in the organization. The IMF assigns 
members with a quota which is broadly based on its relative position in the global economy; the 
                                               
171 Indian Ministry of  Finance, BRICS Finance Ministers Joint Communiqué,  
http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/110922-finance.html,  Washington, 22 September 2011. Last accessed: 
13/12/2011    
Master’s Thesis of (Katherine) Hao-Fei Xiong  105 
 
quota determines the country’s maximum financial commitment to the organization otherwise 
known as payment subscriptions. Voting in the IMF is weighted by country’s 
contributions/subscriptions; the quota also represents a member state’s share of voting power in 
IMF decisions. Quotas also determine the access limit to the amount of financing a member state 
can obtain from the organization, under special arrangements a member and borrow up to 200% 
of its quota annually and 600% cumulatively for fiscal regulation.172Thus when emerging powers 
lobby for the increase in quotas it directly affects an increase of voting power and loan rights.  
 
Quotas are calculated in the IMF’s unit currency known as special drawing rights (SDR), SDR is 
a pooled together from a basket of currencies from the world’s major economies. In recent years 
the push for quota reviews has become increasingly prominent lead mostly by the impetus of 
Brazil, China, India and Russia under the self characterization of emerging markets through the 
G20 as its main mechanism for change. Quota increase is argued by rising states as crucial to 
increasing the legitimacy and effectiveness of the fund.   
 
Reform packages implemented by the IMF are technically conducted in five year cycles; in 2008 
the G20 lobbied for dialogue on reform to enhance the position of emerging markets and 
developing countries. From this initial effort in December 2010, a package for far reaching 
reforms, known as the 2008 Amendment on Voice and Participation was approved by the IMF’s 
Board of Governors and took effect from March 2011 onwards. The shift in quota share was 
implemented from the IMF’s fourteenth general review of quotas, the accepted realignment 
represented a major shift in more than 6 percent from over represented to under represented 
members, essentially providing greater shares to emerging market and developing countries. The 
shift in quota and voting power is generally a adjustment whereby IMF shares are taken from 
developed-over represented countries and transferred to emerging market-under represented 
countries; additionally in the process of these reforms emerging market member states have 
stipulated that the voting power and quota shares of the poorest members are protected and not 
diluted in the process.173  
 
                                               
172 International Monetary Fund, Factsheet: IMF Quotas,  About the IMF, 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/quotas.htm, 13 Sep 2011.                     Last accessed 31/12/2011  
173 International Monetary Fund, IMF Quota and Governance Publications: June 2006- March 2011, 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/quotas/pubs/index.htm, 06 Jan 2012.  Last accessed:10/01/2012  
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BRICS Member States Quota Share and Voting Power in the IMF 
As of 2011, reform package from 2010 has not yet been implemented   
 Quota: SDR in 
Millions  
Quota: % of 
Total  
No. of Votes  % of Total 
Votes  
Brazil 4250.5  1.79 43246 1.72 
Russia 5945.4 2.50 60195 2.39  
India  5821.5 2.45 58956 2.34 
China 9525.9 4.00 96000 3.81 
South Africa 1868.5 0.79 19426 0.77 
Total of 
187 Members 
237993.4 100 2518501 100 
Source: IMF174   
 
Although the 2008 Amendments on Voice and Participation reforms symbolized the success of 
emerging market countries in particular in leveraging the G20 and other members within the 
fund to advocate relevant change in their favor, reforms remain a continued topic of discourse 
and are a perpetual agenda for rising states. As illustrated at the 2010 G20 summit in South 
Korea, further efforts were pursued, particularly by BRICS states175 to continue the realignment 
of quotas in addition to increasing quota shares and interrogation into reform of the IMF’s 
governance structure specifically with the Executive Board.  
 
The next round of proposed reforms includes the doubling of quotas, currently IMF total quotas 
stand at 236billion (SDR) which is roughly the equivalent of 374billionUS$, the doubling of 
quotas will bring these resources to a total of 476.8 billion (SDR) which is 748BbillionUS$.176 
Quota doubling is expected to come from financial contributions of the BRICS states, with the 
                                               
174 Table formatted from IMF Data: IMF Members Quotas and Voting Power, 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.aspx,  Last updated and accessed: 10 Feb 2012.   
175 Active efforts mostly by Brazil, Russia, India and China with South Africa’s support  
176 International Monetary Fund, G20 Agreement on Quotas and Governance, Questions and Answers, 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/faq/quotasgov.htm, 06 Jan 2012.  Last accessed: 10/01/2012  
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exception of South Africa. Not only does this mean that the pool of financial resources available 
for member states to loan from is increased which is a extended safe measure to bail out states 
who are may in future suffer financial crisis. There will also be a shift in voting power, half of 
which will come from developed economies and one third of which will come from oil 
producing economies while the remainder will be calculated through respective member 
contributions, this effectively means that once these new reforms are implemented Brazil, Russia, 
India and China will rise to solidify their positions amongst the top ten IMF shareholders along 
with the US, Japan and the big four EU states of Germany, France, Italy and the UK. More 
importantly the projected end results of these reforms will mean that for the first time in the 
IMF’s history, as fast growing emerging market countries hold stronger sway in the institution, 
the combined voting power of the US and EU states in the top ten will fall below 50 percent.177   
 
In addition to this, the existing quotas of African countries and other developing states with 
smaller shares in the fund will remain unaffected, in other words the combined increase in total 
quotas and shifts in voting power will not take away from African states’ current voting 
percentage in the IMF. The timeline for this phase of IMF reforms is proposed to be 2014 
subsequent to approval by its various governing bodies, where the next IMF quota review will 
take place two years ahead of schedule, with a new formula to calculate country quotas in the 
organization to be established by 2013. Under this new proposed shift, 108 developing countries 
will either gain or maintain their quota share.178  
 
 5.5.2) Reform of IMF Governance Structures  
 
In principle the IMF’s governance structure is meant to reflect the position of each member 
country in the global economy. The more power the economy, the greater weight in voting share 
a member state is supposed to have in the organization. The change in the current world 
economy no longer correlates with the governance structures of the IMF. As emerging market 
economies grow in influence, the greater their financial potential to the fund and thus a greater 
share should be yielded to these economies. Reform of the IMF is only effective if the 
                                               
177 Loc. Cit.  
178 IMF Survey Magazine, IMF Board Approves Far-Reaching Governance Reforms, IMF Survey Online, 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2010/NEW110510B.htm, 05 Nov 2010.  Last accessed: 05/01/2012  
Master’s Thesis of (Katherine) Hao-Fei Xiong  108 
 
governance structures of the organization correlate with the proposed change in quota reform. As 
the focus of current reforms are to reflect the larger role that emerging markets and developing 
countries play in the global economy, this redistribution needs to be shown in the methods in 
which IMF governing staff are elected.  
 
Currently, the IMF’s governing organs are divided into the international monetary and financial 
committee and the development committee who advise the board of governors on areas of 
common concern affecting the global economy and issues related to economic development 
respectively. The board of governors which are represented by member states’ finance and 
reserve bank officials, the board reserves the right to approve quota increases, SDR allocations, 
the admittance of new members, and amendments to the article of agreement document. Other 
than that, the board delegates most of its powers to the Executive Board of the IMF.179  
 
The current Executive Board is a 24 member committee which conducts the daily business of the 
IMF, the executive directors on the board are elected by the Board. Currently five seats on the 
executive board are reserved for the five countries holding the largest quotas (US, France, 
Germany, UK and Japan) while the remaining 19 are elected by member states mainly through 
assigned grouped constituencies of four or more countries. Constituencies are roughly grouped to 
geographical regions, while China and Russia considered single constituencies due to their larger 
quotas and have been afforded their exclusive seats to the Executive Board. Brazil, India and 
South Africa must lobby their chosen candidates through their own respective constituencies.   
 
Brazil shares a constituency with 8 other states from Latin America and the Caribbean, but holds 
61 percent of the vote within this constituency thereby making it the main decision maker in 
dictating who they want representing the constituency- currently Brazilian Paulo Batista. 
Similarly, India shares a constituency with its smaller neighboring states of Bhutan, Bangladesh 
and Sri Lanka. India holds a monopoly of 83 percent of the votes in its constituency. South 
Africa on the other hand belongs to the African constituency of 20 states, and holds 24 percent to 
total voting power in close range to Nigeria who holds 22.5 percent within the same 
                                               
179 International Monetary Fund, How the IMF Makes Decisions, Factsheet, 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/govern.htm , 16 Sep 2011 Last accessed: 06/01/2012  
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constituency.180 Therefore unlike fellow BRICS members South Africa’s position in being able 
to exert influence through the Executive Board from its group constituency is diluted due to its 
limited voting power.      
 
If the new reforms come into effect than all directors on the board will be elected by member 
states from 2012 onwards, doing away with the reserved single seats for developed countries, 
although weight in voting shares will still apply.181 The change in quotas and voting power 
project that the Executive Board after the reforms indicated that advanced European economies 
will hold two fewer seats, which are to be gained by the emerging market and developing 
countries.182    
 
 5.5.3) Electing the New Head of the IMF: BRICS Incongruence?  
 
The managing director for the IMF is selected for five year tenures by the Executive Board, and 
is responsible for day to day running of the fund including the organization, appointment and 
dismissal of staff. The Executive Board draws up a shortlist of three nominees who have been 
suggested by member states and confirmed their desire to be put forward for the position. The 
Executive Board then selects the Managing Director by majority votes cast after a month long 
process, therefore although the objective is still to get consensus amongst members of the 
Executive Board, developed states who have higher voting shares still sway the end decision.  
 
After the controversy surrounding former IMF head Dominique Strauss-Khan leading to his 
eventual resignation, emerging countries and the developing world had an opportunity to add 
their input in the selection process of a new IMF head, the position has historically and 
traditionally been held by a European. This precedent has been criticized by the global south, 
stating that the same consideration should be giving to candidates from developing world 
                                               
180 International Monetary Fund, IMF Executive Directors and Voting Power, Factsheet,  
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/eds.aspx, 12 January 2012.  Last accessed: 14/01/2012  
181 Therefore developed countries will still get more votes and will more likely still be able to elect their desired 
candidates onto the Executive Board.  
182 IMF Survey Magazine, Op. Cit.   
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backgrounds. Prior to the beginning of the selection process shareholders expressed that non-
Europeans should be considered for the job with equal standing.183  
 
Though there is no existing rules in the IMF which stipulated the requirements of a managing 
director’s nationality, the practice is a result of a long standing gentlemen’s agreement between 
the US and Europe. Since the inception of the Bretton Woods institutions, the majority 
shareholders of US and European countries have always yielded to each other for the head of the 
IMF to be European and the head of the World Bank to be American. There in practice the US 
and Western Europe have dominated the board through their majority quotas, despite Brazil and 
South Africa at the beginning of the selection process calling for the next head of the IMF to be a 
candidate from the developing world.184   
 
BRICS countries released a statement regarding the IMF head selection process which was 
presented by its’ representative directors185 on the Executive Board. The press release was used 
to convey the collective stance of BRICS states with regards to this issue. Articulating that the 
convention and practice of selecting the managing director of the fund based on nationality 
undermines the legitimacy and credibility of the fund.  Drawing attention to the public 
announcement made in 2007 when former head Dominique Strauss Khan was elected, Mr. Jean-
Claude Junker president of the Euro group declared that the next IMF head will not be European. 
BRICS states called for the selection of the next person to be in on broad consultation with the 
membership and be based on competency of qualification with strong political acumen and 
technical background, regardless of his/her nationality.  Relating back to the IMF’s new general 
undertaking of reflecting the growing role of emerging economies, the BRICS public statement 
called for the adequate representation of emerging market and developing members in the fund, 
                                               
183 Thomas, L, IMF Job Should Be Open to Non-Europeans: OECD Head, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/20/us-imf-oecd-idUSTRE74J2J620110520, 20 May 2011. Last accessed 
21/12/2011.    
184 Keating, J, Why is the IMF head Chief always a European?, Financial Times, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/05/18/why_is_the_imf_chief_always_a_european 
 18 May 2011. Last accessed: 13/12/2011  
185 Each BRICS state has a representative on the Executive Board, with Moeketsi Majoro (Lesotho) representing 
South Africa through the African constituency in this regard.   
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from this perspective, the new IMF head should thus be committed to change and reform of the 
institutions so as to adapt it to the new realities of the world economy.186  
 
In response to the accumulated discontent and potential controversy over the election of the next 
IMF head, the dean of the Executive Board Mr. Shakour Shalaan announced that the board 
adopted a selection process which would take place in a transparent and merit based manner. All 
candidates were required to have a distinguished record of policy making at senior levels and 
demonstrate the managerial and diplomatic skills needed to lead a global institution.187  
 
Candidates for the position from the global south were rumored to include South Africa’s head 
of the National Planning Commission Trevor Manuel and Kazakhstan’s Central Bank Chief 
Grigory Marchenko. The final shortlisted candidates however turned out to be French Finance 
Minister Christine Lagarde and Mexico’s Central Bank Chief Agustin Carstens. Ultimately, 
Christine Lagarde was successfully being appointed the eleventh head of the IMF on the 5th of 
July 2011 after a month’s long selection process. Despite the BRICS uniting in protest over the 
presumption of a European head of the IMF, BRICS member states eventually showed their 
support and backed Lagarde’s candidacy even though they had originally called for the 
"abandoning the obsolete unwritten convention that requires that the head of the IMF be 
necessarily from Europe".188          
 
In this regard, the pragmatic consideration for the most appropriate candidate to lead the IMF 
was taken into account by BRICS over rhetoric of anti-west domination in the institution. 
Despite Agustin Carstens’ developing world background and experience in the fund, he has been 
criticized for overseeing a feeble economic stimulus package in his own country, with Mexico 
being the hardest hit by the financial crisis out in the global south. Furthermore Carstens 
                                               
186 IMF Press Release, Statement by IMF Directors representing BRICS on the Selection Process for Appointing the 
IMF Managing Director, Press release no. 11/195, http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2011/pr11195.htm, 24 
May 2011.     Last accessed: 15/12/2011  
187 IMF Press Release, IMF Executive Board Initiates Selection Process for Next IMF Managing Director, Press 
Release no.11/191. http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2011/pr11191.htm 
20 May 2011.      Last accessed: 15/12/2011  
188 Reuters, Christine Lagarde set to declare IMF hand as BRICs combine to keep "obsolete" Europe out,  The 
Telegraph, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/8535074/Christine-Lagarde-set-to-declare-IMF-hand-as-
BRICs-combine-to-keep-obsolete-Europe-out.html, 25 May 2011.   Last accessed: 16/12/2011  
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education and rationale sympathies stemming from the Chicago school of market first regulation 
last has been widely question by the global downturn.189  
 
Lagarde on the other hand, in her career in politics and law has held a widely well respected 
reputation, having been ranked as the best finance minister in the Eurozone, not only had she 
gained the backing of the G8 in general, Lagarde travelled to both China and Brazil in an effort 
to win the favor of the BRICS states and successfully managed to lobby public backing from 
China, and private support from Brazil.190 On the matter of exclusivity on Europe’s monopoly 
over the position, Lagarde herself stated that she was not arguing for her candidacy based on the 
fact that she was European.191    
 
Aside from the subtle contradiction made by BRICS states which indicated incongruence 
between the initial political sentiments and eventual actions taken over the issue, considerations 
of the best candidate for IMF head out of the list of available options turned out to be a European.  
Although BRICS states had consulted with each other in finding a candidate who could fit the 
profile, there was no appropriate nominee whom they could legitimately back for the running, as 
highlighted by Chinese finance officials in explaining their support for Christine Lagarde.192  
Moreover, there was strong strategic concerns from BRICS which had to take precedence over 
the principle of greater representation for the global south; the mutual anxiety of the spillover 
effects of the Greek debt crisis, BRICS as emerging markets leaders are conscious of the possible 
threats to their own economic growth from a collapse in the Eurozone, therefore an IMF head 
who has both experience and respect in finance related matters in Europe better serves BRICS’ 
strategic interests in guarding their future economic prosperity.  
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190 Brazil was against the election of Agustin Carstens.  
191 Deen, M and Kennedy, S, Lagarde Declares Candidacy for IMF Head, Bloomberg News, 
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5.5.4) Expanding the Composition of Special Drawing Rights (SDR) to Include Emerging Market 
Currencies   
 
With the financial crisis lowering the reliability of the US dollar and Euro as the world’s major 
currencies, BRICS states whose primary interest of economic growth are being jeopardized by 
massive capital inflows from developed countries. As the dollar depreciates due to the residual 
effects of the economic downturn, the ripple effects on emerging market economies are largely 
negative. Global investors prompted by the lowering value of the dollar and economic recovery 
in developed countries have a propensity to move capital into emerging market economies in 
order to take advantage of assured growth rates.  
 
Special Drawing Rights was originally created as a supplement to the then international reserves 
of gold and the US dollar in a bid to help aid the expansion of world trade and financial 
development. However after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the transfer to 
floating exchange rates, SDR became mainly used as a supplementary reserve asset and is 
exchanged for freely useable currencies by the fund’s members, in addition to being the unit of 
account for the IMF. The value of SDR is determined by a basket of currencies, collectively 
calculated from the Yen, Euro, Pound and the US Dollar. Official review for the composition of 
SDR is done every five years, with the next review expected to take place in 2015.193 
 
Table: Current Exchange Rate per Unit of SDR 
Based on exchange rates week beginning 6th of February 2012 
 Brazil 
(Real) 
Russia 
(Ruble) 
India 
(Rupee)  
China 
(Yuan) 
South 
Africa 
(Rand)   
Currency 
Units per SDR 
2.661 46.716 75.221 11.803 9.751 
Source: IMF
194
 
 
                                               
193 International Monetary Fund, Special Drawing Rights, IMF Factsheet, 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/sdr.htm, 13 Sep 2011.  Last accessed: 05/01/2012.  
194 Table formatted from data. International Monetary Fund. SDR Currency Unit, 
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BRICS and other emerging market economies are currently continuing the conversation in 
looking for alternatives to reliance on the US dollar as the international reserve currency, the 
Sanya declaration concluded that the international financial crisis exposed inadequacies and 
deficiencies of the existing monetary system has called for a broad based international reserve 
currency system to provide greater stability and certainty for the global economy. Though at the 
moment SDR is only used by members of the IMF to support international reserves. BRICS in 
multilateral forums have kept the ongoing dialogue on possibly using the SDR as an alternative 
to global reserve currency. The role of SDR could be expanded through diversified composition 
and encouraging its use as a unit of account to denominate global trade thereby insulating against 
exchange rate volatility. Expanding composition would not only provide an enhanced role for 
SDR but by incorporating a widely used emerging market currencies it would reflect the 
increasing weight of their economies in global trade and finance as well as facilitate the 
internationalization of these currencies.195    
 
Diversification away from a structurally weak dollar was successfully reverberated by BRICS 
through the 2011 G20 Cannes Communiqué “We agree that the SDR basket composition should 
continue to reflect the role of currencies in the global trading and financial system. The SDR 
composition assessment should be based on existing criteria, and we ask the IMF to further 
clarify them. To adjust to currencies’ changing role and characteristics over time, the 
composition of the SDR basket will be reviewed in 2015, or earlier, as currencies meet the 
existing criteria to enter the basket”.196   
 
When the Executive Board met to discuss the reevaluation the SDR basket currencies in 
assessing the range of options available which could be implemented in the long term, in order to 
enhance the role of SDR to contribute to the long term stability of the international monetary 
system, a number of directors cautioned that including currencies that are not fully convertible in 
the SDR basket could reduce its’ attractiveness to IMF member states. Also noted that expanding 
the SDR basket to major emerging market currencies under appropriate conditions, and based on 
                                               
195 Moghadam, R, “Strengthening the International Monetary System: Taking Stock and Looking ahead”, IMF 
Strategy Paper¸ Prepared by the Strategy, Policy and Review Department, 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2011/032311.pdf,  23 March 2011. P. 21 
196 Verma, S, G20 Defers, Financial Times Online, http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2011/11/04/727971/, 04 Nov 2011.  
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transparent criteria, could further expand the SDR role in the international system. Officials 
observed that besides the theoretical advantages of diversifying SDR, the process itself faces 
significant technical and political challenges.197   
 
In this hypothetical projection of including emerging market currencies, the Yuan by default of 
China’s share of global exports would be a candidate under consideration. However in the IMF’s 
evaluation of the Renmenbi’s potential within the SDR basket it was noted that the currency did 
not meet the criteria to be determined a freely useable currency, despite being de-pegged from 
the US dollar it is still considered to be highly managed by authorities,198 in contrast with all the 
other SDR currencies which are largely free floating. Furthermore the only congruent position 
taken by BRICS so far is its call of serious consideration in adding emerging market currencies 
to the SDR, beneath the surface the economic heterogeneity amongst its members have the 
potential to be a source of contention and contradiction. Brazil, India and to a certain extent 
South Africa hold mutual concern on the possible effects that an undervalued Yuan may have on 
their exports. Russia has been benefiting from the soaring rise in prices of oil and commodity 
prices, while China a major importer on the other hand has been criticizing the increase in those 
prices and calling for stabilization in commodity prices.199 The differences in economic systems 
and individual economic interests of the BRICS members may simmer to impede consensus on 
specific international monetary and finance regulation issues.     
 
Thus far the existing consensus within BRICS and the G20 is enhancing emerging market 
presence through emerging market currency representation in the international monetary system, 
and agreement on the potential for expanding the basket to include currencies of large emerging 
market economies in line with their growing role in global trade and finance. The extended 
consensus between BRICS, the G20 and the IMF’s Executive Board is to continue wider 
consultation as a incremental step to a long term process in reviewing the role and composition 
of SDR for the purposes improving international financial stability and consistency.  
                                               
197 International Monetary Fund, IMF Executive Board Concludes Meeting on Enhancing International Monetary 
Stability- A Role for the SDR?, Public Information Notice no.11/2, 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2011/pn1122.htm, 02 Feb 2011. Last accessed: 12/12/2011  
198 Moghadam, R, “Enhancing International Monetary Stability- A Role for SDR?”, IMF Strategy Paper, Prepared 
by the Strategy, Policy and Review Department, http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2011/010711.pdf,  07 Jan 
2011.P.20 
199 International Center for Trade and Sustainable Development, Op. Cit, Bridges Weekly Digest  
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The volatility of the dollar necessitates BRICS states, in their mutual concerns as emerging 
markets, to look for alternatives in reserve currency for greater stability. However concrete 
decisions over the matter have yet to be made leading up to the IMF’s official review of the SDR 
in 2015.   
 
5.6) BRICS and the WTO: Looking Ahead   
 
5.6.1) Pre-BRICS Developing Country Alignment: 2003 Cancun   
 
The 2003 ministerial conference in Cancun is a prime example of developing country coalitions, 
leading to coordinated effective action. At the time this particular type of developing world 
action was innovatively different, more importantly the stance presented showed a high level of 
cohesion. Prior to the official Cancun Summit, developing countries became aware of the US and 
EU’s tendency to negotiate before hand and collude on issues, specifically on agriculture. As a 
pre-emptive response to developed world collusion, countries in the developing world began 
instigating their own interests groups prior, networks of developing countries began to set their 
own agendas and expectations of the Cancun conference. Many of these states were also 
members of the Cairns group, a club of agricultural exporting countries.200 
 
The main concern for developing countries was that much of their national income was derived 
by exporting agricultural goods, which then had to compete in the international market with 
products from subsidized developed nations of the US and EU, thereby narrowing their prospects 
for increased profits and overall economic growth within the industry vital for a developing 
economy. An alternative framework for proposal was initially drafted by Brazil and India, which 
was later joined by China’s collaboration. The alternative proposal was put forward and signed 
by several developing states, South Africa included, which came to be known as the Group of 20 
at Cancun.201 This developing world coalition went beyond blocking the efforts of the developed 
                                               
200 Narlikar. A and Tussie, D, The G20 at The Cancun Ministerial: Developing Countries and Their Evolving 
Coalitions in the WTO, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford , 2004. P951 
201 G20+ of exclusively developing countries coalition was formed over agricultural issues and consists of 23 
members: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Mexico, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Tanzania, Thailand, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zimbabwe. 
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world at the WTO but also took initiative by proposing a feasible alternative, on export subsidies 
the G20 proposed a differentiate formula where over a period of years export subsidies to 
products of particular interest to developing countries are eliminated and requested further 
commitment that members will commit for the elimination of export subsidies for the remaining 
products over a predetermined amount of years.202 Thereby in total guaranteeing that over an 
extended period of time, the developing world would no longer have to contend with the 
developed world’s subsidies.  
 
As a new exemplar of emerging power proactive diplomacy, China, India and Brazil led the 
block consensus comprising of a cohesive mass of developing countries regardless of possible 
fault lines between the diverse members of the group. Instead of fragmentation the coalition at 
Cancun successfully stood steadfast against coordinated western developed world agenda 
thereby eventually stalling the Doha round.203 At the core of this coalition were the legitimate 
and cohesive claims of the emerging powers of Argentina, Brazil, India, China and South Africa 
each with regional leadership legitimacy. 204  Cancun demonstrated the potential success that 
BRICS states, with exception of Russia, had in leading and lobbying for their interests. As 
Russia finally joins the WTO, with the presence of all BRICS members in the organization and 
the propensity of these states to engage proactively, BRICS actions in the WTO may come to 
greater effect.    
  
 5.6.2) All BRICS in the WTO: Russia’s Ascension   
 
Until recently the anachronistic nature of BRICS was further amplified by the anomaly of Russia 
as a non-member of the WTO. The common economic aspirations of the countries combined 
with their voiced ambition in reforming both the IMF and the World Bank was diluted by the 
omission of Russia and thereby the potential for a concerted BRICS presence in the WTO.  
 
                                                                                                                                                       
Not to be confused with the G20 Major Economies aforementioned in this chapter which includes Russia and 
developed countries.   
202 Ibid, P.952  
203 Ibid, P.954 
204 Ibid, P.960  
Master’s Thesis of (Katherine) Hao-Fei Xiong  118 
 
The negotiations for Russia’s ascension into the WTO have been in elaboration for 18 years, 
stalled by various issues most recently by the objection of Georgia in relation to what it 
perceived to be the 2008 invasion. In December 2011, at the 8th Ministerial Conference in 
Geneva, consensus by members were constructed ultimately approving Russia’s ascension into 
the WTO, with the condition of ratifying the deal within the following 220 days to become a 
fully fledged member of the organization.205 Russia with its concurrent credentials of BRICS 
member, UNSC permanent member and leading oil and gas producer has been able to gain all 
rounded access in the international system through its ascension into the WTO. Considering the 
global economic downturn, Russia had recently decided to accept the package offered, by 
opening up to foreign investment stipulated by the WTO and further concentrated effort to 
complete the process, as a means of securing future economic competitiveness.206  
 
For BRICS this means, cementing the full integration of all its members as a foundational 
starting point to instigate proverbial change in the international system. Unlike the imbalanced 
structural rigidity of the World Bank and IMF, the WTO is a consensus based organization 
which technically does not offer unequal leverage for any particular country in its member 
structure. Full inclusion of all BRICS members means that there is a lobby group with significant 
clout in the global economy who have the option to challenge the WTO’s standards and 
implementation of liberalized trade practices, not to mention an extra state aligning with the 
Brazil, China, India and South Africa for developing world agendas by the mere fact that it 
challenges western trade hegemony, provided these actions do not conflict with Russia’s 
immediate national interests. In terms of synchronization within WTO groupings, Russia is the 
only BRICS member not present in the G20 developing country-agriculture based coalition 
formed prior to its ascension at Cancun in 2003.207     
 
 
 
                                               
205 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Conference Approves Russia’s WTO Membership, News Item,  
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news11_e/acc_rus_16dec11_e.htm1, 6 December 2011.   
Last accessed: 31/12/2011 
206 BBC News, Russia Becomes WTO Member After 18 Years of Talks, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-
16212643, 16 December 2011        Last accessed: 31/12/2011  
207 Russia along with developed western states is a member of the G20 Major Economies, but not the G20 WTO 
Cancun group comprised exclusively of developing countries. 
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5.6.3) BRICS meeting of Trade Ministers Prior to the 8
th
 WTO Conference  
 
The trade ministers of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa in Geneva on the 14th of 
December to discuss common agendas and put forward a statement representing the collective 
BRICS sentiment at the WTO ministerial. Recalling the statements made in the Sanya 
declaration on BRICS commitment to the Doha Development Round, and congratulating Russia 
for its recent ascension. Russia, confirmed that the ratification of the commitments in relation to 
its membership will be expected to be implemented from mid 2012 onwards.   
 
Expressing the need for the WTO to further develop its rules and structures to address the 
concerns of developing countries, and welcoming the addition of more Least Developed 
Economies to the organization208 contribute to the shared goal of achieving universality in the 
WTO. Emphasizing that under the present economic circumstances international trade is crucial 
to global recovery, and as a result BRICS states are strongly opposed to all forms of 
protectionism. Pointing out that developed world protectionism is most prevalent in agriculture 
with regards to trade distorting subsidies is most harmful as not only generates food insecurity 
through local farmers no longer have the means to maintain domestic production, but denies the 
development potential of this key sector as well.209   
 
Additionally the joint BRICS statement also clarified that despite the impasse experienced by the 
Doha Round, members are willing to conclude the round based on the adoption of the draft 
modalities last edited in the text of the December 2008 round. Affirming that they are 
vehemently against “plurilateral approaches” taken to undermine the multilateral nature of the 
negotiations, in other words BRICS states reiterate that they will undeniably reject any 
agreement negotiated out of pre-conference and in collusion between western developed states. 
Whilst conveying that priority must be given to the implementation of the Hong Kong 
Ministerial Declaration regarding duty free quota free initiative, as well as the topical matters of 
cotton and agriculture in relation to strong commitment with the cotton four (C4) economies 
                                               
208 Montenegro, Samoa and Vanuatu  
209 BRICS Information Centre, Ministerial Declaration of the BRICS Trade Ministers, 
http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/111214-trade.html, Geneva, 14December 2011.    Last accessed: 09/01/2012  
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being crucial to the process. In addition to mention of support for BRICS technical cooperation 
in areas which are relevant to Africa countries.210 
 
The BRICS ministerial meeting before the WTO conference indicates the continued commitment 
and willingness of BRICS member states to put effort into coordinating their actions in 
international institutions by way of informal meetings before or parallel to official summits. 
Statements released prior give an indication of the general direction and sentiments of the BRICS 
states. Emerging from the narrative is an attempt in rhetoric to draw and show solidarity for other 
developing states particularly those with least developed economies in negotiations of the WTO.     
 
The two main priorities expressed were the BRICS consolidated positions on the clause in 
stemming from the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration of 2005 which relates to paragraph 45 of 
the framework agreement whereby least developed countries are exempt from any reduction 
requirement with regards to market access and custom duties on foreign imports, but it is also 
stipulated that “developed Members, and developing country Members in a position to do so, 
should provide duty-free and quota-free market access for products originating from least-
developed countries”.211A clause which has been reiterated by BRICS as not all members, with 
implicit finger pointing at the western developed states, have made the duty-free-quota-free from 
LDCs point fully operational in their countries. On the contention over cotton subsidies, which 
remains a topic of dispute between the United States and the Cotton-four group of African 
countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Benin and Mali), though concessions being secured from the US 
is still ongoing, it is widely accepted amongst the developing world that the Doha round will not 
conclude unless an agreement over cotton is reached. 212  In principle the cotton four group 
represents the affirmation of African and developing world assertiveness over crucial areas of 
interests in the WTO, the success of the cotton four countries in demonstrating that as LDC’s 
they have had a substantial impact against US trade hegemony is a precedent which is widely 
supported by BRICS states and the developing world at large.           
                                               
210 Loc. Cit.  
211 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration: Annexes, Report by the Chairman of the Special Committee 
on Agriculture, Hong Kong Ministerial 2005, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min05_e/final_annex_e.htm , Adopted 18 December 2005.   
Last accessed: 15/01/2012 
212 Birkbeck, C and Harbourd, M,  Developing Country Coalitions in the WTO: Strategies for Improving the 
Influence of the WTO’s Weakest and Poorest Members, Working Paper: Global Economic Governance Programme, 
Oxford University, no. 63, July 2011,  P.14 
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The ministerial statement before the WTO meeting reveals the aspirations of BRICS to use the 
wide latitude of groups in developing world from least developed countries to African cotton 
producers as a support base for their agenda. Showing solidarity and offering to leverage clout of 
behalf of their interests is by extension strategically threading a lose coalition of the developing 
world at large. It is a continuation to push for G20 developing world agendas originating from 
Cancun to be continually accessed and taken seriously at the WTO. Although with its recent 
ascension, it is still uncertain the degree of support Russia will give to agricultural issues of 
fellow BRICS and developing countries which is not it’s first priority considering Russia’s 
strong concentration in the oil and gas industries.           
 
The potential evolution of BRICS action through the G20 developing countries within the WTO 
is the probability of forming a new type of malleable BRICS led coalition to be used in exerting 
influencing the Doha round, of the coalitions existent in the WTO context BRICS members 
supersede in political clout and economic leverage the larger issue based coalitions (such as G33 
and NAMA 11), the characteristic based groups (G77 and LDC grouping) and the regional based 
groupings (African group and group of Latin American countries).213  
 
Though it is yet to be seen what actions BRICS will choose to implement in affecting their 
agendas through the WTO, whether that be efforts to block defensively or actively pursue their 
own interests offensively. What can be deduced from a wider perspective of BRICS in the 
international system is that the group has a tendency to defend broad principles relevant to the 
developing world. Despite the two specific priorities mentioned in the BRICS pre-WTO 
ministerial meeting, it is still uncertain as to the direction of the grouping in terms of their focus 
on single issues versus the wide variety of cross cutting issues.  How much real support BRICS 
will get from fellow members in the developing world, and the degree of yielding from 
developed countries in the WTO over key trade issues are areas which too remain premature to 
determine.    
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5.6.4) BRICS Potential to Build Coalition from Learned Experience within the G20+ (WTO)    
 
Cancun was largely seen to be a circumstantial grouping, however leading on from historical 
experiences the formation of BRICS solidifies member states’ propensity to forge ahead with 
their own agendas. Though the cohesiveness of BRICS affecting the stalled Doha rounds is yet to 
be demonstrated, there lies potential in a strong degree of coalesce based on social learning and 
the practice of coalition building by emerging powers in the WTO. The BRICS grouping has had 
two decades of coalition forming,214stemming from their learned experience of being involved in 
different coalitions over the decades developing countries have a bank of knowledge to draw 
from.  Aside from regional based groupings, two types of distinct coalitions were formed, bloc 
type coalitions and issue based alliances. The former is based strongly on ideational and identity 
related influences where they combine like minded countries and over time adopt collective 
positions across a spectrum of issues, while the later is formed for instrumental reasons and are 
directed towards specific threats and dissipate once the particular issue has been addressed.215 
From the bloc type coalitions before and during the Uruguay Round in the early days of GATT 
to the gradual G10 informal group of developing countries, the G20 by way of past experience 
has built a coalition based on a combination of bloc type and issues based, which was solidified 
between developing states at Cancun, this allows for a malleability and perseverance of the 
coalition.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
214 With the wayward exception of Russia, as the Former Soviet Union decades prior was more preoccupied with 
Cold War alliances. Note the G20+ agricultural bloc of the WTO is not to be confused with the G20 major 
economies group.   
215 Narlikar. A and Tussie, Op. Cit, P.957 
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5.7) Reforms Outside of Current International Structures  
 
In addition to BRICS states keeping the ball rolling on reform of international financial 
institutions. Much of the agreements made in ministerial meetings and at summit level has put 
forward proposals to form pieces of an alternative framework for inter-BRICS trade, economic 
and financial cooperation as a separate entity from existing international organizations.  
 
5.7.1) Common Currency Plan: Circumventing the Volatility of the Dollar and the Euro  
 
With the US in economic recovery and implementing quantitative easing on the dollar to lower 
its value in order to boast exports, the Eurozone/Greek crisis causing consternation, both the 
Euro and dollar show signs of eroding at a time when the BRICS countries as a group hold more 
than half of the world’s foreign reserves in these currencies. Circumventing the use of the US 
dollar and Euro as currencies for international trade remains a main goal of emerging economies 
currently within the structures of the IMF and outside formal institutions in the wider global 
economy. BRICS states have conveyed plans for a single currency unit within the grouping to 
use for trade amongst themselves, thereby circumventing the need to convert local currencies 
into Euros or Dollars when trading with each other. South Africa’s trade and industry minister 
Rob Davies stated that “one of the critical issues in question is conduction trade between 
ourselves [BRICS] that does not require recourse to third-country currency and to convertible 
currencies like the dollar and euro, which are incredibly volatile these days.” 216      
 
Minister Davies did note that such an endeavor would be a complicated long term process, where 
an initial clearing out arrangement needs to be made. And there would be important structural 
changes to the way BRICS currently trade. This initial proposal was drawn up prior to South 
Africa’s ascension into the group, and was sent back to the drawing board when South Africa 
became an added member. With South Africa having backed the common currency plan behind 
closed door discussions with the other members, the issue will be on the new agenda for the next 
BRICS summit in India 2012. However there is apprehension over the currency proposal, critics 
argue that although among the BRICS members there are several overlapping bilateral and 
                                               
216 Redvers, L, SA Backs BRICS Common Currency Plan, Mail and Guardian Business: the Big Interview, 18-24 
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multilateral trade agreements, there is no formal trade convention in place yet, therefore 
discussions on a common currency plan can be considered premature.217   
5.7.2) BRICS Contact Group for Economic Cooperation  
 
BRICS economies account for 45% of global growth, much of which is export driven and 
requires products entry into foreign markets, the aftermath of the financial crisis resulted in many 
developed economies becoming reluctant with endorsing lax free trade for emerging market 
products. The increasing mutual concern of trade protectionism was raised at summit level, as 
developed economies implement defensive trade policies to guarantee their own recovery; 
emerging markets require continued global trade to guarantee their much needed economic 
growth which is crucial to both domestic stability and development. In the post crisis global 
economic downturn BRICS countries by safeguarding the interests of other developing countries 
could ensure economic growth through multilateral trade with the global south.   
 
The BRICS trade ministers’ declaration prior to the WTO conference had also made mention of 
the contact group initiative which was proposed at the Sanya summit and subsequently 
elaborated on. Acting effectively as a trade liaison mechanism, the group was established and 
entrusted with examining and “proposing an institutional framework and concrete measures to 
expand and enhance economic cooperation both among the BRICS and between BRICS and all 
developing countries within a south-south perspective”.218 The contact group met for the first 
time in Beijing on the 2nd of December 2011 and was set further its discussion at the next BRICS 
summit. The trade ministers of the five countries recognized the growth potential in trade flows 
and investments amongst developing countries and stated that BRICS in this regard should play a 
leading role, as deepened an enlarged economic cooperation amongst BRICS and the global 
south may be conducive to not only shared interests but to helping promote growth in the 
international economy as well.219    
 
 
 
                                               
217 Loc. Cit  
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5.7.3) BRICS Exchange Alliance  
 
What is markedly different about the formation of the BRICS Exchange Alliance is the fact that 
it is largely a corporate sector initiative, and for the most part it is independent of summit level or 
ministerial level consultation. Though Security Exchanges is one of the sub-forums of the 
BRICS summits, it is largely coordinated and led in absence of government officials. The idea 
was originally conceived by the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE) with dual conversations 
between CEO Charles Li and Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) CEO Russell Loubser before 
being bought to the attention of the stock exchanges of fellow BRICS members. The unveiling of 
the cross listing agreement was announced in October 2011 during the 51st Annual General 
Meeting of the World Federation of Exchanges hosted in Johannesburg. The idea of the BRICS 
Exchange Alliance is for respective BRICS stock exchanges to list each other’s benchmark 
indices220 in their own domestic stock exchanges thereby exposing local investors to the options 
of investing in other emerging market stock in their respective local currencies, providing overall 
worldwide easier access to benchmark equity index derivatives.221      
 
The plans to implement this alliance was step up prudently in a three stage process, first was to 
initiate an agreement with all respective BIRCS stock exchanges, currently the alliance consists 
of seven stock exchanges, Russia and India contributing two stock exchanges each, while Brazil 
and South Africa put forward BM&FBOVESPA and the JSE respectively and the HKSE as the 
initial representative for China.222 The second phase is to launch this initiative from June 2012, 
depending on how well received the alliance is the third phase will consist of listing the futures 
and options of specific stocks from BRICS countries on each other’s domestic stock exchange 
listing boards.223 
                                               
220 Initial benchmark index to be determined by respective Stock Exchanges on the basis of that index’s being able 
to attract the most investor attention on the stock exchange of fellow BRICS economies.  
221 Minney, T, BRICS Stock Exchange Forms Alliance, African Capital Markets News, 
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http://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/newsconsul/hkexnews/2011/1110122news.htm , 12/10/2011. Last accessed: 
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The combined listed market capitalization of the alliance is estimated to be at $9,02-trillion, with 
an equity market trading value of $422bn and 9 481 listed companies.224 In an interview JSE 
CEO Russell Loubser stated that the alliance will most likely succeed as investors are looking to 
diversify their portfolios with foreign stock from emerging markets, the cross listing means that 
investors will not need to pay the transaction costs of exchange rates and going through a foreign 
broker. Furthermore, if the initial phases of the alliance network is successful, than there lays the 
vast potential of listing individual stock on BRICS’ stock exchanges and/ or forming a collective 
BRICS index in the financial market.225   
 
Not only is the exchange alliance a consolidated effort to integrate the corporate sector of BRICS 
member states, but also serves as a marketing mechanism for global investors to be exposed to 
companies within the prominent BRICS economies who each hold varying degrees of significant 
growth. It indicates that entities within the corporate sectors are gravitating towards relying on 
fellow BRICS economies’ trade and investment cooperation as a vehicle for growth, in addition 
to negating the use of exchange rate controls, as cross listings will be done in local currencies.  
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5.7.4) Mutual Credit Lines and Developing Banks Cooperation  
 
On the sidelines of the Sanya summit, the development banks of each BRICS country signed an 
agreement at their first meeting to increase cooperation and adapt a framework for mutual credit 
lines denominated in their local currencies in an effort to further negate the use of the dollar. 
With the mutual concern over the long term fate of the dollar, the framework accord was signed 
by Russia’s state development bank the Vnesheconom (VEB) Bank, China’s Development Bank, 
the Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA) and Brazil’s BNDES. With China taking the 
initiative by pledging to pump up to 10billion Yuan in loans to lend to fellow BRICS economies’, 
and while Russia’s VEB chairman Vladimir Dimitriev stated that his country was looking to 
diversify their loans and thus was looking to borrow the equivalent of 500million Yuan. 226 
China’s banks have already lent up to 141billionUS$ to overseas markets as of the end of 2010, 
with $38billion of which were loaned to BRICS economies.227 Therefore the new framework is 
intended to be integrated into existing practices, thereby further formalizing BRICS connections 
with regards to the operations of their development banks. The inter-bank agreement is meant to 
facilitate further capital flows and trade financing.      
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5.7.5) BRICS Response to the Eurozone crisis  
 
Stemming from Greek’s debt dilemma the European Union has been tied up with intensive talks 
in solving the ongoing 2011 Eurozone crisis, BRICS countries’ who depend on the baseline 
stability of the international monetary system and consistency in the global economy, the 
spillover effects of the crisis is a mutual concern to emerging market countries as it is to western 
developed countries. BRICS have mulled over the option of providing debt relief for the 
Eurozone, with China and Brazil being the main impetus behind the drive. The crisis was a 
central issue of discussion at the Cannes G20 summit, while statements of potential offers have 
been made by individual BRICS countries both bilaterally and multilaterally through the 
meetings of the G20 and BRICS. Experts predict that if the Greek scenario spreads to other debt 
ridden countries in the Eurozone, than a second global financial crisis is guaranteed. Christine 
Lagarde has welcomed efforts by the BRICS group to contribute to the solving of the crisis, as it  
stands the Eurozone will require an estimate of 1.5trillion Euros to bail out by the end of 2012, 
more than the resources which the European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) can afford. 
Analysts state that financial support from BRICS economies is highly probably, either through 
IMF mechanisms or through individual bilateral agreements. China has been at the forefront in 
this regard, having already bought 100billion Euros worth of Italian debt whilst holding further 
bilateral meetings with EU members.228  
 
A collective BRICS bailout deal will most likely be conducted through the mechanisms of the 
IMF, while individual BRICS countries continue to enhance dialogue over resolving the crisis on 
their own accord. The financial assistance to the Eurozone crisis is both a preemptive move to 
prevent the potential contagion it will have on the global economy and a political stalking horse 
future relations with Europe. This can be strategically capitalized on at a later stage to exert 
leverage on international issues.  
 
 
 
                                               
228 Vasman, A, BRICS use Eurozone Crisis to Come into their Own, Russia Beyond the Headlines, 
http://rbth.ru/articles/2011/11/12/brics_use_eurozone_crisis_to_come_into_their_own_13749.html 
,  Nov 2011. Last accessed: 12/12/2011.  
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5.8) China-South Africa Relations within BRICS Actions in Guarding Economic Prosperity  
 
South Africa’s asymmetry in the grouping as an internationally insignificant smaller economy 
despite being regionally important is glaringly highlighted in its absence of presence over IMF 
and World Bank reforms, though China-South Africa cooperation can be gauged from the mutual 
support for south-south solidarity and lobbying for the interests of the global south in the wider 
BRICS grouping. South Africa’s small economy within the BRICS group has limited its 
presence and participation on larger reform issues in international financial institutions. South 
Africa holds a much smaller share of IMF quotas, and is the only BRICS member not in the top 
ten, due to it limit capacity to financially contribute South Africa by way of limited economic 
clout is less able to assist with EU bailouts.  
 
South Africa remains the only African member of the G20 major economies, now considered to 
be the premier political grouping with regards to addressing the multifaceted issues facing the 
global economy. Historically South Africa has also been party to south-south cooperation within 
the WTO, but remains the noticeable less active than Brazil, India and China in the organization. 
 
Though IMF reforms are vital and a focus for China’s strategic interests, South Africa’s interests 
are better served in BRICS’ alternative economic cooperation frameworks. Without doubt the 
broad concern of all BRICS states is the linger instability of the global economy due to the 
volatility of the dollar, and uncertainty of the Eurozone dilemma, with exception of South Africa 
other BRICS members with significant shares in the IMF have urged reform of the institution as 
a safe measure to oversee a increased role in the decision making process over international 
monetary and fiscal issues, increased BRICS ascendancy implicitly serves South Africa’s 
interests in the sense that the efforts of larger BRICS economies such as China strives towards 
achieving global stability which would benefit all emerging market and developing countries. 
The EU is one of South Africa’s main export zones, therefore South Africa’s relations with 
China and as a member of BRICS benefits by association from its partners being on the top ten 
shareholders list of the IMF, even though South Africa itself is dwarfed in this regard.     
 
Even in the IMF, South Africa plays a role of de facto representative for Africa. During Christine 
Laagarde’s visit to the country she stated that she wanted to discuss challenges facing Africa and 
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emerging markets more generally, as South Africa was “not only a vital member of the IMF, it is 
also an important player in the G-20 process. This will be an opportunity for me to receive 
feedback on current challenges from such an important African voice”. 229As South Africa’s 
economy continues to project growth, and the prospects for the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) remain positive, currently relations with China and BRICS can be 
leveraged in future to assist in lobbying for areas of mutual interest in the IMF.   
 
South Africa’s participation in economic cooperation with BRICS felt more outside current 
formal international organizations an in the alternative frameworks for trade and economic 
cooperation. The BRICS currency plan was readjusted to accommodate South Africa’s ascension 
into the group indicating the willingness of member states to fully integrate plans for economic 
growth to include South Africa. Furthermore the BRICS exchange alliance was a initiative solely 
driven by representatives of China and South Africa in the stock exchange. The setting up of 
mutual credit lines and cooperation with development banks may serve South Africa’s interests 
as a venue of financing in its infrastructural projects.   
  
When questioned by members of parliament about the implications of South Africa’s unbalanced 
trade with China and other BRICS economies, Trade and Industry Minister stated that with 
regards to balancing bilateral trade with China, South Africa is upgrading efforts on industrial 
development National Industrial Policy Framework and Industrial Policy Action Plan. In 
addition to encouraging high value added exports from South Africa to China, this is a model of 
engagement which can also be applied to the BRICS countries. As there lies potential to structure 
preferential trade agreements, procurement arrangements and sectoral cooperative agreements.230   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
229 IMF Press Release, Statement by IMF Director at the Conclusion of her Visit to South Africa, Press Release no. 
12/1,  http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2012/pr1201.htm,  07 Jan 2012. Last accessed: 16/02/2012  
230 National Council of Provinces, Question for Written Reply by: K Sinclair (COPE), Q.309, see appendix.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusions, Challenges and Prospects   
 
6.1) Conclusions  
 
This study has carefully examined both rhetoric and actions of the BRICS group since the 
official inclusion of all five members in April 2011, with particular focus on South Africa and 
South Africa’s relationship with China in this context. BRICS having emerged from a investment 
banking acronym to a political forum at summit level and thereby prompted discourse on what 
the implications of a multi-regional emerging power grouping may have in the global arena. This 
study has examined the significance of BRICS as a formation which and influenced a revisit to 
the theoretical conjecture of increasing multipolarity in the international system, what is clear 
stemming from the composition of BRICS in the context of the global arena is that the world is 
no longer structured around clear cut north-south divides as it was during the period of the non-
aligned movement’s inception.  
 
The composition and divides of equality and power within the global south itself has further 
complicated and diluted into a diverse asymmetrical pattern with rising states grasping greater 
economic influence while still being considered members of the global south. BRICS is 
indicative of the sub divide of states emerging at the forefront of the developing world with 
considerable economic and political clout challenging western led agenda and assuming 
leadership and representation for the broader global south.  
 
The group has thus far demonstrated persistence in attaining a leveled and equal right in the 
share of international decision making whether that be over peace and security issues or on 
international financial and economic issues.  
 
The infancy and novelty of the grouping is characterized by a lack of formal structure, however 
member states have demonstrated a relative degree of commitment to the forum by arranging 
BRICS meetings of ministers and other relevant officials in congruence with major international 
summits and within international organizations. With all BRICS states on the UN Security 
Council for the year 2011, a relative degree of cooperation and coalesce was demonstrated by the 
stance taking by the five countries on matters related to the Arab Spring, the narrative and 
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actions were largely backed by arguing the need to respect sovereignty and protect territorial 
integrity of the states involved. The sovereignty argument is both the theory and principle which 
BRICS have used to counter proposals drafted by developed states in the UN. In an ever 
interdependent and interconnected world, the rising and emerging BRICS states are using this 
grouping as a fulcrum for asserting their independence and position on relevant issues of concern 
to their national interests. Therefore BRICS states, democracies included, have a propensity to 
diverge from the vision of Western countries to support the principle of sovereignty above all.  
 
BRICS as emerging market economies have the collective concern of a post crisis instability 
affecting their respective potential for growth in the world economy, the BRICS states have also 
show a level of commitment in strategizing around areas of mutual interest, through the pivot of 
the G20 major economies with regards to the reform of international financial institutions with 
particular attention being weighted on the IMF due to the instability of the international 
monetary system. The overall intent of reforms was to rebalance quotas so the emerging BRICS 
markets are yielded increased representation in these organizations. Additionally the group has 
begun several initiatives outside of international structures to facilitate economic cooperation 
within the grouping as a means to ensure economic growth by expanding opportunities with 
fellow emerging economies. The setting up of a common currency plan and BRICS stock 
exchange alliance are a case in point of efforts to circumvent the possible pitfalls of dollar and 
euro uncertainty in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 global economic downturn.   
 
BRICS’s is commonly criticized for its lack of formal structure and permanent secretariat 
however the current amorphous nature of BRICS allows for a certain amicability in the working 
group, where underlying tensions are not directly tapped into which could create impediments in 
cooperation. Though greater definition in agenda and plan of action is crucial to the future 
effectiveness of BRICS, overly stringent definition of structure similar to that of replicating an 
institution may not be the most pragmatic or beneficial course of action. As a loose working 
group allows the coalition of countries to navigate around collective and individual issues that 
could as a means of tactfully avoiding tensions in the international community. The unity and 
efficacy of groupings hit roadblocks when individual state interests are threatened, thus 
aspirational overreach needs to be guarded against.  
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China-South Africa relations has grown exponentially since the first establishment of official 
relations in the post apartheid era. The recent years the intensification of relations based on the 
rhetoric of south-south cooperation has seen the upgrading of a strategic partnership to further 
refined comprehensive strategic partnership. South Africa’s ascension into BRICS was strongly 
influenced by the insistence of China, due to improved bilateral relations and respective mutual 
strategic benefits. The BRICS dimension has provided China-South Africa relations with extra 
partners in propagating common stances in the international arena. With South Africa’s second 
tenure on the UN Security Council, its aspirations for put the interests of Africa first was largely 
respected and support by China and other BRICS states. Though South Africa’s credentials and 
legitimacy in the BRICS grouping has been widely contended, despite being a smaller economic 
player globally, its inclusion presents a geopolitical advantage for the group. However, South 
Africa’s smaller economic clout becomes glaringly noticeable in the BRICS efforts to reform 
international financial institutions, though South Africa supports the principle and actions geared 
to reforms in the IMF and World Bank, despite the recent shift in quota shares to emerging 
BRICS economies, South Africa benefits the least in individual gain on these terms due to the 
smaller size of its economy which translates to very limited impact in these institutions. Thus 
cohesion with BRICS partners who are slowly gaining in this aspect will prove to be a peripheral 
benefit for South Africa, in addition to the BRICS effort in improving trade, economic and 
financial cooperation through the establishment of the BRICS trade liaison contact group and the 
stock exchange alliance.       
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6.2) Challenges  
 
The main challenge that BRICS is faced with is its limited ability to evolve into a proper official 
grouping which leverages for a common political agenda in a concise and collective stance on 
international issues. Though there has been a commitment of BRICS officials to meet and 
discuss common perspectives concurrent to larger international multilateral meetings, the 
heterogeneity and diverging interests of individual members presents itself as a stubborn 
impediment to the future of BRICS as a group. Although amongst the BRICS members, state 
with growing economic clout have growing individual political power in the international arena, 
the collective economic clout in BRICS may not necessary translate into a common political 
agenda due to the differences and disagreements between states.  Furthermore, even though 
BRICS has demonstrated a limited degree of coherence on general and broad issues, asserting 
independence and a desire to be an alternative to a western centric world. The ultimate crucial 
ties that individual countries have to the EU and the United States couples with the awareness of 
BRICS incompatibility on detailed political issues creates a perception of arriere pensee among 
BRICS states, where countries hold strong reservations as to investing further effort in 
formalizing the group. What is noticeable is that agreements and frameworks set up by BRICS 
states are largely focused on trade and economic cooperation and mostly absent of specific 
politically charged agendas. 
 
Additionally each BRICS member state faces their own domestic and internal challenges which 
take precedent over multilateral groupings. National interests stemming from internal challenges 
that each country faces can be contradictory to each other in the BRICS arena. Therefore under 
the current circumstances the transformation of the BRICS economic group into a formal 
political alliance remains elusive.  
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6.2.1) South Africa’s Position in BRICS: Gateway or Stepping Stone to Africa?231  
 
Implicitly tied to South Africa’s ascension into BRICS is the potential it provides member states 
in accessing the African market. South Africa’s has leveraged its position as an experienced 
regional player as a credential into BRICS, the question analysts pose is what BRICS will require 
in return from South Africa. The speculation is that the position as a successful political and 
economic conduit between the African continent and BRICS member states is crucial to South 
Africa’s legitimacy in the group. Thus the presence of South Africa in BRICS means that BRICS 
gives South Africa and incentive to work towards pan-africanism, with increased economic 
integration in SADC and the rest of the African region as a starting point in order for SA to 
solidify its rightful position in the grouping. 
 
In her response to South Africa’s ascension into BRICS Minister Mashabane stating that “We 
will be a good gateway for the BRIC countries. While we may have a small population, we don’t 
just speak for South Africa, we speak for Africa as a whole... we bring the most diversified and 
most advanced economy on the continent. We may not be the same size, but we can open up 
opportunities for them and through that, we can complete our economic integration on the 
continent.”232 This could prove to be very difficult in the future and the reinforced stance by 
South Africa foreign policy could be aspirational over reach. 
 
The continued talks dedicated to attempts in setting up a trilateral free trade agreement through 
the continent joining together the three trade regions of the Southern African Development 
Community, the East African Community and the Common Market for East and Southern 
Africa- effectively forming a free trade area from “Cape to Cairo”. This has been widely 
criticized as an improbable undertaking due to the amount of impediments hindering such a 
project, due to the limited reduction of tariffs across sectors and the poor quality of infrastructure 
in facilitating trade. The trilateral free trade area were to be achieved it could take more than a 
                                               
231 Kornegay, F, Conference: BRICS Shaping the New Global Architecture, Woodrow Wilson Center, 28 June 2011. 
Webcast of conference available at: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/brics-shaping-the-new-global-architecture 
232 Freemantle, S and Stevens, J, “Beyond the Diplomatic Applause ”, Economic Strategy: BRIC and Africa, 
Standard Bank, 26 January 2011. P. 5 
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decade. 233   Short of limited success in establishing a lead role in trade facilitation on the 
continent is the danger of South Africa forfeiting its comparative advantage in Africa to BRIC 
states, thereby diminishing its own economic growth. BRIC firms capacity to emerge as more 
robust business entities on the continent increase competitiveness thereby making South Africa 
more of a stepping stone than gateway to Africa’s economic growth potential.234    
 
The same risk is felt in the political arena; South Africa’s presence in international organization 
constantly claims to be representative of the continents agenda, even though it has demonstrated 
strong commitment to AU’s principles particularly on the UN Security Council, the sentiments 
of other African countries towards South Africa may be less than amicable. Lingering reactive 
resentment from fellow African states for the assumption of leadership on their behalf may 
further diminish South Africa’s advantage. As demonstrated by the AU’s election of the next 
Commission Chairman. Former SA foreign minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, is seeking to 
depose incumbent AU Commission Chairman Jean Ping. However at elections in Ethiopia, South 
Africa did not lobby the necessary two thirds majority with AU member states. West and Central 
African countries were the main supporters of Dr. Jean Ping.235 
 
Without legitimate and visible backing from the African continent, South Africa loses its trump 
card with BRICS thus undermining its position as a strategically useful partner in the group.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
233 Draper, P, Door Closing on SA’s Gateway Status”, Mail and Guardian, http://mg.co.za/article/2011-09-09-door-
closing-on-sas-gateway-status/ , 09 Sep 2011. Last accessed: 11/11/2011   
234 Freemantle S and Stevens, J, Op. Cit, P.6  
235 Cohen, M, South Africa Dominance on the Continent May Derail Bid for AU Post, Bloomberg News, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-26/south-africa-s-dominance-in-africa-may-derail-bid-for-key-continent-
post.html , 27 Jan 2012. Last accessed: 01/02/2012   
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6.2.2) China and India Territorial Disputes 
 
Of the most obvious bilateral disputes between the BRICS members is the historical tension 
between India and China. Some analysts speculate that a factor which largely motivated China’s 
invitation of South Africa into BRICS was to nullify IBSA and diminish India’s alternate 
channels of developing world cooperation.236 In an ongoing border dispute strongly connected 
with China’s territorial claims on Tibet and predating the Sino-India border war of 1962 with 
China insisting that the north east India side of the border has always historical been a part of 
India. Although a mutually agreed line of actual control was signed by the two countries in 1996, 
the dispute has remained etched in the political relations of India and China with a fair amount of 
animosity. Tensions rose again in 2009 when the strategically important Tawang border town of 
Tibet was ramped up by Chinese and Indian troops on both sides in a military skirmish.237 
India’s hosting of the Dalai Lama in exile has been an added source of hostility with China 
retaliating by supporting Pakistan’s claims on disputed territory with India. Despite increased 
and prosperous economic ties in recent years, there remains a guarded cooperation between the 
two countries at international level. From a wider multi-lateral perspective the dynamics of India 
and China playing off each other’s rivals impedes any strong degree of political cohesion 
between the two countries thereby affecting the cohesion of the whole group as well.   
 
6.3) Prospects  
 
BRICS two most prominent members are about to undergo significant internal change in 
leadership. Though it is unlikely that the possible change in leadership in the two countries will 
necessarily lead to any dramatic change both Russia and China’s foreign policy  The personal 
political opinion of respective leaders may result in a subtleties of altered attitudes towards 
Western developed states and BRICS member states.   
 
                                               
236 Sharma, R, BRICS vs IBSA, The Diplomat, http://the-diplomat.com/indian-decade/2011/03/02/bric-vs-ibsa-
china-vs-india/ , 2 March 2011.  Last accessed: 12/11/2011 
237 Wong, E, China and India Dispute Enclave at the Edge of Tibet, New York Times, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/04/world/asia/04chinaindia.html?pagewanted=all,  03 Sep 2009. Last accessed: 
15/12/2011.  
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It is unlikely considering the internal contradictions of the group for BRICS to evolve into an 
official organization or adopt permanent structures in the near future. However, there remains 
room in international relations where BRICS countries can bind together and form agreements of 
broad and general issues of mutual concern. Cooperation will most likely remain strongly within 
the realms of fostering economic growth and trade development amongst countries as political 
congruency is too difficult to be drawn due to divergent national interests.  
 
The speculated main topic of focus at the New Delhi 2012 BRICS summit is on fixing and 
guarding against the global recession. With Russia’s ascension into the WTO, the BRICS 
meetings of Trade Ministers will be focused on forming a collective position on issues related to 
the WTO with particular spotlight on the conclusion of the Doha Round.  With further 
elaboration on work done in technical working groups related to health and agricultural programs, 
the BRICS summits remain a lucrative opportunity for the corporate sector to leverage and 
elaborate contacts in their business networks. The BRICS status as a malleable dialogue forum 
morphing their responses to international issues from general mutual concerns will most likely 
remain.  
 
However considering the interconnectedness of individual BRICS members, BRICS has the 
potential to be utilized as a hybrid coalition of sorts, a centre of focus amidst member states who 
have a network of coalitions spanning across their respective regions. In the BRICS formation, 
IBSA, BASIC, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization exists as internal configurations. The 
lingering characteristic of BRICS remains a common aspiration for securing economic prosperity 
regardless of whatever contradictions may arise within and between states. What is also evident 
in BRICS’ current infancy is that its defensively strong in guarding against agenda’s which are 
not in it best interests, but it is yet to be seen if BRICS will be able to become more offensive in 
lobbying for its objectives, in order for this to occur the group will have to overcome the 
difficulties of diverging interests by showing more coherent and consolidated action.  
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Statement Representing Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa 
on the Selection Process for Appointing an IMF Managing Director 
by the IMF Executive Directors  
 
Press Release No. 11/195 
May 24, 2011  
We, as Executive Directors representing Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa in the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), have the following common understanding concerning the 
selection of the next Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund: 
 
1) The convention that the selection of the Managing Director is made, in practice, on the basis of 
nationality undermines the legitimacy of the Fund. 
2) The recent financial crisis which erupted in developed countries, underscored the urgency of 
reforming international financial institutions so as to reflect the growing role of developing countries 
in the world economy. 
3) Accordingly, several international agreements have called for a truly transparent, merit-based and 
competitive process for the selection of the Managing Director of the IMF and other senior positions 
in the Bretton Woods institutions. This requires abandoning the obsolete unwritten convention that 
requires that the head of the IMF be necessarily from Europe. We are concerned with public 
statements made recently by high-level European officials to the effect that the position of Managing 
Director should continue to be occupied by a European. 
4) These statements contradict public announcements made in 2007, at the time of the selection of 
Mr. Strauss-Kahn, when Mr. Jean-Claude Junker, president of the Euro group, declared that “the next 
managing director will certainly not be a European” and that “in the Euro group and among EU 
finance ministers, everyone is aware that Strauss-Kahn will probably be the last European to become 
director of the IMF in the foreseeable future”. 
5) We believe that, if the Fund is to have credibility and legitimacy, its Managing Director should be 
selected after broad consultation with the membership. It should result in the most competent 
person being appointed as Managing Director, regardless of his or her nationality. We also believe 
that adequate representation of emerging market and developing members in the Fund’s 
management is critical to its legitimacy and effectiveness. 
6) The next Managing Director of the Fund should not only be a strongly qualified person, with solid 
technical background and political acumen, but also a person that is committed to continuing the 
process of change and reform of the institution so as to adapt it to the new realities of the world 
economy. 
  
Aleksei Mozhin, Executive Director (Russia) 
Arvind Virmani, Executive Director (India) 
Jianxiong He, Executive Director (China) 
Moeketsi Majoro, Executive Director representing South Africa 
Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr., Executive Director (Brazil) 
  
From: http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2011/pr11195.htm 
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Sanya Declaration on BRICS, 13 April 2011 - BRICS Leaders Meeting, Sanya, Hainan, 
China, April 2011  
15 Apr 2011 
 
1. We, the Heads of State and Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Russian 
Federation, the Republic of India, the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of 
South Africa, met in Sanya, Hainan, China for the BRICS Leaders Meeting on 14 April 
2011. 
2. The Heads of State and Government of Brazil, Russia, India and China welcome South 
Africa joining the BRICS and look forward to strengthening dialogue and cooperation with 
South Africa within the  forum.  
3. It is the overarching objective and strong shared desire for peace, security, development 
and cooperation that brought together BRICS countries with a total population of nearly 3 
billion from different continents. BRICS aims at contributing significantly to the 
development of humanity and establishing a more equitable and fair world. 
4. The 21st century should be marked by peace, harmony, cooperation and scientific 
development. Under the theme “Broad Vision, Shared Prosperity”, we conducted candid 
and in-depth discussions and reached broad consensus on strengthening BRICS 
cooperation as well as on promoting coordination on international and regional issues of 
common interest. 
5. We affirm that the BRICS and other emerging countries have played an important role in 
contributing to world peace, security and stability, boosting global economic growth, 
enhancing multilateralism and promoting greater democracy in international relations.  
6. In the economic, financial and development fields, BRICS serves as a major platform for 
dialogue and cooperation. We are determined to continue strengthening the BRICS 
partnership for common development and advance BRICS cooperation in a gradual and 
pragmatic manner, reflecting the principles of openness, solidarity and mutual assistance. 
We reiterate that such cooperation is inclusive and non-confrontational. We are open to 
increasing engagement and cooperation with non-BRICS countries, in particular emerging 
and developing countries, and relevant international and regional organizations. 
7. We share the view that the world is undergoing far-reaching, complex and profound 
changes, marked by the strengthening of multipolarity, economic globalization and 
increasing interdependence. While facing the evolving global environment and a 
multitude of global threats and challenges, the international community should join hands 
to strengthen cooperation for common development. Based on universally recognized 
norms of international law and in a spirit of mutual respect and collective decision making, 
global economic governance should be strengthened, democracy in international relations 
should be promoted, and the voice of emerging and developing countries in international 
affairs should be enhanced. 
8. We express our strong commitment to multilateral diplomacy with the United Nations 
playing the central role in dealing with global challenges and threats. In this respect, we 
reaffirm the need for a comprehensive reform of the UN, including its Security Council, 
with a view to making it more effective, efficient and representative, so that it can deal 
with today’s global challenges more successfully. China and Russia reiterate the 
importance they attach to the status of India, Brazil and South Africa in international 
affairs, and understand and support their aspiration to play a greater role in the UN.  
9. We underscore that the concurrent presence of all five BRICS countries in the Security 
Council during the year of 2011 is a valuable opportunity to work closely together on 
issues of peace and security, to strengthen multilateral approaches and to facilitate 
future coordination on issues under UN Security Council consideration. We are deeply 
concerned with the turbulence in the Middle East , the North African and West African 
regions and sincerely wish that  the countries affected achieve peace, stability, prosperity 
and progress and enjoy their due standing and dignity in the world according to 
legitimate aspirations of their peoples. We share the principle that the use of force should 
be avoided. We maintain that the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial 
integrity of each nation should be respected. 
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10. We wish to continue our cooperation in the UN Security Council on Libya. We are of the 
view that all the parties should resolve their differences through peaceful means and 
dialogue in which the UN and regional organizations should as appropriate play their role. 
We also express support for the African Union High-Level Panel Initiative on Libya. 
11. We reiterate our strong condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and 
stress that there can be no justification, whatsoever, for any acts of terrorism. We 
believe that the United Nations has a central role in coordinating the international action 
against terrorism within the framework of the UN Charter and in accordance with 
principles and norms of the international law. In this context, we urge early conclusion of 
negotiations in the UN General Assembly of the Comprehensive Convention on 
International Terrorism and its adoption by all Member States. We are determined to 
strengthen our cooperation in countering this global threat. We express our commitment 
to cooperate for strengthening international information security. We will pay special 
attention to combat cybercrime. 
12. We note that the world economy is gradually recovering from the financial crisis, but still 
faces uncertainties. Major economies should continue to enhance coordination of macro-
economic policies and work together to achieve strong, sustainable and balanced growth. 
13. We are committed to assure that the BRICS countries will continue to enjoy strong and 
sustained economic growth supported by our increased cooperation in economic, finance 
and trade matters, which will contribute to the long-term steady, sound and balanced 
growth of the world economy. 
14. We support the Group of Twenty (G20) in playing a bigger role in global economic 
governance as the premier forum for international economic cooperation. We expect new 
positive outcomes in the fields of economy, finance, trade and development from the G20 
Cannes Summit in 2011. We support the ongoing efforts of G20 members to stabilise 
international financial markets, achieve strong, sustainable and balanced growth and 
support the growth and development of the global economy.  Russia offers to host the 
G20 Summit in 2013. Brazil, India, China and South Africa welcome and appreciate 
Russia’s offer. 
15. We call for a quick achievement of the targets for the reform of the International 
Monetary Fund agreed to at previous G20 Summits and reiterate that the governing 
structure of the international financial institutions should reflect the changes in the world 
economy, increasing the voice and representation of emerging economies and developing 
countries. 
16. Recognising that the international financial crisis has exposed the inadequacies and 
deficiencies of the existing international monetary and financial system, we support the 
reform and improvement of the international monetary system, with a broad-based 
international reserve currency system providing stability and certainty. We welcome the 
current discussion about the role of the SDR in the existing international monetary 
system including the composition of SDR’s basket of currencies. We call for more 
attention to the risks of massive cross-border capital flows now faced by the emerging 
economies. We call for further international financial regulatory oversight and reform, 
strengthening policy coordination and financial regulation and supervision cooperation, 
and promoting the sound development of global financial markets and banking systems. 
17. Excessive volatility in commodity prices, particularly those for food and energy, poses 
new risks for the ongoing recovery of the world economy. We support the international 
community in strengthening cooperation to ensure stability and strong development of 
physical market by reducing distortion and further regulate financial market. The 
international community should work together to increase production capacity, 
strengthen producer-consumer dialogue to balance supply and demand, and increase 
support to the developing countries in terms of funding and technologies. The regulation 
of the derivatives market for commodities should be accordingly strengthened to prevent 
activities capable of destabilizing markets. We also should address the problem of 
shortage of reliable and timely information on demand and supply at international, 
regional and national levels. The BRICS will carry out closer cooperation on food security.  
18. We support the development and use of renewable energy resources. We recognise the 
important role of renewable energy as a means to address climate change. We are 
convinced of the importance of cooperation and information exchange in the field of 
development of renewable energy resources.  
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19. Nuclear energy will continue to be an important element in future energy mix of BRICS 
countries. International cooperation in the development of safe nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes should proceed under conditions of strict observance of relevant safety 
standards and requirements concerning design, construction and operation of nuclear 
power plants. 
20. Accelerating sustainable growth of developing countries is one of the major challenges for 
the world. We believe that growth and development are central to addressing poverty 
and to achieving the MDG goals. Eradication of extreme poverty and hunger is a moral, 
social, political and economic imperative of humankind and one of the greatest global 
challenges facing the world today, particularly in Least Developed Countries in Africa and 
elsewhere.  
21. We call on the international community to actively implement the outcome document 
adopted by the High-level Plenary Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly on the 
Millennium Development Goals held in September 2010 and achieve the objectives of the 
MDGs by 2015 as scheduled.  
22. Climate change is one of the global threats challenging the livelihood of communities and 
countries. China, Brazil, Russia and India appreciate and support South Africa’s hosting of 
UNFCCC COP17/CMP7. We support the Cancun Agreements and are ready to make 
concerted efforts with the rest of the international community to bring a successful 
conclusion to the negotiations at the Durban Conference applying the mandate of the Bali 
Roadmap and in line with the principle of equity and common but differentiated 
responsibilities. We commit ourselves to work towards a comprehensive, balanced and 
binding outcome to strengthen the implementation of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change and its Kyoto Protocol. The BRICS will intensify 
cooperation on the Durban conference. We will enhance our practical cooperation in 
adapting our economy and society to climate change.  
23. Sustainable development, as illustrated by the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, Agenda 21, the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation and multilateral 
environmental treaties, should be an important vehicle to advance economic growth. 
China, Russia, India and South Africa appreciate Brazil as the host of the 2012 UN 
Conference on Sustainable Development and look forward to working with Brazil to reach 
new political commitment and achieve positive and practical results in areas of economic 
growth, social development and environmental protection under the framework of 
sustainable development. Brazil, Russia, China and South Africa appreciate and support 
India’s hosting of the eleventh meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity. Brazil, China and South Africa also appreciate and 
support the sixth meeting of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the 
Parties to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to be held in October 2012.  
24. We underscore our firm commitment to strengthen dialogue and cooperation in the fields 
of social protection, decent work, gender equality, youth, and public health, including the 
fight against HIV /AIDS.  
25. We support infrastructure development in Africa and its industrialisation within 
framework of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). 
26. We have agreed to continue further expanding and deepening economic, trade and 
investment cooperation among our countries. We encourage all countries to refrain from 
resorting to protectionist measures. We welcome the outcomes of the meeting of BRICS 
Trade Ministers held in Sanya on 13 April 2011. Brazil, China, India and South Africa 
remain committed and call upon other members to support a strong, open, rule-based 
multilateral trading system embodied in the World Trade Organisation and a successful, 
comprehensive and balanced conclusion of the Doha Development Round, built on the 
progress already made and consistent with its development mandate. Brazil, India, China 
and South Africa extend full support to an early accession of Russia to the World Trade 
Organisation 
27. We reviewed the progress of the BRICS cooperation in various fields and share the view 
that such cooperation has been enriching and mutually beneficial and that there is a 
great scope for closer cooperation among the BRICS. We are focused on the consolidation 
of BRICS cooperation and the further development of its own agenda. We are determined 
to translate our political vision into concrete actions and endorse the attached Action Plan, 
which will serve as the foundation for future cooperation. We will review the 
implementation of the Action Plan during our next Leaders Meeting. 
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28. We intend to explore cooperation in the sphere of science, technology and innovation, 
including the peaceful use of space. We congratulate the Russian people and government 
upon the 50th anniversary of the flight of Yury Gagarin into the space, which ushered in a 
new era in development of science and technology. 
29. We express our confidence in the success of the 2011 Universiade in Shenzhen, the 2013 
Universiade in Kazan, the 2014 Youth Olympic Games in Nanjing, the 2014 Winter 
Olympic and Paralympics Games in Sochi, the FIFA 2014 World Cup in Brazil, the 2016 
Olympic and Paralympics Games in Rio de Janeiro and the FIFA 2018 World Cup in Russia. 
30. We extend our deepest condolences to the people of Japan with the great loss of life 
following the disasters that struck the country. We will continue our practical support to 
Japan in overcoming consequences of these catastrophes. 
31. The leaders of Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa extend our warm appreciation to 
China for hosting the BRICS Leaders Meeting and the Hainan Provincial Government and 
Sanya Municipal Government and their people for their support to the Meeting. 
32. Brazil, Russia, China and South Africa thank India for hosting the BRICS Leaders Meeting 
in 2012 and offer their full support.  
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BRICS Action Plan From Sanya Summit 
 
We formulated the Action Plan, laying the foundation for the BRICS cooperation, with the 
purpose to strengthen BRICS cooperation and benefit our peoples.  
I. Enhance existing cooperation programs 
1. Hold the third Meeting of High Representatives for Security Issues in the latter half of 
2011 in China.  
2. Hold the meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs during the 66th Session of the United 
Nations General Assembly.   
3. Hold sherpas/sous-sherpas meeting in due time. 
4. Representatives to international organizations based in New York and Geneva meet 
periodically in an informal manner. 
5. Ministers of Finance and Governors of Central Banks meet under the G20 framework and 
during the annual meetings of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.  
6. Hold the Meeting of Agriculture Expert Working Group and the second Meeting of Ministers 
of Agriculture in 2011 in China, and cooperate in issues including establishment of BRICS 
System of Agricultural Information and holding a seminar on food security.  
7. Hold the Meeting of the heads of the National Statistical Institutions in September 2011 in 
China. 
8. Hold the second BRICS International Competition Conference in September 2011 in China, 
and explore the possibility of signing an Agreement on Cooperation between Antimonopoly 
Agencies. 
9. Continue to hold the BRICS Think-tank Symposiums, and consider establishing a network 
of research centers of all BRICS countries.  
10. Hold another Business Forum prior to the next BRICS Leaders Meeting. 
11. Strengthen financial cooperation among the BRICS Development Banks.  
12. Implement the Protocol of Intent among the BRIC Countries’ Supreme Courts.  
13. Release the Joint Statistical Publication by BRICS Countries. 
14. Continue to hold the Meeting of Cooperatives. 
II. New areas of cooperation 
  1. Host the first BRICS Friendship Cities and Local Governments Cooperation Forum in 2011 
in China. 
  2. Host the Meeting of Ministers of Health in 2011 in China. 
  3. Engage in joint research on economic and trade issues.  
  4. Update, as appropriate, the Bibliography on the BRICS countries.     
III. New proposals to explore 
  1. Cooperate in the cultural field according to the agreement of the BRICS leaders. 
  2. Encourage cooperation in sports. 
  3. Explore the feasibility to cooperate in the field of green economy. 
  4. Hold a meeting of Senior Officials for discussing ways of promoting scientific, 
technological and innovation cooperation in BRICS format㸪including by establishment a 
working group on cooperation in pharmaceutical industry. 
5. Establish, at UNESCO, a “BRICS-UNESCO Group”, aiming at developing common 
strategies within the mandate of the Organization 
Source: The Presidency    
Issued by: Department of International Relations and Cooperation 
15 Apr 2011 
 From: http://www.info.gov.za/speech/DynamicAction?pageid=461&sid=17834&tid=32162 
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JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ ON THE OUTCOME OF THE MEETING OF BRICS DEPUTY 
FOREIGN MINISTERS ON THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH 
AFRICA  
  
24-11-2011 
On November 24th, 2011, Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Brazil, Russia, India, China 
and South Africa met in the format of BRICS to discuss the situation in the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA).  
The Participants in the meeting underlined the legitimacy of the aspirations of the peoples of the 
region for greater political and social rights. They agreed that the transformation processes in 
the region created the need to search for ways of addressing crises in MENA within the 
framework of international law and only through peaceful means, without resorting to force, 
through establishing a broad national dialogue with due respect for independence, territorial 
integrity and sovereignty of the countries in the region. They rejected violence as a means of 
achieving political goals. They emphasized the need for full respect of human rights by all sides, 
especially by the authorities, in protecting unarmed civilians.  
 
The role of the UN Security Council was emphasized, since it bears the primary responsibility 
for the maintaining international peace and security. It was noted that all parties should strictly 
implement UNSC decisions. They noted that it was inadmissible to impose solutions on the 
MENA states through outside intervention in the internal political processes.  
 
The BRICS Deputy Foreign Ministers stressed that the only acceptable way to resolve the 
internal crisis in Syria is through urgent peaceful negotiations with participation of all parties as 
provided by the Arab League initiative taking into account the legitimate aspirations of all 
Syrians. Any external interference in Syria's affairs, not in accordance with the UN Charter, 
should be excluded. In this context the experience of the international community with regard to 
developments in Libya needs a thorough review to see if the actions taken were in conformity 
with the provisions of the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council.  
 
The Participants expressed their support for the Libyan people’s democratic aspirations on the 
basis of public consensus and through a comprehensive national political dialogue with 
participation of all segments of Libyan society. They reaffirmed the importance of 
strengthening the leading role of the United Nations and its Security Council in post-conflict 
settlement and reconstruction in Libya. In this regard, the Participants emphasized the 
importance of establishment of the United Nations mission in Libya tasked to support the 
transition process in the country. They also noted the demand for consolidated efforts by the 
international community, including those of the African Union, with a view to help overcome 
the devastating consequences of the civil war and reaffirmed the readiness of the BRICS 
countries to make meaningful contributions to building a free, democratic and stable Libya that 
enjoys development.  
  
The BRICS countries welcomed the signing of the GCC initiative concerning the peaceful 
transition of power in Yemen, which took place in Riyadh on November 23. They highly 
appreciated the constructive position of the Yemeni parties, which demonstrated their 
responsibility and concern for the interests of the country and its people. The Participants 
acknowledged the successful efforts undertaken by the international community, Secretary-
General of the GCC Mr. Abdellatif Zayani and representative of the UN Secretary-General 
Mr.Jamal Benomar. The Participants called on all the political forces of Yemen to now do their 
utmost to implement the agreement on transition of power peacefully. The Participants 
considered that the approach adopted for addressing the situation in Yemen, based on the 
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dialogue between the authorities and the opposition, can be applied to similar situations in the 
region.  
  
 
The Participants agreed that the period of fundamental transformation taking place in the states 
of the Middle East and North Africa should not be used as a pretext to delay resolution of 
lasting conflicts but rather it should serve as an incentive to settle them, in particular the Arab-
Israeli one. Resolution of this and other long-standing regional issues would generally improve 
the situation in the Middle East and North Africa. Thus, at the meeting, the Participants confirm 
their commitment to achieving comprehensive, just and lasting settlement of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict on the basis of the universally recognized international legal framework including the 
relevant UN resolutions, the Madrid principles and the Arab Peace Initiative.  
  
The BRICS states support the resumption of the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations aiming at the 
establishment of an independent, viable and territorially contiguous Palestinian State with full 
sovereignty within the 1967 borders, with agreed-upon territorial swaps and with East 
Jerusalem as its capital. They also encouraged the Quartet to intensify its efforts towards early 
realization of these goals.  
  
The Participants support Palestinian efforts to achieve UN membership. They also underscored 
the importance of direct negotiations between the parties to reach final settlement. They call 
upon Palestinians and Israelis to take constructive measures, rebuild mutual trust and create the 
right conditions for restarting negotiations, while avoiding unilateral steps, in particular 
settlement activity in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. They advocated the earliest 
reunification of the Palestinians. A united position of the Palestinians based on the PLO 
principles and the Arab Peace Initiative would contribute to progress towards a Palestinian-
Israeli settlement, achieving lasting peace and providing security for all the countries and 
peoples of the region.  
  
The Participants are highly concerned about security and stability in the Gulf region, call for 
political dialogue in resolving differences and are against the use and threat of force. They 
advocate settling the situation concerning Iran’s nuclear programme only through political and 
diplomatic means and establishing dialogue between all the parties concerned, in particular 
between Iran and P5+1, as well as between Iran and the IAEA, in order to clarify the questions 
regarding Iran’s nuclear programme. It has been emphasized that imposing additional and 
unilateral sanctions on Iran is counterproductive and would only exacerbate the situation. The 
BRICS States expressed their hope for the successful holding of the 2012 Conference to be 
attended by all states of the Middle East, on the establishment of the Middle East free of nuclear 
weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived 
at by the states of the region.  
  
The Participants stressed the necessity to build a system of relations in the Gulf region that 
would guarantee equal and reliable security for all States of the sub-region.  
The Participants agreed on the convenience of regular consultations on the Middle East and 
North Africa issues in different fora, including the UN, and reaffirmed their support for 
informal meetings among their representatives.  
Moscow, 24 November 2011 
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
From: http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/89A37436A9B44BC2442579530024C8D4 
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Ministerial Declaration BRICS Trade Ministers (Geneva) 
  
We, the Ministers of Brazil, China, India, Russia, and South Africa, have met on 14 December 2011 in Geneva, 
before the 8th World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference.  
 
Following up on our previous meeting held in Sanya, China, on 13 April 2011, we are pleased with the recent 
establishment of a contact group entrusted with the task of proposing an institutional framework and 
concrete measures to expand economic cooperation both among BRICS countries and between BRICS 
countries and all developing countries, within a South-South perspective. We notice that the contact group 
met for the first time on December 2nd, 2011, in Beijing, China, to further its work. 
 
We also note that India would be hosting the Fourth BRICS Summit in New Delhi on 29 March 2012 and the 
first substantive meeting of the BRICS trade ministers would also take place on 28 March 2012. This would 
provide a good opportunity to review the outcomes of the MC8 and to devise a common approach on the 
way ahead. 
 
We recognise the huge growth potential both in trade flows among developing countries and in cooperation 
in investments in the coming decades. We believe that the BRICS countries should play a leading role in 
South-South cooperation. We are accordingly committed to further expanding economic, trade and 
investment ties among our countries. Deepened and enlarged economic cooperation of the BRICS countries 
may be conducive not only to serving our shared interests but also to helping promote growth in the global 
economy. We agree that steps to strengthening economic and trade cooperation among our countries should 
be taken in an incremental, proactive, and pragmatic manner.  
 
We further recall that, in Sanya, we highlighted our commitment to the WTO trade regime and to the Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA). 
 
In this context, the WTO BRICS countries congratulate Russia, the largest economy outside the multilateral 
trading system, on the successful conclusion of the accession process to the WTO, and look forward to the 
forthcoming Ministerial Conference to formally endorse Russia as a new member. This will be a crucial step in 
making the WTO even more representative and legitimate, further strengthening the multilateral trading 
system. 
 
We express satisfaction at the completion of the accession processes of three other new WTO members: 
Montenegro, Samoa, and Vanuatu. We also welcome the approval of a new set of guidelines for the 
accession of the Least Developed Countries that will contribute to our shared goal of reaching universality in 
WTO membership. 
 
In this process of buttressing the multilateral trade system, we underscore the pressing need to further 
develop its rules and structure to address in particular the concerns and interests of developing countries. 
The WTO must maintain its central role in monitoring the implementation of the multilateral trade disciplines 
and commitments, including in the key area of dispute settlement. It also serves as a forum for discussion of 
trade related matters that all members agree to be relevant and pertinent. The negotiating functions of the 
Organisation must also be preserved and energised. 
 
We attach great importance to the role of the WTO in keeping protectionist forces at bay. Under the present 
global economic conditions, international trade plays an even more critical role in stimulating economic 
growth and development. We are in full agreement that all forms of protectionism must be resisted. At the 
same time, we underscore the need for developing countries to retain and use, when necessary, any existing 
WTO-consistent policy space. We also underline that trade distorting subsidies granted by developed 
economies, particularly in agriculture, are one of the most harmful forms of protectionism. These subsidies 
generate food insecurity and deny the development potential of this key sector in countries that already face 
formidable challenges to participate in global trade flows. 
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We are particularly concerned with the existing impasse in the Doha Development Round. Despite these 
circumstances, we will remain fully engaged in negotiations with a view to concluding the single undertaking 
within the shortest possible timeframe. We emphasise that negotiations on any component of the DDA must 
be based on the mandates multilaterally agreed since the launching of the Round in 2001 and on the delicate 
balance of trade-offs achieved over the last 10 years, which are also reflected in the draft modalities texts of 
December 2008. We remain willing to conclude the Round on the basis of those draft modalities. 
 
We agree that the DDA negotiating stalemate should not discourage members from seeking results in specific 
areas where they agree that progress is possible. We will instruct our negotiators to engage effectively and 
constructively whenever such agreement exists. These efforts must not lose sight, however, of the centrality 
of development in the Doha mandate. Any early outcomes must deliver first on elements of interest to the 
poorest among the membership. Issues of interest to the developing and the least developing countries must 
be at the forefront, without linkages to other areas. The full implementation of the Hong Kong Ministerial 
Declaration regarding the duty-free-quota-free initiative, as well as topics like cotton and agriculture, must be 
given priority and constitute an integral part of any early agreements. These efforts must be wholly 
consistent with the existing mandates and observe the principles of transparency and inclusiveness. In this 
context, we will not encourage or support plurilateral approaches, or any other negotiating modality that 
may compromise or weaken the multilateral nature of the negotiations. 
  
We welcome measures taken by our agencies of technical cooperation in areas which are especially relevant 
to African countries. They complement initiatives undertaken by the WTO and other relevant international 
organizations. We underline the need to keep pursuing and enhancing aid-for-trade initiatives that benefit 
our trading partners. The cooperation with the Cotton-4 economies is a landmark in this field and we commit 
to maintain and intensify it. 
  
The Minister of the Russian Federation recalls that her country is expected to start implementing its 
commitments in the WTO as of mid-2012. She affirms that, with full WTO membership attained, Russia is 
going to participate in a constructive and active manner in the DDA negotiations in view of the crucial role 
that a balanced DDA outcome would have in the strengthening and development of the world trade system. 
   
Published by Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
 
From: http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/sala-de-imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/declaracao-dos-ministros-de-comercio-do-brics-genebra-14-de-
dezembro-de-2011 
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BRICS Finance Ministers' Joint Communiqué 
Washington DC, September 22, 2011 
 
We, the BRICS Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, met on September 22, 2011 in Washington DC, 
USA, amid growing concern regarding the state of the global economy.  
While BRICS countries recovered quickly from the 2008-09 global financial crisis, some of us have been 
subject to inflationary pressures and growth prospects of all our countries have been dampened by global 
market instability. In advanced countries, the build up of sovereign debt and concerns regarding medium to 
long-term plans of fiscal adjustment are creating an uncertain environment for global growth. Also, excessive 
liquidity from aggressive policy actions taken by central banks to stabilize their domestic economies has been 
spilling over into emerging market economies, fostering excessive volatility in capital flows and commodity 
prices.  
 
The immediate problem at hand is to get growth back on track in developed countries. In this context we 
welcome the recent fiscal package announced by USA as well as the decisions taken by Euro area countries to 
address financial tensions, notably by making the EFSF flexible. It is critical for advanced economies to adopt 
responsible macroeconomic and financial policies, avoid creating excessive global liquidity and undertake 
structural reforms to lift growth create jobs and reduce imbalances.  
The current situation requires decisive actions. We are taking necessary steps to secure economic growth, 
maintain financial stability and contain inflation. We are also determined to speed up structural reform to 
sustain strong growth which would advance development and poverty reduction at home and benefit global 
growth and rebalancing. The contribution of BRICS countries and other emerging market economies to global 
growth is rising and will increase further. However, global rebalancing will take time and its impact may not 
be felt sufficiently in the short-term. We will also work to intensify trade and investment flows among our 
countries to build upon our synergies.  
The BRICS are open to consider making additional efforts in working with other countries and International 
Financial Institutions in order to address the present challenges to global financial stability, depending on 
individual country circumstances.  
We are concerned with the slow pace of quota and governance reforms in the IMF. The implementation of 
the 2010 reform is lagging. We must also move ahead with the comprehensive review of the quota formula 
by January 2013 and the completion of the next review of quotas by January 2014. This is needed to increase 
the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Fund. We reiterate our support for measures to protect the voice and 
representation of the IMF’s poorest members. We call on the IMF to make its surveillance more integrated 
and evenhanded.  
Multilateral Development Banks are considered by developing countries as important partners in helping 
them meet their long term development finance needs. In the current global economic environment, the 
Banks need to mobilize more resources to increase their assistance to low income and other developing 
countries including finding ways of expanding their lending capacity, so that development finance is not 
neglected.  
In the face of a slowdown of global economic growth, it is necessary to maintain international policy co-
operation and co-ordination. We remain committed to work with the international community, including 
making contributions to the G20 Cannes Action Plan consistent with national policy frameworks to ensure 
strong, sustainable and balanced growth. We shall work together in searching for a coordinated solution to 
the current challenges as we did in 2008-09. 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Government of India 
  
 
From: http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/110922-finance.html 
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Resolution on Syria  
United Nations S/RES/1973 
(2011) 
Security Council Distr.: General 
17 March 2011 
 
 
 
Resolution 1973 (2011) 
Adopted by the Security Council at its 6498th meeting, on 
17 March 2011 
 
The Security Council, 
 
Recalling its resolution 1970 (2011) of 26 February 2011, 
 
Deploring the failure of the Libyan authorities to comply with resolution 1970 (2011), 
 
Expressing  grave  concern  at  the  deteriorating  situation,  the  escalation  of violence, and the 
heavy civilian casualties, 
 
Reiterating  the responsibility  of the Libyan authorities to protect  the Libyan population   and   
reaffirming   that   parties   to   armed   conflicts   bear   the   primary responsibility to take all feasible 
steps to ensure the protection of civilians, 
 
Condemning the gross and systematic violation of human rights, including arbitrary detentions, 
enforced disappearances, torture and summary executions, 
 
Further  condemning  acts  of  violence  and  intimidation  committed   by  the Libyan authorities 
against journalists, media professionals  and associated personnel and urging  these  authorities  to  
comply  with  their  obligations  under  international humanitarian law as outlined in resolution 1738 
(2006), 
 
Considering that the widespread and systematic attacks currently taking place in the Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya against the civilian population may amount to crimes against humanity, 
 
Recalling   paragraph   26  of  resolution   1970  (2011)  in  which  the  Council expressed  its  
readiness   to  consider  taking  additional   appropriate  measures,   as necessary, to facilitate and 
support  the return of humanitarian agencies and make available humanitarian and related assistance in 
the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 
 
Expressing its determination  to ensure the protection of civilians and civilian populated areas  
and the rapid  and  unimpeded  passage  of humanitarian  assistance and the safety of humanitarian 
personnel, 
 
Recalling the condemnation by the League of Arab States, the African Union, and  the  Secretary  
General  of  the  Organization  of  the  Islamic  Conference  of  the serious violations of human rights and 
international humanitarian law that have been and are being committed in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 
 
Taking  note  of  the  final  communiqué   of the  Organisation  of  the  Islamic Conference  of  8  
March  2011,  and  the  communiqué  of  the  Peace  and  Security Council of the African Union of 10 
March 2011 which established an ad hoc High Level Committee on Libya, 
 
Taking note also of the decision of the Council of the League of Arab States of 
12  March  2011  to  call  for  the  imposition  of  a  no-fly  zone  on  Libyan  military aviation, and to 
establish safe areas in places exposed to shelling as a precautionary measure  that  allows  the  protection  
of  the  Libyan  people  and  foreign  nationals residing in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 
 
Taking note further of the Secretary-General’s  call on 16 March 2011 for an immediate cease-fire, 
 
Recalling  its  decision  to  refer  the  situation  in  the  Libyan  Arab  Jamahiriya since 15 February 
2011 to the Prosecutor  of the International Criminal Court, and stressing  that  those  responsible  for  
or  complicit  in  attacks  targeting  the  civilian population, including aerial and naval attacks, must be 
held to account, 
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Reiterating its concern at the plight of refugees and foreign workers forced to flee  the  violence  
in  the  Libyan  Arab  Jamahiriya,   welcoming   the  response  of neighbouring States, in particular 
Tunisia and Egypt, to address the needs of those refugees and foreign workers, and calling on the 
international community to support those efforts, 
 
Deploring the continuing use of mercenaries by the Libyan authorities, 
 
Considering that the establishment of a ban on all flights in the airspace of the Libyan  Arab  
Jamahiriya  constitutes  an  important  element  for  the  protection  of civilians  as  well  as  the  safety  
of  the  delivery  of  humanitarian  assistance  and  a decisive step for the cessation of hostilities in 
Libya, 
 
Expressing concern also for the safety of foreign nationals and their rights in the Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya, 
 
Welcoming the appointment  by the Secretary General of his Special Envoy to Libya,  Mr. 
Abdel-Elah  Mohamed Al-Khatib  and  supporting  his  efforts  to  find  a sustainable and peaceful 
solution to the crisis in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 
 
Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and 
national unity of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 
 
Determining that the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya continues to constitute a threat to 
international peace and security, 
 
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 
 
1. Demands the immediate establishment of a cease-fire and a complete end to violence 
and all attacks against, and abuses of, civilians; 
 
2. Stresses the need to intensify efforts to find a solution to the crisis which responds 
to the legitimate demands of the Libyan people and notes the decisions of the  Secretary-General  to  
send  his  Special  Envoy  to  Libya  and  of  the  Peace  and Security Council of the African Union to 
send its ad hoc High Level Committee to Libya with the aim of facilitating dialogue to lead to the 
political reforms necessary to find a peaceful and sustainable solution; 
 
 
3. Demands that the Libyan authorities comply with their obligations under 
international  law,  including  international   humanitarian   law,  human  rights   and refugee law and 
take all measures to protect civilians and meet their basic needs, and to ensure the rapid and 
unimpeded passage of humanitarian assistance; 
 
 
Protection of civilians 
 
4. Authorizes   Member   States  that  have  notified   the  Secretary-General, acting 
nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements,  and acting in cooperation with 
 the Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures, 
notwithstanding  paragraph  9  of  resolution  1970  (2011),  to  protect  civilians  and civilian  populated  
areas  under  threat  of  attack  in  the  Libyan  Arab  Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a 
foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory,  and requests the Member  States 
concerned to inform the Secretary-General   immediately   of   the   measures   they   take   pursuant   to   
the authorization conferred  by this paragraph  which  shall  be immediately  reported to the Security 
Council; 
 
5. Recognizes  the important  role of the League  of Arab States in matters relating to 
the maintenance  of international peace  and security  in the region,  and bearing in mind  Chapter  
VIII  of the  Charter  of the United  Nations,  requests  the Member States of the League of Arab States 
to cooperate with other Member States in the implementation of paragraph 4; 
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No Fly Zone 
 
6. Decides  to establish  a ban on all flights  in the airspace of the Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya in order to help protect civilians; 
 
7. Decides further that the ban imposed  by paragraph 6 shall not apply to flights 
whose  sole  purpose  is humanitarian,  such  as delivering  or facilitating  the delivery of assistance, 
including medical supplies, food, humanitarian workers and related assistance, or evacuating foreign 
nationals from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, nor shall it apply to flights authorised by paragraphs 4 or 
8, nor other flights which are  deemed   necessary   by   States  acting   under   the  authorisation   
conferred   in paragraph 8 to be for the benefit of the Libyan people, and that these flights shall be 
coordinated with any mechanism established under paragraph 8; 
 
8. Authorizes  Member States that have notified the Secretary-General and the 
Secretary-General  of the League  of Arab  States,  acting  nationally  or through regional organizations 
or arrangements, to take all necessary measures to enforce compliance with the ban on flights imposed by 
paragraph 6 above, as necessary, and requests  the  States  concerned  in  cooperation  with  the  League  
of Arab  States  to coordinate closely with the Secretary General  on the measures they are taking to 
implement this ban, including by establishing an appropriate mechanism for implementing the provisions 
of paragraphs 6 and 7 above, 
 
9. Calls  upon  all  Member  States,  acting  nationally  or  through  regional 
organizations or arrangements, to provide assistance, including any necessary over- flight approvals, for 
the purposes of implementing paragraphs 4, 6, 7 and 8 above; 
 
10. Requests  the Member  States concerned to coordinate closely with each other  and  the  
Secretary-General  on  the  measures  they  are  taking  to  implement paragraphs 4, 6, 7 and 8 above, 
including practical measures for the monitoring and approval of authorised humanitarian or evacuation 
flights; 
 
11. Decides  that  the  Member  States concerned  shall  inform  the  Secretary- General  
and  the  Secretary-General  of  the  League  of Arab  States  immediately  of measures  taken  in  
exercise  of  the  authority  conferred  by  paragraph   8  above, including to supply a concept of 
operations; 
 
12. Requests the Secretary-General  to inform the Council immediately of any actions 
taken by the Member States concerned in exercise of the authority conferred by paragraph  8 above and 
to report to the Council within 7 days and every month thereafter on the implementation  of this  
resolution,  including information  on any violations of the flight ban imposed by paragraph 6 above; 
 
 
Enforcement of the arms embargo 
 
13. Decides that paragraph 11 of resolution 1970 (2011) shall be replaced by the 
following paragraph : “Calls upon all Member States, in particular States of the region, acting nationally 
or through regional organisations or arrangements, in order to ensure strict implementation of the arms 
embargo established by paragraphs 9 and 
10 of resolution  1970  (2011),  to inspect in their  territory, including seaports  and airports, and on 
the high seas, vessels and aircraft bound to or from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, if the State concerned 
has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the cargo contains items the supply, 
sale, transfer or export of which is prohibited  by paragraphs  9 or 10 of resolution  1970 (2011) as 
modified  by this resolution, including the provision  of  armed  mercenary  personnel,  calls  upon  all 
flag  States  of  such  vessels  and  aircraft  to  cooperate  with  such  inspections  and authorises Member 
States to use all measures commensurate to the specific circumstances to carry out such inspections”; 
 
 
14. Requests  Member  States  which  are  taking  action  under  paragraph  13 above on  
the high  seas  to coordinate  closely  with  each  other  and the  Secretary- General and further 
requests the States concerned to inform the Secretary-General and the Committee established 
pursuant to paragraph 24 of resolution 1970 (2011) (“the Committee”)  immediately  of measures 
taken in the exercise  of the authority conferred by paragraph 13 above; 
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15. Requires any Member State whether acting nationally or through regional 
organisations  or  arrangements,   when  it  undertakes   an  inspection  pursuant   to paragraph 13 above, 
to submit promptly an initial written report to the Committee containing, in particular, explanation of the 
grounds for the inspection, the results of such inspection,  and whether  or not  cooperation was 
provided,  and,  if prohibited items for transfer are found, further requires such Member  States to 
submit to the Committee, at a later stage, a subsequent  written report containing relevant details on  
the  inspection,   seizure,  and  disposal,  and  relevant  details  of  the  transfer, including a description 
of the items,  their  origin  and intended  destination,  if this information is not in the initial report; 
 
 
16. Deplores  the  continuing  flows  of  mercenaries   into  the  Libyan  Arab 
Jamahiriya  and   calls   upon   all   Member   States   to  comply   strictly  with   their obligations under 
paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011) to prevent the provision of armed mercenary personnel to the 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 
 
 
Ban on flights 
 
17. Decides that all States shall deny permission to any aircraft registered in the Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya or owned or operated by Libyan nationals or companies to take off from,  land in or 
overfly their territory unless  the particular flight has been  approved  in  advance  by  the  Committee,  or  
in  the  case  of  an  emergency landing; 
 
18. Decides that all States shall deny permission to any aircraft to take off from,  land  
in  or  overfly  their  territory,  if  they  have  information  that  provides reasonable  grounds  to  believe  
that  the  aircraft  contains  items  the  supply,  sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 
9 and 10 of resolution 1970 (2011) as modified by this resolution,  including the provision of armed 
mercenary personnel, except in the case of an emergency landing; 
 
Asset freeze 
 
19. Decides that the asset freeze imposed by paragraph 17, 19, 20 and 21 of resolution 
1970 (2011) shall apply to all funds, other financial assets and economic resources which are on their 
territories, which are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly,  by  the  Libyan  authorities,  as  designated  
by  the  Committee,  or  by individuals  or  entities  acting  on  their  behalf  or  at  their  direction,  or  by  
entities owned or controlled by them, as designated by the Committee,  and decides further that all 
States shall ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from  being  made  
available  by their  nationals  or by any  individuals  or entities within  their  territories,  to or for the 
benefit  of the Libyan  authorities,  as designated by the Committee,  or individuals or entities acting on 
their behalf or at their  direction,  or  entities  owned  or  controlled  by  them,  as  designated  by  the 
Committee,  and  directs  the  Committee   to  designate   such   Libyan  authorities, individuals or entities 
within 30 days of the date of the adoption of this resolution and as appropriate thereafter; 
 
 
 
 
 
20. Affirms   its   determination   to   ensure   that   assets   frozen   pursuant   to paragraph 17 
of resolution 1970 (2011) shall, at a later stage, as soon as possible be made available to and for the 
benefit of the people of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya; 
 
21. Decides  that  all  States  shall  require  their  nationals,  persons  subject  to their  jurisdiction   and  
firms  incorporated   in  their  territory  or  subject   to  their jurisdiction to exercise vigilance when 
doing business with entities incorporated in the Libyan Arab  Jamahiriya or  subject  to its  jurisdiction,  
and  any  individuals  or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and entities owned or 
controlled by them, if the States have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such 
business could contribute to violence and use of force against civilians; (2011), particularly paragraphs 9 
and 10 thereof, or to have assisted others in doing so; 
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Panel of Experts 
 
 
24. Requests the Secretary-General  to create for an initial period of one year, in  
consultation  with  the  Committee,  a  group  of  up  to  eight  experts  (“Panel  of Experts”), under the 
direction of the Committee to carry out the following tasks: 
 
(a) Assist   the  Committee  in  carrying  out  its  mandate   as  specified  in paragraph 24 
of resolution 1970 (2011) and this resolution; 
 
(b) Gather,  examine  and  analyse  information  from  States,  relevant  United Nations 
bodies, regional organisations and other interested parties regarding the implementation  of  the  measures   
decided   in  resolution  1970   (2011)   and   this resolution, in particular incidents of non-compliance; 
 
(c) Make  recommendations  on  actions  the  Council,  or  the  Committee  or 
State, may consider to improve implementation of the relevant measures; 
 
(d) Provide to the Council an interim report on its work no later than 90 days after the 
Panel’s appointment, and a final report to the Council no later than 30 days prior to the termination of its 
mandate with its findings and recommendations; 
 
25. Urges  all  States,  relevant  United  Nations  bodies  and  other  interested parties, to 
cooperate fully with the Committee and the Panel of Experts, in particular by  supplying   any  
information  at  their  disposal  on  the  implementation   of  the measures  decided  in  resolution  1970  
(2011)  and  this  resolution,  in  particular incidents of non-compliance; 
 
26. Decides that the mandate of the Committee as set out in paragraph 24 of resolution 
1970 (2011) shall also apply to the measures decided in this resolution; 
 
27. Decides that all States, including the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, shall take the necessary 
measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the Libyan authorities,  or  of  any  person  or  
body  in  the  Libyan  Arab  Jamahiriya,  or  of  any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such 
person or body, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was affected 
by reason of  the  measures  taken  by  the  Security  Council  in  resolution  1970  (2011),  this resolution 
and related resolutions; 
 
28. Reaffirms its intention to keep the actions of the Libyan authorities under continuous 
review and underlines its readiness to review at any time the measures imposed by this resolution and 
resolution 1970 (2011), including by strengthening, suspending or lifting  those measures,  as appropriate,  
based  on compliance by the Libyan authorities with this resolution and resolution 1970 (2011). 
 
29. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter. 
 
Designations 
 
22. Decides  that  the  individuals  listed  in Annex  I  shall  be  subject  to  the travel 
restrictions imposed in paragraphs 15 and 16 of resolution 1970 (2011), and decides further that the 
individuals and entities listed in Annex II shall be subject to the asset freeze imposed in paragraphs 17, 
19, 20 and 21 of resolution 1970 (2011); 
 
23. Decides that the measures specified in paragraphs 15, 16, 17, 19, 20 and 
21 of resolution 1970 (2011) shall apply also to individuals and entities determined by the Council or 
the Committee to have violated the provisions of resolution 1970.
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Draft Resolution on Syria (Vetoed)  
United Nations S/2011/612 
 
    Security Council Distr.: General 
4 October 2011 
 
Original: English 
 
 
France, Germany, Portugal and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland: draft resolution 
 
The Security Council, 
 
Expressing grave concern at the situation in Syria, 
 
Recalling its Presidential Statement of 3 August, 
 
Welcoming the Secretary-General’s statements articulating continued concerns about   the   ongoing   
violence   and   humanitarian   needs,   calling   on   the   Syrian Government  to  halt  its  violent  offensive  
at  once,  calling  for  an  independent investigation  of  all  human  rights  violations  during  recent  
demonstrations,   and stressing the need to hold to account those responsible for human rights violations, 
 
Noting    Human    Rights    Council’s    report    of   its   17th    Special    session (A/HRC/S-17/1), 
including the decision to dispatch an independent international commission of inquiry  to investigate all 
alleged violations of international human rights law since March 2011 in Syria, 
 
Recalling   the   Syrian   Government’s   primary   responsibility   to  protect   its population, and the 
Secretary-General’s call for the Syrian Government to allow unhindered and sustained access for 
 humanitarian aid and humanitarian organizations, welcoming OCHA’s 
humanitarian assessment mission and urging the Syrian authorities to cooperate comprehensively with the 
United Nations, 
 
Stressing  that  the  only  solution  to  the  current  crisis  in  Syria  is  through  an inclusive and Syrian-
led political process with the aim of effectively addressing the legitimate  aspirations  and  concerns  of  the  
population  which  will  allow  the  full exercise of fundamental freedoms for its entire population, including 
of the rights of freedom  of  expression,  assembly  and  peaceful  protest,  and  further  stressing  that such a 
political process can only be advanced through an environment free from any sort of violence, fear and 
intimidation, 
 
Noting  the announced commitments by the Syrian authorities to reform,  and 
regretting the lack of progress in implementation, 
 
Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national 
unity of Syria, 
 
Deeply concerned by the continuing deterioration of the situation in Syria and the  potential  for  
further  escalation  of  the  violence,  and  reaffirming  the  need  to resolve the current crisis in Syria 
peacefully, 
 
Welcoming the engagement of the Secretary-General and the League of Arab States, and all other 
diplomatic efforts aimed at addressing this situation, including those of Turkey, Russia,  Brazil, India,  
South Africa,  and  regretting  the lack  of a substantive response by the Syrian authorities to these demands, 
 
1. Strongly  condemns  the  continued  grave  and  systematic  human  rights violations  and  
the  use  of  force  against  civilians  by  the  Syrian  authorities,  and expresses profound regret at the deaths 
of thousands of people including women and children; 
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2. Demands  an immediate end to all violence and urges all sides to reject violence and 
extremism; 
 
3. Recalls   that   those   responsible   for   all   violence   and   human   rights violations 
should be held accountable; 
 
4. Demands that the Syrian authorities immediately: 
 
(a) cease  violations  of  human  rights,  comply  with  their  obligations  under applicable 
international law, and cooperate fully with the office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights; 
 
(b) allow the full exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms by its entire 
population, including rights of freedom of expression and peaceful assembly, release   all   political   
prisoners   and   detained   peaceful   demonstrators,   and   lift restrictions on all forms of media; 
 
(c) cease the use of force against civilians; 
 
(d) alleviate the humanitarian situation in crisis areas, including by allowing expeditious, 
unhindered  and sustained access for internationally recognized human rights monitors,  humanitarian  
agencies  and  workers,  and  restoring  basic  services including access to hospitals; 
 
(e) ensure the safe and voluntary return of those who have fled the violence to their homes; 
 
5. Calls  for  an  inclusive  Syrian-led  political  process  conducted  in  an environment free  
from  violence,  fear,  intimidation,  and  extremism,  and  aimed  at effectively addressing the legitimate 
aspirations and concerns of Syria’s population, and encourages the Syrian opposition and all sections of 
Syrian society to contribute to such a process; 
 
6. Requests    the   Secretary-General    to   continue    to   urge   the   Syrian Government to 
implement paragraphs 2 and 4 above, including by appointing at the appropriate time a Special  Envoy  in 
consultation  with  the  Security  Council,  and encourages all States and regional organizations to contribute 
to this objective; 
 
7. Encourages  in this regard the League of Arab states to continue  efforts aimed at ending 
the violence and promoting  such an inclusive  Syrian-led political process; 
 
8. Strongly  condemns  attacks   on  diplomatic   personnel  and  recalls   the fundamental 
principle of the inviolability  of diplomatic  agents and the obligations on  host   States,  including   under   
the  1961  Vienna  Convention   on  Diplomatic Relations,  to  take  all  appropriate  steps  to  protect  
embassy  premises  and  prevent attacks on diplomatic agents; 
 
 
9. Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance and restraint over the direct or indirect supply, 
sale or transfer to Syria of arms and related materiel of all types, as well as technical training, financial 
resources or services, advice, or other services or assistance related to such arms and related materiel; 
 
10. Requests   the  Secretary-General  to  report  on  implementation   of  this resolution within 
30 days of its adoption and every 30 days thereafter; 
 
11. Expresses   its   intention   to   review   Syria’s   implementation   of   this resolution  
within  30  days  and  to  consider  its  options,  including  measures  under Article 41 of the Charter of the 
United Nations; 
 
12. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter. 
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THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF 
PROVINCES QUESTION FOR 
WRITTEN REPLY 
390. Mr K A Sinclair (COPE-NC) to ask the Minister of Trade and Industry: 
 
Whether his department has any plans to address the R23.7 billion trade deficit that has been  incurred  as a 
result of the trade between South Africa and China in the 2010-11 financial year; if not, what is the 
position in this regard; if so, (a) what plans, (b) how will his department address this  deficit and (c) how 
will South Africa’s entry into Brazil, Russia, India and China group affect this deficit? CW489E 
 
 
Response 
 
It is important to consider changes in trade flows with our partners over time. According to 
South Africa’s trade figures, the trade deficit with China has been in decline, moving from  R45.5 
billion in 2008 to R24.5 billion in 2010. It is also important to note that South African trade 
statistics are not consistent with those of China. According to China’s trade  figures, bilateral 
trade is balanced. The discrepancy has to do with differences in the way trade flows are 
recorded. The main reason appears to be that South African authorities record exports to Hong 
Kong and to China separately. Much of our exports to Hong Kong are shipped onwards to 
China, and Chinese authorities as record these as imports into China. 
 
While nominal balances are important to consider, the more important concern in our view  has 
been in the structure of bilateral trade with China. South Africa’s exports are  dominated  by 
low-value  added raw materials while  imports from China are dominated by higher value added, 
manufactured goods. This structure of trade, in our view, is not sustainable in the longer term. 
 
Rectifying  this  pattern  requires  that  we  step  up  our  efforts  on  industrial development   
and  upgrading  as  set  out  in  the  National  Industrial  Policy Framework  and Industrial 
Policy Action Plan. In parallel, we are working with China to encourage  higher value added 
exports from South Africa. Under the Comprehensive  Strategic  Partnership  with  China,  we  
have  an  agreement  to promote higher value added products from South Africa and an 
undertaking for greater investment from China into beneficiation projects in South Africa. 
 
This could be a model for engagement with other BRICS countries and we see enormous   
opportunities to structure   new kinds   of   trade   and   investment agreements with  BRICS  that 
foster complementarities and cooperation  in the industrial, agricultural and  service sectors. 
Appropriately structured preferential 
 
 
trade agreements, procurement arrangements, sectoral cooperative agreements, alongside targeted 
investment and export promotion activities, can help to forge a  trade  relationship  in  which  
South  Africa  will  export  higher  value  added, sophisticated  products   that   embody  higher   
levels  of  technology,  support industrial  upgrading,  and  place  us  on   a   long-term,  
sustainable  economic development path. 
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